scholarly journals Sovereign Reputation and Yield Spreads: A Case Study on Retroactive Legislation

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 260-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Otto Randl ◽  
Josef Zechner

Abstract This paper uses recent legislation in Austria to establish a link between sovereign reputation and yield spreads. In 2009, Hypo Alpe Adria International, a bank previously co-owned by the regional government of Carinthia, had been nationalized by Austria’s central government in order to avoid a default triggering multi-billion Euro local government guarantees. In 2015, special legislation retroactively introduced collective action clauses allowing a haircut on both the bonds and the guarantees while avoiding formal default. We document that legislative and administrative action designed to partly abrogate the guarantees resulted in a loss of reputation, leading to higher yield spreads for sovereign debt. Our analysis of covered bonds uncovers an increase in yield spreads on the secondary market and a deterioration of primary market conditions.

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (162) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kay Chung ◽  
Michael Papaioannou

This paper analyzes the effects of including collective action clauses (CACs) and enhanced CACs in international (nondomestic law-governed) sovereign bonds on sovereigns’ borrowing costs, using secondary-market bond yield spreads. Our findings indicate that inclusion of enhanced CACs, introduced in August 2014, is associated with lower borrowing costs for both noninvestment-grade and investment-grade issuers. These results suggest that market participants do not associate the use of CACs and enhanced CACs with borrowers’ moral hazard, but instead consider their implied benefits of an orderly and efficient debt resolution process in case of restructuring.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Antung Deddy Radiansyah

Gaps in biodiversity conservation management within the Conservation Area that are the responsibility of the central government and outside the Conservation Areas or as the Essential Ecosystems Area (EEA) which are the authority of the Regional Government, have caused various spatial conflicts between wildlife /wild plants and land management activities. Several obstacles faced by the Local Government to conduct its authority to manage (EEA), caused the number and area of EEA determined by the Local Government to be still low. At present only 703,000 ha are determined from the 67 million ha indicated by EEA. This study aims to overview biodiversity conservation policies by local governments and company perceptions in implementing conservation policies and formulate strategies for optimizing the role of Local Governments. From the results of this study, there has not been found any legal umbrella for the implementation of Law number 23/ 2014 related to the conservation of important ecosystems in the regions. This regulatory vacuum leaves the local government in a dilemma for continuing various conservation programs. By using a SWOT to the internal strategic environment and external stratetegic environment of the Environment and Forestry Service, Bengkulu Province , as well as using an analysis of company perceptions of the conservation policies regulatary , this study has been formulated a “survival strategy” through collaboration between the Central Government, Local Governments and the Private Sector to optimize the role of Local Government’s to establish EEA in the regions.Keywords: Management gaps, Essential Ecosystems Area (EEA), Conservation Areas, SWOT analysis and perception analysis


Media Iuris ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Galih Arya Prathama

The increase of regional capacity in managing the needs of Regional Development accompanied by the Delegation of Authority from Central Government to Regional Government, has implications in increasing the need for Development Funds, while the Regions can’t continue to rely on the fulfillment of these needs to the Central Government. In response to this, in implementing Autonomy, the Regions are given additional Authority of Financial Management. Such authority, creates demands for the Regions to be creative and focused in achieving the Government Goals that have been established.,As an effort to execute duties and functions of Regional Government in the form of Regional Financial Management, then a region must be able to recognize the potential and explore all the resources it has. Local Government is expected to dig deeper related to the potential derived from its own financial resources, especially in order to meet the needs of government financing and development in the region, one of them through Local Own Revenue as one of the main sources of Regional Financial Reception. Independence of Local Own Revenue for a Regional Government, giving positive support to the ability of the region in meeting the needs to build the region. Thus, the greater source of income derived from the potential owned by a region, the more freely the area can accommodate the needs of community without the interest of Central Government which is not in accordance with the needs of people in the region.


2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (04) ◽  
Author(s):  
Umilhair Alting ◽  
Winston Pontoh ◽  
I Gede Suwetja

Fiscal decentralization is one the major component of the decentralization implementation of regional autonomy. As the new beginning in regional development and the people in managing the resources or all of the potential to the prosperity and the progress of region. Financial aspect is one of the basic criteria to find out the real capability regional government in managing their autonomy system (household system) the capability of regional government in managing their financial can be seen in APBD which describes the capability of local government in financing the activities of development task and equity in each region. The purpose of this research is to determine the financial capability of Tidore in regional autonomy especially in 2013-2017 judging by ratio of independency, decentralization fiscal degree, growth ratio. This research used observation, interview and documentation to collect the data. The data was analyzed using qualitative and quantitative data with described analysis. The result showed that the independence ratio of Tidore has been able to improve its financial capability. The degree of decentralization is still highly dependent on the central government, although it has been increasing year by year. Growth rate fluctuated this indicates the local government of Tidore is not too concerned with regional development and community welfare.Keywords: regional autonomy, ratio of independency, The degree of decentralization ratio, Growth ratio.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 71
Author(s):  
Dewi Gartika

In Act No. 23 of 2014 on Regional Government, where there mention of the obligatory functions and affairs of choice, where one obligatory This is an investment, then in Government Regulation No. 38 Year 2007 on the dealings between the central government, provincial government and district / city government, a local government authority is in the field of investment, government Bandung, capital investment is obligatory and one local government authority is placed in the structure organization Bappeda Bandung is in the Investment Sector, is of course contrary to the Law No. 23 Year 2014 and Government Regulation No. 38 of 2007. This paper provides the organizational structure of institu-tional investment in the city of Bandung.Dalam Undang-Undang Undang-Undang Nomor 23 Tahun 2014 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah dise-butkan mengenai urusan wajib dan urusan pilihan, dimana salah satu urusan wajib ini adalah pena-naman modal, kemudian dalam Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 38 Tahun 2007 tentang Pembagian urusan antara pemerintah pusat, pemerintah provinsi, dan pemerintah kabupaten/kota, salah satu kewenangan pemerintah daerah adalah dalam bidang penanaman modal, di pemerintahan Kota Bandung, penanaman modal yang merupakan urusan wajib dan salah satu kewenangan pemerintah daerah ditempatkan dalam struktur organisasi Bappeda Kota Bandung yaitu pada Bidang Pena-naman Modal, ini tentu saja berseberangan dengan UU No. 32 Tahun 2004/UU No. 23 Tahun 2014 dan Peraturan Pemerintah No. 38 Tahun 2007. Artikel ini berisi tentang struktur organisasi kelem-bagaan penanaman modal di Kota Bandung.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (13) ◽  
pp. 5261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao Liang ◽  
Yuqing Liang ◽  
Chong Chen ◽  
Meine Pieter van Dijk

This study carries out an in-depth analysis of urban water policy implementation in China through a policy cycle analysis and case study of Sponge city program. The policy cycle analysis articulates discrete steps within the policy formulation and implementation process, while the case studies reflect the specific problems in water project implementation. Because of the principal–agent relation between central and local government, a ‘‘double wheel’’ policy cycle model is adopted to reflect the policy cycles at central level and at local level. Changde city and Zhuanghe city, two demo cities in the Sponge city program, are chosen for the analysis. The policy cycle analysis shows that the central government orders local government to implement policy without clear direction on how to attract private sector participation. The evaluation of central government did not include private sector involvement, nor the sustainability of the investments. This promotes the local government’s pursuit of project construction completion objectives, without seriously considering private sector involvement and operation and maintenance (O&M) cost. The local governments do not have political motivation and experiences to attract private investments into project implementation. The case study in the two demo cities shows that local government subsidies are the main source of O&M funding currently, which is not sustainable. The water projects are not financially feasible because no sufficient revenue is generated to cover the high initial investments and O&M cost. The lack of private sector involvement makes it difficult to maintain adequate funding in O&M, leading to the unsustainability of the water projects. It is not easy to achieve private sector involvement, but it could be the key to realizing urban water resilience in a more sustainable way.


Author(s):  
Gde Edi Budiartha

Local regulations are local regulations that are established by local specificities recognized by the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia-1945 as part of their decentralization. Local regulations can not contradict the legislation of higher order not to cause a result of the cancellation. This cancellation is the authority of the central government in relation to the unitary state. Supervision by the central government there are two models of preventive supervision and oversight repesif. Cancellation regulatory oversight repesif area is conducted on local government. Cancellation Provincial Regulation made by the President and the Minister of the Interior gave rise to a dualism. For it will be discussed on How cancellation arrangements are made with the Provincial Regulations and Regulations Presidential Decree of the Minister of the Interior? 2. What is the legal effect of the cancellation of Provincial Regulation by Presidential Decree and the Regulation of the Minister of the Interior? The issues discussed using normative research by using the approach of legislation, the legal concept analysis approach, in order to obtain answers that dualism cancellation provincial regulations stipulated in several laws including Law No. 32 Year 2004 on Regional Government, Law No. 28 year 2009 on Local Taxes and levies, Government Regulation No. 79 Year 2005 on Guidelines Direction and Control of Local Government, Minister of the Interior No. 1 Year 2014 on the Establishment of the Regional law Products stating that the authority of the cancellation of regulations made by the President of the instrument while the Presidential Decree cancellation made by the Minister of the Interior was limited to cancellation Draft Regional Regulation on stage during the evaluation of preventive supervision and legal consequences caused by the dualism cancellation of local regulations are different between cancellation made by the President and minister of Interior. Cancellation is cancellation of its President in the field of executive interim final cancellation made by the Minister of the Interior if the local government to enforce the local regulations canceled Interior Minister will ask the cancellation to the President.


2016 ◽  
Vol 34 (6) ◽  
pp. 602-619 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Michael Greenhalgh ◽  
Kevin Muldoon-Smith ◽  
Sophie Angus

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the introduction of the business rates retention scheme (BRRS) in England which transferred financial liability for backdated appeals to LAs. Under the original scheme, business rates revenue, mandatory relief and liability for successful appeals is spilt 50/50 between central government and local government which both share the rewards of growth and bear the risk of losses. Design/methodology/approach The research adopts a microanalysis approach into researching local government finance, conducting a case study of Leeds, to investigate the impact of appeals liability and reveal disparities in impact, through detailed examination of multiple perspectives in one of the largest cities in the UK. Findings The case study reveals that Leeds, despite having a buoyant commercial economy driven by retail and service sector growth, has been detrimentally impacted by BRRS as backdated appeals have outweighed uplift in business rates income. Fundamentally BRRS is not a “one size fits all” model – it results in winners and losers – which will be exacerbated if local authorities get to keep 100 per cent of their business rates from 2020. Research limitations/implications LAs’ income is more volatile as a consequence of both the rates retention and appeals liability aspects of BRRS and will become more so with the move to 100 per cent retention and liability. Practical implications Such volatility impairs the ability of local authorities to invest in growth at the same time as providing front line services over the medium term – precisely the opposite of what BRRS was intended to do. It also incentivises the construction of new floorspace, which generates risks overbuilding and exacerbating over-supply. Originality/value The research reveals the significant impact of appeals liability on LAs’ business rates revenues which will be compounded with the move to a fiscally neutral business rates system and 100 per cent business rates retention by 2020.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-90
Author(s):  
José María González-González ◽  
Manuel Jesús García-Fénix

Este trabajo se propone analizar las formas de trabajo institucional desarrolladas por distintos actores para la emergencia e implantación del Coste Efectivo de los Servicios de las Entidades Locales (CESEL). Los resultados del estudio de caso longitudinal realizado ponen de manifiesto que los principales actores, Gobierno Central y Ayuntamiento, llevaron a cabo diferentes formas de trabajo institucional (político, cultural y técnico), surgiendo conflictos durante su desarrollo debido a las distintas lógicas institucionales en las que se apoyaron: eficiencia económica e interés social, respectivamente. Este trabajo contribuye a la perspectiva teórica adoptada evidenciando que las formas en las que se desarrolla el trabajo institucional por distintos actores determinan la configuración final de la nueva institución que quiere crearse. Así, aunque la regulación estableció como finalidad del CESEL profundizar en el cumplimiento de los principios de eficiencia y de transparencia de la gestión pública local, las formas en las que se ha desarrollado el trabajo institucional durante su implantación lo han configurado como un instrumento de transparencia, presentando además serias limitaciones para que ésta sea efectiva. This paper aims to analyze the forms of institutional work carried out by different actors with regard to the emergence and implementation of Cost-Effective of Local Government Services (CESEL, Coste Efectivo de los Servicios de las Entidades Locales). The results of the longitudinal case study evidence that the main actors, Central Government and Local Government, carried out different types of institutional work (political, cultural and technical), by arising conflicts during their development due to the different institutional logics in which they were supported: economic efficiency and social interest, respectively. This work contributes to the theoretical perspective adopted by evidencing that the ways in which institutional work is developed by different actors determine the final configuration of the new institution that is to be created. Thus, although the regulation established that the purpose of CESEL is to deepen on compliance with the principles of efficiency and transparency of local public management, the ways in which the institutional work has been developed during its implementation have configured it as an instrument for transparency and also it presents serious limitations so that transparency is effective.


2007 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dania Thomas ◽  
Javier García-Fronti

AbstractOur examination of changes in the period leading up to the Argentine debt exchange and after, reveals that with Collective Action Clauses (CACs), the sovereign debt market is increasingly reliant on good faith as a standard of fair dealing to ensure fair and orderly debt restructurings in the future. Unlike the entrenched, enforceable, doctrinal good faith in domestic jurisdictions such as the U.S., the norm relied on in the sovereign debt market is a contextual open norm similar to the notion of Treu und Glauben, section 242 BGB of the German civil code. It is not a legal rule with specific requirements that need to be fulfilled. This paper reveals that reliance on a contextual, open norm is evidence of a shift in the framework that regulates sovereign debt restructurings: a shift from enforcement to voluntary compliance. Further, we argue that in the absence of a multilateral, regulatory, framework that embeds good faith as a specific standard of fair dealing, this reliance will exacerbate not solve the problem of sovereign debt restructurings.


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