scholarly journals Competitive pressure and firm investment efficiency: Evidence from corporate employment decisions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabri Boubaker ◽  
Viet A. Dang ◽  
Syrine Sassi
Keyword(s):  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Competitive Pressure ◽  
Firm Investment ◽  
Employment Decisions ◽  
Corporate Employment

Conditional Conservatism and Firm Investment Efficiency

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Manuel García Lara ◽  
Beatriz Garcia Osma ◽  
Fernando Penalva
Keyword(s):  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Firm Investment ◽  
Conditional Conservatism

scholarly journals Independent directors and corporate investment: evidence from an emerging market

2019 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Quoc Trung Tran
Keyword(s):  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Corporate Investment ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Firm Investment ◽  
Full Sample ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Research Findings

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether independent directors reduce corporate overinvestment and improve investment efficiency in an emerging market. Design/methodology/approach First, the author developed a research model in which corporate investment is a function of Tobin’s Q, the proportion of independent directors in the board and an interaction between them. Second, the author divided the full sample into groups of firms with a low- and high-financial constraint to compare the effects of independent directors between financially unconstrained and constrained firms. Findings With a full sample of 1,281 observations collected from 193 firms listed in Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange during the period from 2009 to 2017, the author find that the proportion of independent directors is negatively related to firm investment but its interactive term with Tobin’s Q is positively related to corporate investment. These findings imply that independent directors can help firms reduce overinvestment and improve investment efficiency. Moreover, the research findings indicate that these effects of independent directors are stronger for financially constrained firms. Originality/value The extant literature shows that independent directors are an effective mechanism to reduce agency problems in firm decisions and operating performance. However, there has been no research on the role of independent directors in corporate investment policy.

Pro-Labor Institutions and Corporate Employment Efficiency

2020 ◽  
pp. 0148558X2092985
Author(s):  
Boochun Jung ◽  
Tony Kang ◽  
Woo-Jong Lee ◽  
Gaoguang (Stephen) Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Adjustment Costs ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Collectivist Culture ◽  
Employee Protection ◽  
Labor Adjustment Costs ◽  
Labor Adjustment ◽  
Labor Institutions ◽  
Corporate Employment

We examine how labor-friendly institutional features (i.e., laborism) relate to corporate investment efficiency in labor in a sample of firms from 33 countries over 1996–2012. We consider three dimensions of laborism—the presence of a left-leaning government, rigidity of employee protection laws, and collectivist culture. Our evidence shows that firms operating in stronger laborism countries make less efficient labor investment decisions, which is consistent with higher labor adjustment costs associated with laborism.

scholarly journals Does Institutional Ownership Improve Firm Investment Efficiency?

2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (12) ◽  
pp. 2772-2792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yue Cao ◽  
Yizhe Dong ◽  
Yu Lu ◽  
Diandian Ma
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Firm Investment

The Mutual Friend: Dual Holder Monitoring and Firm Investment Efficiency

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-115
Author(s):  
Miguel Antón ◽  
Luca X Lin
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
High Growth ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Firm Investment ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Debt Overhang ◽  
Equity Value ◽  
Growth Firms ◽  
Editorial Decision ◽  
And Control

Abstract We investigate the influence of simultaneous equity holdings by creditors (dual holders) on investment efficiency. Such creditors have stronger incentives and power to monitor firm investment as they have cash flow and control rights from both debt and equity sides. We provide evidence that dual holders, particularly noncommercial bank dual holders, significantly mitigate overinvestment. For high growth firms and those subject to debt overhang, dual holders also alleviate underinvestment. Equity value increases at the presence of dual holders. Our results indicate that by improving firm investment efficiency, dual holders not only make creditor investments safer but also create value for shareholders. Received March 26, 2019; editorial decision September 17, 2019 by Editor Isil Erel.

scholarly journals Institutional investors' horizons and corporate employment decisions

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 ◽  
pp. 101634 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Ghaly ◽  
Viet Anh Dang ◽  
Konstantinos Stathopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Employment Decisions ◽  
Corporate Employment
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