scholarly journals Asymmetric Information in Simple Bargaining Games: An Experimental Study

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Klempt ◽  
Kerstin Pull ◽  
Manfred Stadler
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Risk Premium ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Behavioral Pattern ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Hiding Behavior ◽  
Informational Advantage

Abstract Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at stake: in some cases, the proposer is better informed, in others, it is the responder. We analyze the effects of both types of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto power: the ultimatum and the dictator game. We find that the extent to which proposers demand less in the ultimatum as compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we find informed proposers to exploit their informational advantage by offering an amount that does not reveal the true size of the pie, with proposers in the ultimatum game exhibiting this behavioral pattern to a larger extent than those in the dictator game. Uninformed proposers risk imposed rejection when they ask for more than potentially is at stake, and ask for a risk premium in dictator games. We concentrate on proposers, but also explore responder behavior: We find uninformed responders to enable proposers’ hiding behavior, and we find proposer intentionality not to play an important role for informed responders when they decide whether to accept or reject an offer by an (uninformed) proposer.

scholarly journals Emotional Intelligence and Bargaining Behavior

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Sazhin
Keyword(s):  
Emotional Intelligence ◽  
Emotional Regulation ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Trait Emotional Intelligence ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Bargaining Behavior

In this experiment, we examined how trait Emotional Intelligence (EI) related tobehavior in social bargaining tasks. EI is theoretically related to both higher trait levels of empathy and better emotional regulation. More empathetic people may act more generously toward a bargaining partner. Subjects with better emotional regulation may be better at controlling their emotions in bargaining situations, which may help them make more self-interested choices. We used the Ultimatum and Dictator games to measure whether higher EI individuals behaved more generously or selfishly. These games are played between two people, where one person receives an endowment from the experimenter and decides how much to share with a recipient. The Ultimatum Game allows the recipient to reject offers, which forces the proposer to give his money back to the experimenter. In the Dictator Game, the recipient is unable to reject the proposer's offer. To maximize earnings, the most strategic thing to do in the Ultimatum Game is to make offers closer to even splits to avoid getting rejected by one's partner and to keep the whole endowment in the Dictator Game where there is no threat of retribution. Conversely, if a subject is motivated by fairness, they would make fair offers in both games. We found that subjects with higher EI acted strategically by being fair in the Ultimatum Game and selfish in the Dictator Game. These findings suggest that EI predicts more self interested behavior in bargaining situations.

scholarly journals Comparing mind perception in strategic exchanges: human-agent negotiation, dictator and ultimatum games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minha Lee ◽  
Gale Lucas ◽  
Jonathan Gratch
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Social Actors ◽  
Ultimatum Games ◽  
Mind Perception ◽  
Cognitive Aptitude ◽  
Negotiation Agents ◽  
Emotional Capacity

AbstractRecent research shows that how we respond to other social actors depends on what sort of mind we ascribe to them. In a comparative manner, we observed how perceived minds of agents shape people’s behavior in the dictator game, ultimatum game, and negotiation against artificial agents. To do so, we varied agents’ minds on two dimensions of the mind perception theory: agency (cognitive aptitude) and patiency (affective aptitude) via descriptions and dialogs. In our first study, agents with emotional capacity garnered more allocations in the dictator game, but in the ultimatum game, agents’ described agency and affective capacity, both led to greater offers. In the second study on negotiation, agents ascribed with low-agency traits earned more points than those with high-agency traits, though the negotiation tactic was the same for all agents. Although patiency did not impact game points, participants sent more happy and surprise emojis and emotionally valenced messages to agents that demonstrated emotional capacity during negotiations. Further, our exploratory analyses indicate that people related only to agents with perceived affective aptitude across all games. Both perceived agency and affective capacity contributed to moral standing after dictator and ultimatum games. But after negotiations, only agents with perceived affective capacity were granted moral standing. Manipulating mind dimensions of machines has differing effects on how people react to them in dictator and ultimatum games, compared to a more complex economic exchange like negotiation. We discuss these results, which show that agents are perceived not only as social actors, but as intentional actors through negotiations, in contrast with simple economic games.

scholarly journals Learning to be selfish? A large-scale longitudinal analysis of Dictator games played on Amazon Mechanical Turk

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Alonso Arechar ◽  
David Gertler Rand
Keyword(s):  
Longitudinal Analysis ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Mechanical Turk ◽  
Amazon Mechanical Turk ◽  
Social Setting ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Dictator Games

We investigate whether experience playing the Dictator Game (DG) affects prosociality by aggregating data from 37 experiments run on Amazon Mechanical Turk over a six-year period. While prior evidence has shown a correlation between experience on Amazon Mechanical Turk and selfishness, it is unclear to what extent this is the result of selection versus learning. Examining a total of 27,266 decisions made by 17,791 unique individuals, our data shows evidence of significant negative effects of both selection and learning. First, people who participated in a greater total number of our experiments were more selfish, even in their first game – indicating that people who are more likely to select into our experiments are more selfish. Second, a given individual tends to transfer less money over successive experiments – indicating that experience with the DG leads to greater selfishness. These results provide clear evidence of learning even in this non-strategic social setting.

DESIGN AND VALUATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES WITH STRATEGIC DEBT SERVICE AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

1999 ◽  
Vol 02 (02) ◽  
pp. 201-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
YONGHUA PAN
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Risk Premium ◽  
High Growth ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Debt Service ◽  
Growth Potential ◽  
Unified Framework ◽  
Financing Decisions ◽  
Corporate Securities

This paper studies the effects of strategic debt service, asymmetric information and their interaction on the valuation of corporate securities and on corporate financing decisions. By introducing information asymmetry into a continuous-time setting, our model is able to integrate these two factors in a unified framework. Such a model allows for obtaining valuation results in a separating equilibrium. The basic results of this paper imply that the risk premium of debt could be partly contributed by information effect. This part of risk premium could be very significant for those good firms with a project which will produce much higher cash flows than what the market expects. We also find that a firm's financing decision depends on its primitives: firms are more apt to rely on equity if they have: (1) high growth potential, (2) riskier projects, (3) higher ratio of intangible assets to total assets and (4) lesser information asymmetry; firms would prefer debt, otherwise.

scholarly journals Social preferences across different populations: Meta-analyses on the ultimatum game and dictator game

2021 ◽  
Vol 90 ◽  
pp. 101613
Author(s):  
François Cochard ◽  
Julie Le Gallo ◽  
Nikolaos Georgantzis ◽  
Jean-Christian Tisserand
Keyword(s):  
Social Preferences ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Different Populations ◽  
Meta Analyses

Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anuj Bhowmik ◽  
Maria Gabriella Graziano
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Asset Markets ◽  
The Core ◽  
Information Models ◽  
The Status ◽  
Initial Improvement ◽  
Core Allocations ◽  
Asymmetric Information Economies

AbstractThis paper analyses two properties of the core in a two-period exchange economy under uncertainty: the veto power of arbitrary sized coalitions; and coalitional fairness of core allocations. We study these properties in relation to classical (static) and sequential (dynamic) core notions and apply our results to asset markets and asymmetric information models. We develop a formal setting where consumption sets have no lower bound and impose a series of general restrictions on the first period trades of each agent. All our results are applications of the same lemma about improvements to an allocation that is either non-core or non-coalitionally fair. Roughly speaking, the lemma states that if all the members of a coalition achieve a better allocation in some way (for instance, by blocking the status quo allocation or because they envy the net trade of other coalitions) then an alternative improvement can be obtained through a perturbation of the initial improvement.

scholarly journals The Effect of Sense of Community Responsibility on Residents’ Altruistic Behavior: Evidence from the Dictator Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 460
Author(s):  
Chao Yang ◽  
Yanli Wang ◽  
Yuhui Wang ◽  
Xuemeng Zhang ◽  
Yong Liu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Sense Of Community ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Demographic Variables ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Community Responsibility ◽  
The Rich ◽  
High Level

Understanding the new mechanism of altruistic behavior is pivotal to people’s health and social development. Despite the rich literature on altruism, this is the first study exploring the association between the sense of community responsibility (SOC-R) and altruistic behavior by repeated dictator games. Data were gathered from 95 residents (30% male; M age = 33.20 years). Demographic variables, money motivation, and SOC-R were measured. The results revealed that there was a significant positive correlation between SOC-R and altruistic behavior, and SOC-R had a positive predictive effect on residents’ altruistic behavior. With the increasing of the number of tasks assigned, the level of residents’ altruistic behavior gradually decreased. There was a significant difference in money allocation between the groups with high and low levels of SOC-R. The level of altruistic behavior in the group with a high level of SOC-R was significantly higher than that in the the group with a low level of SOC-R. Findings from the present study highlighted the potential value of strengthening residents’ SOC-R in the improvement of altruism. Implications and directions for future research were also discussed.

scholarly journals The Intuition of Punishment: A Study of Fairness Preferences and Cognitive Ability

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Seier
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Test Results ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Other Regarding

Can differences in cognitive reflection explain other-regarding behavior? To test this, I use the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task to classify individuals as intuitive or reflective and correlate this measure with choices in three games that each subject participates in. The main sample consists of 236 individuals who completed the dictator game, ultimatum game and a third-party punishment task. Subjects afterwards completed the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test. Results showed that intuitive individuals acted more prosocially in all social dilemma tasks. These individuals were more likely to serve as a norm enforcer and third-party punish a selfish act in the dictator game. Reflective individuals were found more likely to act consistently in a self-interested manner across the three games.

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