How street‐level bureaucrats become policy entrepreneurs: The case of urban renewal

Governance ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 475-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
Einat Lavee ◽  
Nissim Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Urban Renewal ◽  
Policy Entrepreneurs ◽  
Street Level ◽  
Street Level Bureaucrats

Policy Refiners and Street-Level Lesson Learners

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alastair Stark
Keyword(s):  
Policy Evaluation ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Street Level ◽  
Street Level Bureaucrats ◽  
Central Level ◽  
Government Level ◽  
Inquiry Lesson

This chapter explores agents who are influential in terms of inquiry lesson-learning but have not been examined before in inquiry literature. The key argument is that two types of agent—policy refiners and street-level bureaucrats—are important when it comes to the effectiveness of post-crisis lesson-learning. As they travel down from the central government level, street-level actors champion, reinterpret, and reject inquiry lessons, often because those lessons do not consider local capacities. Policy refiners, however, operate at the central level in the form of taskforces, implementation reviews, and policy evaluation processes. These refiners examine potentially problematic inquiry lessons in greater detail in order to determine whether and how they should be implemented. In doing so, these ‘mini-inquiries’ can reformulate or even abandon inquiry recommendations.

Labour Input Logic of Street-Level Bureaucrats: Evidence from Chinese Market Supervision Commission

2021 ◽  
pp. 147892992110215
Author(s):  
Chunna Li ◽  
Jun Yang
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Climate ◽  
Time Allocation ◽  
Public Management ◽  
New Public Management ◽  
Strong Impact ◽  
Chinese Market ◽  
Frontline Staff ◽  
Street Level ◽  
Labour Input ◽  
Street Level Bureaucrats

The theory of street-level bureaucracy and its relevant data have proven the expected duties of the frontline staff of local government may be excessive but their time spent working remains quite low. Using data from participatory observations of street-level officials in a Chinese city, this study reveals the logic of this labour input paradox. Organizational climate incentive and promotional incentive jointly influence the time allocation of street-level bureaucrats. The organizational climate incentive reflects the weak incentive characteristic of the maintenance function of labour; promotional incentives have a strong impact on motivation, which is characteristic of the promotional function of labour. These findings reveal the costs of the New Public Management movement in an organization lacking an effective promotion mechanism and a positive organizational climate incentive. This is a snapshot of the dilemma faced by China’s public organization reforms, but it is also a problem other country must solve.

scholarly journals Understanding street-level bureaucrats’ attitude towards clients: Towards a measurement instrument

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shelena Keulemans ◽  
Steven Van de Walle
Keyword(s):  
Work Engagement ◽  
Measurement Instrument ◽  
Prosocial Motivation ◽  
Street Level ◽  
Affective Attitude ◽  
Test Study ◽  
Causality Testing ◽  
Street Level Bureaucrats ◽  
Cognitive Attitude ◽  
Multicomponent Model

The attitude of street-level bureaucrats towards their clients has an impact on the decisions they take. Still, such attitudes have not received much scholarly attention, nor are they generally studied in much detail. This article uses Breckler's psychological multicomponent model of attitude to develop a scale to measure street-level bureaucrats' general attitude towards their clients. By means of a test study ( N=218) and a replication study ( N = 879), the article shows that street-level bureaucrats' attitude towards clients consists of four different components: a cognitive attitude component, a positive affective attitude component, a negative affective attitude component and a behavioural attitude component. It also establishes a conceptual and empirical distinction from related attitudes, such as prosocial motivation, work engagement, bureaucrats’ rule-following identities and self-efficacy, and suggests avenues for application and further validation among different groups of street-level bureaucrats. This instrument opens up opportunities for theory testing and causality testing that surpasses case-specific considerations.

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