An iterative combinatorial auction design for fractional ownership of autonomous vehicles

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aigerim Bogyrbayeva ◽  
Mahdi Takalloo ◽  
Hadi Charkhgard ◽  
Changhyun Kwon
Keyword(s):  
Autonomous Vehicles ◽  
Combinatorial Auction ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Fractional Ownership

Combinatorial Auction Design

2003 ◽  
Vol 49 (11) ◽  
pp. 1485-1503 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Pekeč ◽  
Michael H. Rothkopf
Keyword(s):  
Combinatorial Auction ◽  
Auction Design

scholarly journals Combinatorial Auction Design for Real-Estate Markets

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dries Goossens ◽  
Sander Onderstal ◽  
Frits Spieksma ◽  
Jan Pijnacker
Keyword(s):  
Real Estate ◽  
Combinatorial Auction ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Real Estate Markets

scholarly journals The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-140
Author(s):  
Lawrence M. Ausubel ◽  
Peter Cramton ◽  
Paul R. Milgrom
Keyword(s):  
Combinatorial Auction ◽  
Auction Design

Generalized Stable User Matching for Autonomous Vehicle Co-Ownership Programs

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 61-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anpeng Zhang ◽  
Jee Eun Kang ◽  
Changhyun Kwon
Keyword(s):  
Autonomous Vehicles ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Autonomous Vehicle ◽  
Stable Matching ◽  
Computational Time ◽  
Combinatorial Properties ◽  
Fractional Ownership ◽  
Shared Mobility ◽  
New Form

We investigate a new form of car-sharing system that can be introduced in the market for autonomous vehicles called fractional ownership or co-ownership. Although dynamic ride sharing provides ad hoc shared mobility services without any long-term commitment, we consider co-ownership programs with which users can still “own” a car with committed usage and ownership. We assume that an autonomous vehicle is shared by a group of users, which is only accessible by the group. We use stable matching to help users find an appropriate group with which to share an autonomous vehicle and present a generalized stable matching model that allows flexible sizes of groups as well as various alternative objectives. We also present a heuristic algorithm to improve computational time owing to the combinatorial properties of the problem.

scholarly journals The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design

2005 ◽  
pp. 115-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence M. Ausubel ◽  
Peter Cramton ◽  
Paul Milgrom
Keyword(s):  
Combinatorial Auction ◽  
Auction Design

scholarly journals Combinatorial Auction Design

2017 ◽  
pp. 111-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Porter ◽  
Stephen J. Rassenti ◽  
Anil Roopnarine ◽  
Vernon L. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Combinatorial Auction ◽  
Auction Design

scholarly journals Combinatorial auction design

2003 ◽  
Vol 100 (19) ◽  
pp. 11153-11157 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Porter ◽  
S. Rassenti ◽  
A. Roopnarine ◽  
V. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Combinatorial Auction ◽  
Auction Design
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