scholarly journals COMMUNICATION AND MARKET SHARING: AN EXPERIMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF SOFT AND HARD INFORMATION

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Freitag ◽  
Catherine Roux ◽  
Christian Thöni
Keyword(s):  
Hard Information

Strategic Nondisclosure in Takeovers

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Li ◽  
Tingjun Liu ◽  
Ran Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Cautionary Note ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Target Value ◽  
Hard Information ◽  
Withholding Information ◽  
Acquisition Price

We examine takeover auctions when an informed bidder has better information about the target value than a rival and target shareholders. The informed bidder’s information is either hard or soft, and only hard information can be credibly disclosed. We show that withholding information creates a winner’s curse, thereby serving as a preemption device that deters the rival’s participation. In turn, an endogenous dis- closure cost arises that induces the informed bidder to optimally withhold favorable information to minimize the acquisition price—breaking down the standard  unraveling result, even if his information is always hard. Perhaps surprisingly, stronger competition from the uninformed bidder can reduce the target shareholders’ payoff and increase the payoff of the informed bidder while unambiguously improving social welfare. Moreover, “hardened” information can reduce the gains to trade, decreasing welfare but increasing shareholders’ payoff. Our results provide a cautionary note to promoting more competition and more disclosure.

LSD: 1967

1968 ◽  
Vol 114 (515) ◽  
pp. 1219-1222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glin Bennet
Keyword(s):  
Lysergic Acid ◽  
Lysergic Acid Diethylamide ◽  
Hard Information ◽  
Personal Experiences

It is twenty years since the appearance of Stoll's paper: “Lysergic acid diethylamide, a hallucinatory agent of the ergot group” (23). In this he sought to reproduce in a group of subjects Hofmann's personal experiences of the drug, and so set the LSD snowball on its way. Some 1,500 papers must by now have been gathered to it; they deal with a greater range of uses than has been thought of for any drug, a greater variety of benefits and disasters, and a confusing number of claims. Yet we have little hard information about this curious substance.

scholarly journals Financial Intermediation and Technology

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (161) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnoud Boot ◽  
Peter Hoffmann ◽  
Luc Laeven ◽  
Lev Ratnovski
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Data Collection ◽  
Business Model ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Financial Intermediation ◽  
Communication Channels ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Balance Sheets ◽  
Hard Information

We study the effects of technological change on financial intermediation, distinguishing between innovations in information (data collection and processing) and communication (relationships and distribution). Both follow historic trends towards an increased use of hard information and less in-person interaction, which are accelerating rapidly. We point to more recent innovations, such as the combination of data abundance and artificial intelligence, and the rise of digital platforms. We argue that in particular the rise of new communication channels can lead to the vertical and horizontal disintegration of the traditional bank business model. Specialized providers of financial services can chip away activities that do not rely on access to balance sheets, while platforms can interject themselves between banks and customers. We discuss limitations to these challenges, and the resulting policy implications.

scholarly journals Selecting Applicants

Econometrica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 615-645
Author(s):  
Alex Frankel
Keyword(s):  
Test Score ◽  
Acceptance Rate ◽  
Soft Information ◽  
Test Results ◽  
Hard Information ◽  
Rate Functions ◽  
Simple Implementation ◽  
Acceptance Rates ◽  
Test Result

A firm selects applicants to hire based on hard information, such as a test result, and soft information, such as a manager's evaluation of an interview. The contract that the firm offers to the manager can be thought of as a restriction on acceptance rates as a function of test results. I characterize optimal acceptance rate functions both when the firm knows the manager's mix of information and biases and when the firm is uncertain. These contracts may admit a simple implementation in which the manager can accept any set of applicants with a sufficiently high average test score.

scholarly journals A Model for Lender-Borrower Trust in Peer-To-Peer Lending

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Dyah Wahyu Sukmaningsih
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Elaboration Likelihood Model ◽  
Soft Information ◽  
Financial Data ◽  
Trust Building ◽  
Elaboration Likelihood ◽  
Hard Information ◽  
Likelihood Model ◽  
Peer Lending ◽  
Determinant Factor

This research examined factors that influenced lender’s trust towards the borrower. The peerto-peer lending platform facilitated lending mechanism between lender and borrower. However, the loan was often considered as an unsecured loan, since there was a lack of traditional financial data. Using literature review, this research analyzed the determinant factor to establish trust between borrower and lender. Based on Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), the result of this research proposes a model for trust building between lender and borrower. The model categorizes information to establish trust into hard information, soft information, and social capital.

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