The Contemplative Self after Michel Henry: A Phenomenological Theology. By Joseph Rivera. Pp. xi, 394, Notre Dame, IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 2015, £49.91.

2017 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 738-740
Author(s):  
Simon Henriksson
Keyword(s):  
Michel Henry ◽  
University Of Notre Dame ◽  
Phenomenological Theology

Provocations and Improvisations Concerning Reality: The Encounters of Jacques Derrida and Jean Luc-Nancy

Derrida Today ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-101
Author(s):  
Joanna Hodge
Keyword(s):  
Jacques Derrida ◽  
The Real ◽  
Michel Henry

This essay responds to the Nancean account of presentation, evoked in the opening citation, in order to trace out in Nancy's enquiries a disruption of Husserlian presentation, and a re-thinking of materiality on the edge of classical phenomenology. It stages a non-encounter between the writings of Jean-Luc Nancy and of Jacques Derrida in relation to a third term, the Lacanian conception of the ‘real’. Thereby it can be shown how these writings touch on each other, in response to phenomenology and to psychoanalytical theory, but do not engage. All the same, the claim to be made is that the writings of Nancy and Derrida converge in forming a third option, alongside the secularised phenomenologies of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty and the Christian phenomenologies of Jean-Luc Marion and Michel Henry, by marking up the event of Lacan's reformulation of Freud's psychoanalytical theorising.

,Vitalismus‘ und reine Potenzialität bei Michel Henry

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-70
Author(s):  
Rolf Kühn
Keyword(s):  
Michel Henry ◽  
Life Itself ◽  
Recent Interpretation

The recent interpretation of Michel Henry’s thought as a ‘phenomenological vitalism’ raises fundamental questions regarding the reception of his phenomenology. The issue raised, however, is not primarily about radical phenomenology being inspired (or not) by more or less vitalistic philosophies like those of Maine de Biran, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and even Freud, rather it concerns the ‘how’ of purely immanent appearing in affect and force understood as immediate corporeality. Does the latter, being original affectivity, require temporality in order to free the affect from its passivity (Passibilit%t) and, thus, in order to enable action? This, however, would lead to an impossible intentional gap or difference within the original phenomenality of life itself. As an alternative, flesh can be seen as a potentiality, inwhich the concrete transcendental possibility and the phenomenological power of appearing as ‘I can’ are already united prior to any formal exercise of freedom. Such inquiry into the reception of the phenomenology of life provides at the same time a framework for the contemporary phenomenological debate

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