Impact of social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-79
Author(s):  
Armando Sacco ◽  
Georges Zaccour
Keyword(s):  
Exploratory Analysis ◽  
International Environmental Agreement ◽  
Environmental Agreement

Part VIII Compliance, Implementation, and Effectiveness, Ch.51 Compliance Theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitchell Ronald B
Keyword(s):  
International Environmental Agreement ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Causal Influence ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
Highly Effective ◽  
Environmental Agreement ◽  
Induced Compliance

This chapter describes the conceptual and theoretical challenges raised by efforts to understand international environmental agreement (IEA) compliance and effectiveness. Both compliance and non-compliance can arise for reasons unrelated to an IEA's causal influence. Equating IEA compliance (comparing state behaviours to legal standards) with IEA influence can overstate the latter by conflating IEA-induced compliance and ‘coincidental’ compliance, in which state behaviours meet IEA standards for reasons unrelated to the IEA. States may negotiate IEA obligations that require no change in their behaviours, may comply because doing so is cheaper than violation, or may lack the capacity to violate IEA rules. Equating non-compliance with a lack of IEA influence also misleads because it ignores the fact that IEAs can lead states to take well-intended actions that fall short of legal standards, as when IEAs set ambitious obligations or exogenous changes put compliance out of reach. Indeed, IEAs with aggressive obligations may be highly effective despite having high non-compliance rates. Thus, the chapter argues that investigations of compliance improve to the extent that scholars use them to identify the causal influence of IEAs rather than a causal assessment of rule-following.

scholarly journals Free Trade, Autarky And The Sustainability Of An International Environmental Agreement

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hassan Benchekroun ◽  
Halis Murat Yildiz
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Policy ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Environmental Damage ◽  
International Environmental Agreement ◽  
Trigger Strategies ◽  
Environmental Agreement ◽  
Net Benefits ◽  
The One ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Opening Up

We determine the impact of free trade on the sustainability of an international environmental agreement (IEA) and incorporate it into the assessment of the net benefits of opening up to free trade. We show that such an analysis can reverse the conclusions reached within a standard one-shot game framework. First, we examine a one shot game and argue that the benefits from an increase in economic activity due to free trade outweigh the extra cost of free trade associated with larger environmental damage. Then, we analyze the infinite repetition of the one-shot game where countries can use trigger strategies and show that there exist circumstances where an IEA is sustainable under autarky but not under free trade. This aggravates the environmental damages caused by free trade and leads to the possibility that autarky may welfare dominate free trade. This conclusion remains valid even when countries adopt the most cooperative environmental policy when the "fully cooperative" environmental policy is not sustainable.

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