scholarly journals Why central banks announcing liquidity injections is more effective than forward guidance

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Baumgärtner ◽  
Jens Klose
Keyword(s):  
Central Banks ◽  
Forward Guidance

The Over-Burdened Central Bank and the Shift Away from Autonomy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre L. Siklos
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Self Assessments ◽  
Crisis Conditions ◽  
Central Bankers ◽  
Influence Behavior

Many central banks took on additional responsibilities. Inadequate self-assessments remain unfinished almost a decade after the crisis erupted. Government-central bank relationships need to be conditioned on whether times are normal versus crisis conditions. Transparency confronts ambiguity when central banks must communicate the outlook and the conditionality of their decisions. Forward guidance was taken too far and ended up being futile. Central bankers simply exhausted their ability to influence behavior through mere words or ambiguous statements. This is a self-inflicted wound for institutions that are seen as overburdened. These forces leave central banking more vulnerable than is commonly acknowledged. Squaring the conventional objectives of monetary policy with the unclear aims of financial stability is difficult. Adequate limitations on the authority of central banks have yet to be thoroughly debated. We are nowhere near resolving the inherent tensions between old and new sets of central bank objectives.

scholarly journals Does Forward Guidance Matter in Small Open Economies? Examples from Europe

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Jakub Rybacki
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Term Structure ◽  
Open Economies ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Small Open Economies ◽  
Forecast Horizon ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
European Economies

The effect of forward guidance on interest rate expectations in small, open economies is often described as heterogeneous. There are examples when financial markets adjusted term structure to reflect interest rate forecasts provided in the projections published by the central banks. On the other hand, medium-term expectations can persistently deviate from trajectories presented by decision-makers, influenced by foreign monetary policy. Our aim is to find the maximal forecast horizon where the domestic forward guidance of local banks in European economies affects market interest rate expectations strongly as compared to the ECB policy. We analyzed the term structure of interest rates in Sweden, Norway, and the Czech Republic. Central banks in these three economies provide the most mature forward guidance, e.g., regularly publishing interest rate forecasts with detailed discussions. The three-month interbank rate path calculated with the Nelson-Siegel model was contrasted with both the trajectory of policy rates presented in central bank projections and that implied by the three-month EURIBOR. We found that interest rate expectations were more influenced by ECB policy than by domestic assumptions when the forecast horizon exceeds four quarters.

scholarly journals Ewolucja zmian i zadania banków centralnych w świetle doświadczeń kryzysu finansowego

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-50
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Alińska ◽  
Bogusław Pietrzak ◽  
Katarzyna Wasiak
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Communication Policy ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Monetary Authorities ◽  
Effective Instrument ◽  
Targeting Strategy

Communication policy of central banks in the framework of direct inflation targeting strategy and related strategies is important. Its tools include forward guidance as a method of influencing the expectations of market participants. Although forward guidance was used before the outbreak of the financial crisis, it was not popular. After 2008, under conditions of zero interest rate, monetary authorities have begun After 2008, under conditions of zero interest rate, monetary authorities have begun to use the forward guidance as an unconventional and effective instrument allowing monetary policy to have impact on market interest rates. However, the riskswhen using forward guidance include the possibility of misinterpretation of the conditional nature of the declaration of the monetary authorities.

Central Bank Planning

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Braun
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Structural Break ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
State Agency ◽  
Policy Interventions ◽  
Forward Guidance

Central banks have increasingly used communication to guide market actors’ expectations of future rates of interest, inflation, and growth. However, aware of the pitfalls of (financial) central planning, central bankers until recently drew a line by restricting their monetary policy interventions to short-term interest rates. Longer-term rates, they argued, reflected decentralized knowledge and should be determined by market forces. By embracing forward guidance and quantitative easing (QE) to target long-term rates, central banks have crossed that line. While consistent with the post-1980s expansion of the temporal reach of monetary policy further into the future, these unconventional policies nevertheless mark a structural break—the return of hydraulic macroeconomic state agency, refashioned for a financialized economy. This chapter analyses the theoretical and practical reasoning behind this shift in the governability paradigm and examines the epistemic and reputational costs of modern central bank planning and the non-market setting of long-term bond prices.

Central Bank Communication

2019 ◽  
pp. 230-262
Author(s):  
Jakob de Haan ◽  
Jan-Egbert Sturm
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Inflation Expectations ◽  
Short Term ◽  
The Public ◽  
Central Bank Communication ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
The World ◽  
Future Direction

Many central banks in the world nowadays regard their external communication as an important tool to achieve their goals. This chapter provides an overview of the different ways in which central banks inform the public about the future direction of monetary policy and how successful they have been in recent years. Forward guidance is either part of a monetary policy strategy in which an explicit inflation target is targeted or is part of a strategy that attempts to circumvent the effective lower bound regarding the nominal interest rate. In both cases, forward guidance attempts to influence longer-term interest rates and inflation expectations through the expected future short-term interest rates.

scholarly journals Monetary Policy Transparency

2014 ◽  
pp. 67-97
Author(s):  
Petra Geraats
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Private Sector ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Empirical Measures ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
The World ◽  
Monetary Policy Transparency

This chapter examines transparency as a key feature of monetary policymaking by central banks around the world. It begins by presenting a conceptual framework for transparency and reviewing empirical measures, practices, and trends in monetary policy transparency. It then looks at theory regarding macroeconomic transparency as well as relevant empirical evidence. It also considers two ways in which monetary policy has become more transparent: the publication of macroeconomic forecasts and analysis and the disclosure of forward guidance about policy actions. The chapter illustrates how transparency allows the private sector to align its expectations with those of the central bank, making monetary policy more effective in the process.

scholarly journals Forward Guidance and Heterogeneous Beliefs

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Andrade ◽  
Gaetano Gaballo ◽  
Eric Mengus ◽  
Benoît Mojon
Keyword(s):  
Economic Activity ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Heterogeneous Beliefs ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Survey Of Professional Forecasters ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Guidance Policy ◽  
The Cost

Central banks’ announcements that rates are expected to remain low could signal either a weak macroeconomic outlook, which would slow expenditures, or a more accommodative stance, which may stimulate economic activity. We use the Survey of Professional Forecasters to show that, when the Fed gave guidance between 2011:III and 2012:IV, these two interpretations coexisted despite a consensus on low expected rates. We rationalize these facts in a New-Keynesian model where heterogeneous beliefs introduce a trade-off in forward guidance policy: leveraging on the optimism of those who believe in monetary easing comes at the cost of inducing excess pessimism in non-believers. (JEL D83, E12, E43, E52, E58, E65)

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