Acts of Shared Intentionality. In Search of Uniquely Human Thinking A Natural History of Human Thinking, Michael Tomasello. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. 2014. xi-178 pp.

Ethos ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. E10-E13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Lázaro ◽  
Moisès Esteban-Guitart
Keyword(s):  
Natural History ◽  
Harvard University ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
History Of ◽  
Human Thinking

scholarly journals Precís of A Natural History of Human Thinking

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Tomasello
Keyword(s):  
Natural History ◽  
Harvard University ◽  
History Of ◽  
Human Thinking

AbstractA précis of Michael Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Thinking (Harvard University Press, 2014).

scholarly journals Tension in the Natural History of Human Thinking

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrike Moll
Keyword(s):  
Natural History ◽  
Homo Sapiens ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Evolutionary Time ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
Instrumental Reasoning ◽  
History Of ◽  
Human Thinking ◽  
Evolutionary Story

AbstractMichael Tomasello has greatly expanded our knowledge of human cognition and how it differs from that of other animals. In this commentary to his recent book A Natural History of Human Thinking, I first critique some of the presuppositions and arguments of his evolutionary story about how homo sapiens’ cognition emerged. For example, I question the strategy of relying on the modern chimpanzee as a model for our last shared ancestor, and I doubt the idea that what changed first over evolutionary time was hominin behavior, which then in turn brought about changes in cognition. In the second half of the commentary I aim to show that the author oscillates between an additive and a transformative account of human shared intentionality. I argue that shared intentionality shapes cognition in its entirety and therefore precludes the possibility that humans have the same, individual intentionality (as shown in, e.g. their instrumental reasoning) as other apes.

scholarly journals Response to Commentators

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Tomasello
Keyword(s):  
Natural History ◽  
Harvard University ◽  
History Of ◽  
Human Thinking

AbstractThis paper is a reply to the comments by Henrike Moll, Glenda Satne, Ladislav Koreň and Michael Schmitz on Michael Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Thinking (Harvard University Press, 2014).

How is the moral stance related to the intentional stance and group thinking?

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes Rakoczy
Keyword(s):  
Natural History ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
History Of ◽  
Group Thinking ◽  
Moral Stance

Abstract The natural history of our moral stance told here in this commentary reveals the close nexus of morality and basic social-cognitive capacities. Big mysteries about morality thus transform into smaller and more manageable ones. Here, I raise questions regarding the conceptual, ontogenetic, and evolutionary relations of the moral stance to the intentional and group stances and to shared intentionality.

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