Corporate cannibalism in an oligopolistic market

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xingtang Wang ◽  
Leonard F. S. Wang
Keyword(s):  
Oligopolistic Market

Recalibrating the governance of remedial clauses in contract law

2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-455
Author(s):  
Moshood Abdussalam
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Market Structures ◽  
Modern Times ◽  
Oligopolistic Market ◽  
Commercial Networks

Yawning gaps in bargaining powers between transacting parties have always been a source of concern in commercial relations and the legal governance of such relations. In modern times, the likely implications of gaps in bargaining powers are not only palpable as it concerns the affairs of transacting parties with weaker bargaining powers, but also on the welfare of society, at large. That is particularly so in this milieu of pervasive oligopolistic market structures, organised commercial networks, digitisation, and big data. The imperative to guard against the use of contractually agreed remedial clauses to consolidate market power and as tools for wealth extraction is the concern of this article. To this end, this article makes a case for a recalibration of the rule against penalties in contract law.

Consumers’ Misevaluation and Public Promotion

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Atsushi Yamagishi
Keyword(s):  
Welfare Loss ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Free Entry ◽  
Opposite Result ◽  
True Value ◽  
Oligopolistic Market ◽  
Public Econ ◽  
The Government

Abstract: I analyze markets in which consumers may misestimate the true value of goods and the government can affect the valuation through public promotion. When entry of firms is not allowed, the government makes consumers overvalue the goods to mitigate welfare loss from underproduction in an oligopolistic market, provided that the promotion cost is sufficiently low. On the contrary, in a free-entry market, no matter how low the promotion cost is, the government may make consumers undervalue them in order not to induce wasteful entries despite the remaining underproduction problem. In addition, my result in a free-entry market suggests that the main finding of Glaeser and Ujhelyi (J Public Econ 94: 247-257, 2010)crucially depends on the barriers to entry and the opposite result may be obtained under free entry.

scholarly journals Economising, Strategising and the Vertical Boundaries of the firm

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dermot Leahy ◽  
Catia Montagna
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Mode ◽  
Industrial Economics ◽  
Boundaries Of The Firm ◽  
Oligopolistic Market ◽  
Marginal Production ◽  
International Trading ◽  
Strategic Incentives ◽  
Oligopolistic Market Structure

AbstractWe bridge the organisational economics and industrial economics literatures on the vertical boundaries of the firm by contextualising the transaction cost approach to the make-or-buy decision within an oligopolistic market structure. Firms invest in the quality of the intermediate resulting in the endogenous determination of the price of the intermediate and marginal production cost of the final good. We highlight new strategic incentives to outsource and/or vertically integrate and show how these incentives can result in asymmetric-mode-of-operations, investment and costs. We apply our model to a number of different international trading setups.

Turning Over the Keys: Public Prisons, Private Equity, and the Normalization of Markets Behind Bars

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Jacob Swanson ◽  
Mary Fainsod Katzenstein
Keyword(s):  
Private Equity ◽  
People Of Color ◽  
Market Force ◽  
Traditional Role ◽  
Social Mechanism ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Loved One ◽  
Oligopolistic Market ◽  
Economic Functioning

In recent decades, public prisons and jails have increasingly outsourced operational functions by “turning over the keys” to private business and, more recently and specifically, to private equity. By the early 2000s, private equity-owned corporations had entered the core sectors of prison and jail operations, creating “markets behind bars” in telecommunications, commissary sales, health provision, and a range of other services. Two decades later, they have become a quasi-oligopolistic market force across the carceral economy. Reacting to these developments, scholars and activists have explored how private firms generate profits by extracting resources from families of the incarcerated. Less explored is the fact that it is often and particularly private equity firms that partner with public carceral institutions in these extractive practices. In this reflection, we propose a three-part schematic for understanding how such partnerships, with their attendant predation on the poor and people of color, have become normalized. We focus, first, on the mechanism of bureaucracy through which mutual profit-making by public and private entities becomes regularized; second, we explore the legal mechanisms—the apparently small but potent and politically unexamined legal maneuvers—that enable the redirection of family resources beyond the support of a loved one to the operational needs of jails and prisons; finally, we trace the role of gender as a social mechanism through which private equity and its prison/jail partners rely simultaneously on women’s traditional role as caretaker and non-traditional role as primary breadwinner. We show that all three mechanisms are crucial to the economic functioning of the carceral state.

Conclusions

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker R. Berghahn
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War I ◽  
The United States ◽  
Late Nineteenth Century ◽  
Attitudes And Practices ◽  
Merger Wave ◽  
Oligopolistic Market ◽  
Late Nineteenth ◽  
Market Organization ◽  
Financial Power

This concluding chapter summarizes the major points of the preceding chapters. For the period up to World War I, it became clear that the elites of the United States, and its businessmen on the East and West coasts in particular, saw their country as a highly dynamic and modern industrial and financial power. Based on the idea of a competitive capitalism, American big business, in the wake of the great merger wave of the late nineteenth century and congressional legislation that had banned the formation of cartels and monopolies, developed in the direction of an oligopolistic market organization. These developments shaped corporate attitudes and practices toward the domestic and international economy from 1900 onward. No less important, the emergence of the United States as a major industrial power stirred Britain and Germany into responses to the American challenge.

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