Are Incentive Contract Settlements Nonevents?*

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 983-992
Author(s):  
Marie‐Hélène Gagnon ◽  
Aurélien Philippot
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Contract

The Effects of Contract Framing on Misconduct and Entitlement

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer E. Nichol
Keyword(s):  
Data Availability ◽  
Incentive Contract ◽  
Contract Framing ◽  
Sense Of Entitlement

ABSTRACT This study examines the effects of incentive contract framing on misreporting and entitlement. I conduct a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment, manipulating incentive contract framing (Bonus/Penalty) and the awareness of the opportunity to misreport (Before Effort/After Effort). I predict and find that (1) penalty contracts cause a higher rate and degree of misreporting, and (2) this greater misreporting occurs due to a greater sense of entitlement to the incentive funds. Collectively, this study's theory and results indicate that while penalty contracts can sometimes increase effort relative to bonus contracts, they also encourage greater dishonesty in reporting when that effort is not successful. Data Availability: Contact the author.

Incentive contract design in competing distribution channels

2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 295-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Changxian Liu ◽  
Houping Tian ◽  
Jianping Sun ◽  
Desheng Dash Wu
Keyword(s):  
Contract Design ◽  
Distribution Channels ◽  
Incentive Contract
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