Within‐syndicate conflicts, loan covenants, and syndicate formation

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 547-583 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nishant Dass ◽  
Vikram Nanda ◽  
Qinghai Wang
Keyword(s):  
Loan Covenants

The Information Content of Bank Loan Covenants

2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (10) ◽  
pp. 3700-3737 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cem Demiroglu ◽  
Christopher M. James
Keyword(s):  
Information Content ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Loan Covenants

Using covenants in loan agreements to promote tariff reform

2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-321
Author(s):  
Michael Fortin
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Water Supply ◽  
Regulatory Reform ◽  
Reform Process ◽  
Tariff Reform ◽  
Current Thinking ◽  
Loan Covenants ◽  
Development Banks ◽  
Water Supply And Sanitation

This paper evaluates efforts made by development banks to promote tariff reform using covenants in infrastructure loan agreements. These covenants are evaluated within the broader context of tariff regulation in the water supply and sanitation sector. The paper outlines prerequisites for effective tariff regulation and reviews the experience with tariff regulation in developing countries and the current thinking regarding regulatory reform. Efforts by development banks to promote tariff regulation using loan covenants are often misdirected in light of the complexity of tariff regulation and the regulatory reform process.

Loan Covenants: Evidence from India

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baag Pankaj ◽  
Ashok Banerjee
Keyword(s):  
Loan Covenants

Tough Love: The Effects of Debt Contract Design on Firms’ Performance

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-80
Author(s):  
Ioannis Spyridopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Debt Contract ◽  
Positive Externalities ◽  
Managerial Agency ◽  
Editorial Decision ◽  
Loan Covenants ◽  
Instrumental Variables Approach ◽  
Published Paper

Abstract I investigate whether restrictive loan covenants disrupt or improve firms’ operating performance. Using an instrumental variables approach to address the endogenous relationship between covenant strictness and firms’ efficiency, I find that stricter loan covenants lead to an increase in profitability and firm value even when firms do not violate a covenant. Stricter covenants improve performance only in firms with managerial agency conflicts: those without large shareholder ownership, facing softer competition in their product market, or with weaker shareholder rights. The evidence suggests that by designing stringent contracts ex ante, creditors create positive externalities in poorly governed firms through managerial incentives. Received December 7, 2018; editorial decision May 31, 2019 by Editor Uday Rajan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Loan covenants

2004 ◽  
pp. 125-145
Author(s):  
Andrew Fight
Keyword(s):  
Loan Covenants

Bond and loan covenants, theory and practice

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 461-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
William W. Bratton
Keyword(s):  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Loan Covenants
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document