Institutional choice in the governance of the early Atlantic sugar trade: diasporas, markets, and courts

Pragmatism and its consequences are central issues in American politics today, yet scholars rarely examine in detail the relationship between pragmatism and politics. This book systematically explores the subject and makes a strong case for adopting a pragmatist approach to democratic politics—and for giving priority to democracy in the process of selecting and reforming political institutions. What is the primary value of democracy? When should we make decisions democratically and when should we rely on markets? And when should we accept the decisions of unelected officials, such as judges or bureaucrats? This book explores how a commitment to pragmatism should affect our answers to such important questions. It concludes that democracy is a good way of determining how these kinds of decisions should be made—even if what the democratic process determines is that not all decisions should be made democratically. So, for example, the democratically elected U.S. Congress may legitimately remove monetary policy from democratic decision-making by putting it under the control of the Federal Reserve. This book argues that pragmatism offers an original and compelling justification of democracy in terms of the unique contributions democratic institutions can make to processes of institutional choice. This focus highlights the important role that democracy plays, not in achieving consensus or commonality, but rather in addressing conflicts. Indeed, the book suggest that democratic politics is perhaps best seen less as a way of reaching consensus or agreement than as a way of structuring the terms of persistent disagreement.

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Applying Institutional Choice Theory to Patent Right – Case of Patentable Subject Matter Debates

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.1696023 ◽

2009 ◽

Author(s):

Nari Lee

Keyword(s):

Subject Matter ◽

Choice Theory ◽

Institutional Choice ◽

Patentable Subject Matter ◽

Patent Right

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Multilateralism, Bilateralism and Institutional Choice: The Political Economy of Regime Complexes in International Trade Policy

Global Policy ◽

10.1111/1758-5899.12884 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 12 (S4) ◽

pp. 14-24

Author(s):

Dirk De Bièvre ◽

Emile Ommeren

Keyword(s):

Political Economy ◽

International Trade ◽

Trade Policy ◽

The Political ◽

Institutional Choice ◽

International Trade Policy

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Interpersonal Comparisons of the Good: Epistemic not Impossible

Utilitas ◽

10.1017/s0953820815000266 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 28 (3) ◽

pp. 288-313 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

MATHEW COAKLEY

Keyword(s):

Institutional Choice ◽

Individual Level ◽

Interpersonal Comparisons ◽

Individual Good ◽

Level Information ◽

Action Policy ◽

Social Mind ◽

The Individual

To evaluate the overall good/welfare of any action, policy or institutional choice we need some way of comparing the benefits and losses to those affected: we need to make interpersonal comparisons of the good/welfare. Yet sceptics have worried either: (1) that such comparisons are impossible as they involve an impossible introspection across individuals, getting ‘into their minds’; (2) that they are indeterminate as individual-level information is compatible with a range of welfare numbers; or (3) that they are metaphysically mysterious as they assume the existence either of a social mind or of absolute levels of welfare when no such things exist. This article argues that such scepticism can potentially be addressed if we view the problem of interpersonal comparisons as fundamentally an epistemic problem – that is, as a problem of forming justified beliefs about the overall good based on evidence of the individual good.

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