Retailers' endogenous sequencing game and information acquisition game in the presence of information leakage

Yongjae Kim

doi:10.1111/itor.12844

Retailers' endogenous sequencing game and information acquisition game in the presence of information leakage

International Transactions in Operational Research ◽

10.1111/itor.12844 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 28 (2) ◽

pp. 809-838

Author(s):

Yongjae Kim

Keyword(s):

Information Acquisition ◽

Information Leakage ◽

Sequencing Game

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Information sharing and leakage in the two-echelon supply chain

RAIRO - Operations Research ◽

10.1051/ro/2019066 ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

Jingru Wang ◽

Zhiyuan Zhen ◽

Qiang Yan

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Information Sharing ◽

Information Acquisition ◽

Information Leakage ◽

High Signal ◽

Market Demand ◽

Retail Competition ◽

Ex Post ◽

Private Signals ◽

Demand Information

We consider ex post demand information sharing and leakage in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and two retailers competing in quantities. The incumbent retailer has an advantage to acquire information about the market at a cost. If he invests in information acquisition, he privately acquires a signal about the market demand. We examine the incumbent’s incentive of information acquisition and sharing, and the upstream supplier’s information leakage strategy. We confirm that the incumbent’s information acquisition and sharing decisions depend on whether the information acquisition is observable. When it is observable, the incumbent fully shares his private signals even though the shared high signal may hurt him. However, when it is unobservable, the incumbent can share the favorable signal (low signal) and withhold the unfavorable signal (high signal). Moreover, we also find that the supplier will always leak the signal to the entrant no matter what signal she acquires. In addition, we demonstrate under the information sharing and leakage strategy, it may benefit the whole supply chain when the retail competition intensity is not very large.

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Quantifying Decoherence via Increases in Classicality

Entropy ◽

10.3390/e23121594 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 23 (12) ◽

pp. 1594

Author(s):

Shuangshuang Fu ◽

Shunlong Luo

Keyword(s):

Information Acquisition ◽

Open Systems ◽

Superposition Principle ◽

Information Leakage ◽

Direct Consequence ◽

Information Theoretic ◽

Classical Transition ◽

Quantum Mutual Information ◽

System Information ◽

Century Development

As a direct consequence of the interplay between the superposition principle of quantum mechanics and the dynamics of open systems, decoherence is a recurring theme in both foundational and experimental exploration of the quantum realm. Decoherence is intimately related to information leakage of open systems and is usually formulated in the setup of “system + environment” as information acquisition of the environment (observer) from the system. As such, it has been mainly characterized via correlations (e.g., quantum mutual information, discord, and entanglement). Decoherence combined with redundant proliferation of the system information to multiple fragments of environment yields the scenario of quantum Darwinism, which is now a widely recognized framework for addressing the quantum-to-classical transition: the emergence of the apparent classical reality from the enigmatic quantum substrate. Despite the half-century development of the notion of decoherence, there are still many aspects awaiting investigations. In this work, we introduce two quantifiers of classicality via the Jordan product and uncertainty, respectively, and then employ them to quantify decoherence from an information-theoretic perspective. As a comparison, we also study the influence of the system on the environment.

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