scholarly journals Reasonable Disagreement About, and Within, Watson and Hartley’s Political Liberalism

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 836-845
Author(s):  
Paul Billingham
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Reasonable Disagreement

scholarly journals Epistemic Foundations of Political Liberalism

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 598-620 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabienne Peter
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Reasonable Disagreement ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Core ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Third Person

At the core of political liberalism is the claim that political institutions must be publicly justified or justifiable to be legitimate. What explains the significance of public justification? The main argument that defenders of political liberalism present is an argument from disagreement: the irreducible pluralism that is characteristic of democratic societies requires a mode of justification that lies in between a narrowly political solution based on actual acceptance and a traditional moral solution based on justification from the third-person perspective. But why should we take disagreements seriously? This—epistemic question—has not received the attention it deserves so far. I argue that the significance of public justification can be explained through the possibility of reasonable disagreement. In a reasonable disagreement, the parties hold mutually incompatible beliefs, but each is justified to hold the belief they do. I shall use the notion of a reasonable disagreement to explain the possibility of an irreducible pluralism of moral and religious doctrines and, on that basis, why the justification of political institutions has to be public.

scholarly journals Political Liberalism and Political Community

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
RJ Leland ◽  
Han van Wietmarschen
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Political Community ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
Reciprocity Principle ◽  
Reasonable Disagreement ◽  
Main Obstacle ◽  
Standard Argument ◽  
Civic Friendship ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
Political Decisions

We provide a justification for political liberalism’s Reciprocity Principle, which states that political decisions must be justified exclusively on the basis of considerations that all reasonable citizens can reasonably be expected to accept. The standard argument for the Reciprocity Principle grounds it in a requirement of respect for persons. We argue for a different, but compatible, justification: the Reciprocity Principle is justified because it makes possible a desirable kind of political community. The general endorsement of the Reciprocity Principle, we will argue, helps realize joint political rule and relationships of civic friendship. The main obstacle to the realization of these values is the presence of reasonable disagreement about religious, moral, and philosophical issues characteristic of liberal societies. We show the Reciprocity Principle helps to overcome this obstacle.

Process Philosophy and Political Liberalism

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel A. Dombrowski
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Process Philosophy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Nonhuman Animals ◽  
Static View ◽  
Process Oriented ◽  
The Right ◽  
Political Right

In this work two key theses are defended: political liberalism is a processual (rather than a static) view and process thinkers should be political liberals. Three major figures are considered (Rawls, Whitehead, Hartshorne) in the effort to show the superiority of political liberalism to its illiberal alternatives on the political right and left. Further, a politically liberal stance regarding nonhuman animals and the environment is articulated. It is typical for debates in political philosophy to be adrift regarding the concept of method, but from start to finish this book relies on the processual method of reflective equilibrium or dialectic at its best. This is the first extended effort to argue for both political liberalism as a process-oriented view and process philosophy/theology as a politically liberal view. It is also a timely defense of political liberalism against illiberal tendencies on both the right and the left.

Conclusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Political Values ◽  
State Action ◽  
Substantive Content ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Equal Citizenship

The conclusion stresses that the argument for the view that political liberalism is a feminist liberalism depends on claims made about the substantive content of free and equal citizenship and how this conception of citizenship limits and shapes what kinds of state action can be justified to others. Some may charge that the position defended in the book is actually a comprehensive liberalism, not a political liberalism. This objection is addressed in the conclusion as well as the inability of political liberalism to address certain egalitarian commitments that may be part of some feminist comprehensive doctrines. It is argued that our view does not amount to a partially comprehensive liberalism, as the view rests on political values that are part of the idea of constitutional democracy and the demands of citizenship within such societies.

Integrity and the Case for Restraint

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Moral Ideal ◽  
Democratic Societies

This chapter discusses the concern that exclusive accounts of public reason threaten or undermine the integrity of some religiously oriented citizens in democratic societies. It discusses various notions of integrity that might be claimed to ground such a concern. It is argued that purely formal accounts of integrity that do not distinguish between the integrity of reasonable and unreasonable persons, as specified within political liberalism, cannot underwrite integrity challenges that should concern political liberals. It is further argued that if the inquiry is limited to conceptions of integrity that distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable persons, the supposed burdens persons of faith face are not burdens different from those that all citizens face equally. It is claimed the concern is best understood as a challenge to the account of public justification and the account of public reason as a moral ideal.

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