Target Information Asymmetry and Acquisition Price

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 976-1016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Cheng ◽  
Lin Li ◽  
Wilson H.S. Tong
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Target Information ◽  
Acquisition Price

scholarly journals Ethics, Adverse Selection, Target Method of Sale Strategies, and Akerlof’s “Lemons” Problem

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Carol L. Cain ◽  
Gary M. Fleischman ◽  
Antonio J. Macias ◽  
Juan Manuel Sanchez
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Merger And Acquisition ◽  
Business And Society ◽  
Target Information ◽  
Market For Lemons ◽  
Strong Positive Relationship ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Lemons Problem

This study examines the acquisition dynamics associated with the target management’s choice to initiate the sale of the firm using the auction method. Specifically, we examine opportunistic merger and acquisition (M&A) dynamics related to the target-initiated method-of-sale decision (auctions vs. one-on-one negotiations), as a noteworthy example of Akerlof’s (1970) theory of the market for lemons. While we find a strong positive relationship between proxies of adverse selection risk and the likelihood of target initiation, robustness tests suggest target initiation itself is a unique indicator of information asymmetry in an acquisition environment. We also find that most target-initiated transactions follow an auction as the method of sale, which increases target information asymmetry advantages. While wealth accrued to both bidders and targets increases in non-target-initiated auctions, this benefit disappears when the target initiates the acquisition, causing both bidders and targets to suffer wealth losses. According to Akerlof’s theory, these wealth losses represent the cost of perceived dishonesty due to enhanced adverse section risk, which provides noteworthy implications for both business and society.

Central Hub M&A Advisors

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred Yawson ◽  
Huizhong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Abnormal Returns ◽  
Investment Banks ◽  
Specific Information ◽  
Equity Issuance ◽  
Target Information ◽  
Information Advantage ◽  
Central Network

Abstract We examine how an M&A advisor’s position in the network of investment banks affects its ability to create value for acquirers in takeover transactions. We show that acquirers enlisting the services of more centrally positioned M&A advisors enjoy higher announcement abnormal returns and pay lower takeover premiums. Consistent with the idea that central network positions convey an information advantage, we find that the effects are stronger for acquirers facing greater target information asymmetry and for M&A advisors depending more on networks for target-specific information. The information advantage primarily comes from network contacts that had previously assisted the targets in equity issuance. Centrally positioned advisors charge premium fees; network banks appear to enjoy a significant advantage in the competition for future co-advisory appointments.

IPO of SMEs and Information Asymmetry

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-188
Author(s):  
Joo-Hwan Kim ◽  
Jin-Woo Park
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry

Blockchain in Supply Chain: Case Study of Lottemart Ciputat

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. K. Handoyo ◽  
M. R. Mashudi ◽  
H. P. Ipung
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
New Technology ◽  
Business Case ◽  
Analysis Method ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
Production Processes

Current supply chain methods are having difficulties in resolving problems arising from the lack of trust in supply chains. The root reason lies in two challenges brought to the traditional mechanism: self-interests of supply chain members and information asymmetry in production processes. Blockchain is a promising technology to address these problems. The key objective of this paper is to present qualitative analysis for blockchain in supply chain as the decision-making framework to implement this new technology. The analysis method used Val IT business case framework, validated by the expert judgements. The further study needs to be elaborated by either the existing organization that use blockchain or assessment by the organization that will use blockchain to improve their supply chain management.

PENGARUH PARTISIPASI ANGGARAN, ASIMETRI INFORMASI, TEKANAN ANGGARAN DAN KOMITMEN ORGANISASI TERHADAP SENJANGAN ANGGARAN DI PEMERINTAH KABUPATEN BANYUMAS

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-153
Author(s):  
Ody Tegar Permana ◽  
Eliada Herwiyanti ◽  
I Wayan Mustika
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Commitment ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Linear Regression Analysis ◽  
Sample Selection ◽  
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis ◽  
Budgetary Slack ◽  
Budgetary Participation ◽  
Independent Variable ◽  
Spss Software ◽  
Government Institution

This study aims to determine the effect of budgetary participation, information asymmetry, budget pressure, and organizational commitment to budgetary slack. Population in this research is all government institution in Banyumas Regency. The sample selection was conducted by census method. Dependent variable used in this research is budget slack, while the independent variable used in this research is budget participation, information asymmetry, budget pressure, and organizational commitment. The data has been collected through questionnaires, then processed with the help of SPSS software. Based on the results of multiple linear regression analysis concluded that budgetary participation, information asymmetry, and organizational commitment affect the budget slack while budget pressure has no effect. The results of this study increasingly complement previous studies in the field of management accounting, especially in the scope of budgeting.   Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh partisipasi anggaran, asimetri informasi, tekanan anggaran, dan komitmen organisasi terhadap senjangan anggaran. Populasi dalam penelitian ini adalah seluruh instansi pemerintahan di Kabupaten Banyumas. Pemilihan sampel dilakukan dengan metode sensus. Variabel dependen yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah senjangan anggaran, sedangkan variabel independen yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah partisipasi anggaran, asimetri informasi, tekanan anggaran, dan komitmen organisasi. Data yang telah dikumpulkan melalui isian kuesioner, selanjutnya diolah dengan bantuan software SPSS. Berdasarkan hasil analisis regresi linear berganda disimpulkan bahwa partisipasi anggaran, asimetri informasi, dan komitmen organisasi berpengaruh terhadap senjangan anggaran sedangkan tekanan anggaran tidak berpengaruh. Hasil penelitian ini semakin melengkapi penelitian-penelitian sebelumnya di bidang akuntansi manajemen khususnya di lingkup penganggaran.

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