scholarly journals The bargaining set and coalition formation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken‐Ichi Shimomura
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Bargaining Set

scholarly journals A Bargaining Set Based on External and Internal Stability and Endogenous Coalition Formation

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emiliya A. Lazarova ◽  
Peter E. M. Borm ◽  
Maria Montero ◽  
Hans Reijnierse
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Internal Stability ◽  
Bargaining Set

Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players

1979 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amnon Rapoport ◽  
James P. Kahan ◽  
Sandra G. Funk ◽  
Abraham D. Horowitz
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation

Minority Presidents in a Coalitional World

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Chaisty ◽  
Nic Cheeseman ◽  
Timothy J. Power
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Cost Minimization ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
System Level ◽  
Current State ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter summarizes the main parameters of coalitional presidentialism and the key concepts, definitions, explanatory frameworks, indicators, and propositions. It summarizes our understanding of coalitional presidentialism; the distinction between coalition formation and maintenance; the definition of coalitions; the multidimensional understanding of coalition management (the ‘presidential toolbox’); and an analytical framework that emphasizes the motivation of presidents to achieve cost minimization under constraints determined by system-level, coalition-level, and conjunctural factors. It also summarizes our main empirical findings: (1) the characteristics of presidential tools, (2) the substantive patterns of their deployment, (3) the factors that shape the costs of using these tools, (4) the actual (observed) costs of using them, and (5) the potential for imperfect substitutability of these tools. Finally, it concludes with some reflections on the current state of the research on comparative presidentialism.

scholarly journals On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (04) ◽  
pp. 1550008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bezalel Peleg ◽  
Peter Sudhölter
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Set ◽  
Ntu Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Ntu Game ◽  
Bargaining Sets

We show that the Aumann–Davis–Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-leveled NTU game that is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an example that the foregoing statement may not be valid if the NTU game is marginal convex.

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