NETWORK EFFECTS AND SWITCHING COSTS IN THE US WIRELESS INDUSTRY

Author(s):  
Stefan Weiergraeber
Author(s):  
D.V. Shram ◽  

The article is devoted to the antimonopoly regulation of IT giants` activities. The author presents an overview of the main trends in foreign and Russian legislation in this area. The problems the antimonopoly regulation of digital markets faces are the following: the complexity of determining the criteria for the dominant position of economic entities in the digital economy and the criteria for assessing the economic concentration in the commodity digital markets; the identification and suppression of cartels; the relationship between competition law and intellectual property rights in the digital age. Some aspects of these problems are considered through the prism of the main trends in the antimonopoly policy in the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom and Russia. The investigation findings of the USA House of Representatives Antitrust Subcommittee against Apple, Google, Amazon and Facebook are presented. The author justifies the need to separate them, which requires the adoption of appropriate amendments to the antimonopoly legislation. The article analyzes the draft law of the European Commission on the regulation of digital markets – Digital Markets Act, reveals the criteria for classifying IT companies as «gatekeepers», and notes the specific approaches to antimonopoly regulation in the UK and the US. The article describes the concepts «digital platform» and «network effects», presented in the «fifth antimonopoly package of amendments», developed in 2018 by the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation, and gives an overview of the comments of the Ministry of Economic Development regarding these concepts wording in the text of the draft law, which formed the basis for the negative conclusion of the regulator. It is concluded that in the context of the digital markets’ globalization, there is a need for the international legal nature antitrust norms formation, since regional legislation obviously cannot cope with the monopolistic activities of IT giants.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hemang Subramanian ◽  
Sabyasachi Mitra ◽  
Sam Ransbotham

Business models increasingly depend on inputs from outside traditional organizational boundaries. For example, platforms that generate revenue from advertising, subscription, or referral fees often rely on user-generated content (UGC). But there is considerable uncertainty on how UGC creates value—and who benefits from it—because voluntary user contributions cannot be mandated or contracted or its quality assured through service-level agreements. In fact, high valuations of these platform firms have generated significant interest, debate, and even euphoria among investors and entrepreneurs. Network effects underlie these high valuations; the value of participation for an individual user increases exponentially as more users actively participate. Thus, many platform strategies initially focus on generating usage with the expectation of profits later. This premise is fraught with uncertainty because high current usage may not translate into future profits when switching costs are low. We argue that the type of user-generated content affects switching costs for the user and, thus, affects the value a platform can capture. Using data about the valuation, traffic, and other parameters from several sources, empirical results indicate greater value uncertainty in platforms with user-generated content than in platforms based on firm-generated content. Platform firms are unable to capture the entire value from network effects, but firms with interaction content can better capture value from network effects through higher switching costs than firms with user-contributed content. Thus, we clarify how switching costs enable value for the platform from network effects and UGC in the absence of formal contracts.


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