Bi-cooperative network games: A link-based allocation rule

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Surajit Borkotokey ◽  
Loyimee Gogoi ◽  
Diganta Mukherjee
Keyword(s):  
Allocation Rule ◽  
Cooperative Network ◽  
Network Games

scholarly journals Dynamic cooperative network games with pairwise interactions

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 95-120
Author(s):  
Mariia A. Bulgakova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Network ◽  
Pairwise Interaction ◽  
Cooperative Network ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Network Games ◽  
Pairwise Interactions

This article is an overview of results obtained in the field of dynamic network games with pairwise interaction. The paper provides a summary and analysis of works related to two-stage and multistage nonzero-sum games based on pairwise interaction. The meaning of pairwise interaction is to consider the game as a family of games occurring on a network between pairs of players (vertices of a graph) connected to each other by an edge. The network can be set or formed in the first stage. In the paper, solutions of cooperative pairwise interaction games are also considered.

scholarly journals ALLOCATION RULES WITH OUTSIDE OPTION IN COOPERATION GAMES WITH TIME‐INCONSISTENCY

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-96
Author(s):  
Harald D. Stein
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Allocation Rule ◽  
Network Games ◽  
Myerson Value ◽  
Allocation Rules ◽  
Outside Option ◽  
Coalition Structures ◽  
Dynamic Setting

In game theory agents have the possibility to make binding agreements. The agents are assumed to determine their strategies based on intended but bounded rationality. The field of strategic games provides the possibility to an agent to understand the optimality of his behaviour. In coalition and network games stability, Pareto‐efficiency and fairness of agreements is investigated. The paper shows the relationship between the different fields of game theory in the case of 3 agents. On that basis it shows the ubiquity of time‐inconsistency in dynamic setting due to bounded rationality, deception and environment changes. The paper explains why allocation rules like the Shapley‐based Aumann‐Drèze‐value and the Myerson‐value for coalition structures must be modified in dynamic setting in order to consider the influence of excluded agents, the outside option. An accordingly modified allocation rule is introduced and investigated. It is shown that the “Aumann‐Drèze‐value” and the “Myerson‐value for coalition structures” remains relevant for the case that the switching of the partner is connected with high costs. It is shown through the example of enterprise cooperation in supply chains that low partner switching costs require the introduced allocation rule that considers the outside option. Santrauka Žaidimu teorijoje agentai turi galimybe sudaryti isipareigojančius susitarimus. Agentai, kaip yra mano‐ma, numato savo strategijas riboto racionalumo salygomis. Strateginiu žaidimu sritis sudaro galimybe agentui suvokti optimalios elgsenos krypti. Straipsnyje tyrinejamas ryšys tarp skirtingu žaidimu teo‐rijos sričiu tuo atveju, kai susitarimuose dalyvauja trys agentai. Atskleidžiamas neišvengiamas agentu elgsenos nesuderinamumas del riboto racionalumo, apgavysčiu bei aplinkos pokyčiu. Straipsnyje aiš‐kinama, kad žaidimu teorijos numatomos agentu susitarimu taisykles turetu būti modifikuotos siekiant ivertinti papildomu susitarimu alternatyvu galimybe.

scholarly journals ALLOCATION RULES WITH OUTSIDE OPTION IN COOPERATION GAMES WITH TIME‐INCONSISTENCY

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harald D. Stein
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Allocation Rule ◽  
Network Games ◽  
Myerson Value ◽  
Allocation Rules ◽  
Outside Option ◽  
Coalition Structures ◽  
Dynamic Setting

In game theory agents have the possibility to make binding agreements. The agents are assumed to determine their strategies based on intended but bounded rationality. The field of strategic games provides the possibility to an agent to understand the optimality of his behaviour. In coalition and network games stability, Pareto‐efficiency and fairness of agreements is investigated. The paper shows the relationship between the different fields of game theory in the case of 3 agents. On that basis it shows the ubiquity of time‐inconsistency in dynamic setting due to bounded rationality, deception and environment changes. The paper explains why allocation rules like the Shapley‐based Aumann‐Drèze‐value and the Myerson‐value for coalition structures must be modified in dynamic setting in order to consider the influence of excluded agents, the outside option. An accordingly modified allocation rule is introduced and investigated. It is shown that the “Aumann‐Drèze‐value” and the “Myerson‐value for coalition structures” remains relevant for the case that the switching of the partner is connected with high costs. It is shown through the example of enterprise cooperation in supply chains that low partner switching costs require the introduced allocation rule that considers the outside option. Santrauka Žaidimu teorijoje agentai turi galimybe sudaryti isipareigojančius susitarimus. Agentai, kaip yra mano‐ma, numato savo strategijas riboto racionalumo salygomis. Strateginiu žaidimu sritis sudaro galimybe agentui suvokti optimalios elgsenos krypti. Straipsnyje tyrinejamas ryšys tarp skirtingu žaidimu teo‐rijos sričiu tuo atveju, kai susitarimuose dalyvauja trys agentai. Atskleidžiamas neišvengiamas agentu elgsenos nesuderinamumas del riboto racionalumo, apgavysčiu bei aplinkos pokyčiu. Straipsnyje aiš‐kinama, kad žaidimu teorijos numatomos agentu susitarimu taisykles turetu būti modifikuotos siekiant ivertinti papildomu susitarimu alternatyvu galimybe.

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