Competition, Law, and the Power of (Imagined) Geography: Market Definition and the Emergence of Too-Big-to-Fail Banking in the United States

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brett Christophers
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Too Big To Fail

scholarly journals The impact of geographic market definition on the stringency of hospital merger control in Germany and the Netherlands

2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Varkevisser ◽  
Frederik T. Schut
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
The United States ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
Hospital Mergers ◽  
Hospital Markets ◽  
Hospital Merger ◽  
The Impact

AbstractIn markets where hospitals are expected to compete, preventive merger control aims to prohibit anticompetitive mergers. In the hospital industry, however, the standard method for defining the relevant market (SSNIP) is difficult to apply and alternative approaches have proven inaccurate. Experiences from the United States show that courts, by identifying overly broad geographic markets, have underestimated the anticompetitive effects of hospital mergers. We examine how geographic hospital markets are defined in Germany and the Netherlands where market-oriented reforms have created room for hospital competition. For each country, we discuss a landmark case where definition of the geographic market played a decisive role. Our findings indicate that defining geographic hospital markets in both countries is less complicated than in the United States, where antitrust analysis must take managed care organisations into account. We also find that different methods result in much more stringent hospital merger control in Germany than in the Netherlands. Given the uncertainties in defining hospital markets, the German competition authority seems to be inclined to avoid the risk of being too permissive; the opposite holds for the Dutch competition authority. We argue that for society the costs of being too permissive with regard to hospital mergers may be larger than the costs of being too stringent.

Origins of too-big-to-fail policy in the United States

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
George C. Nurisso ◽  
Edward Simpson Prescott
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
The United States ◽  
Too Big To Fail ◽  
Interstate Banking ◽  
Legal Constraints ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
Over Time

This article traces the origin of too-big-to-fail policy in modern US banking to the bailout of the $1.2b Bank of the Commonwealth in 1972. It describes this bailout and those of subsequent banks through that of Continental Illinois in 1984. During this period, market concentration due to interstate banking restrictions is a factor in most of the bailouts and systemic risk concerns were raised to justify the bailouts of surprisingly small banks. Finally, most of the bailouts in this period relied on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's use of the Essentiality Doctrine and Federal Reserve lending. A discussion of this doctrine is used to illustrate how legal constraints on regulators may become less constraining over time.

scholarly journals When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
PATRICE BOUGETTE ◽  
MARC DESCHAMPS ◽  
FRÉDÉRIC MARTY
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Chicago School ◽  
The United States ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Minor Influence

In this article, the authors interrogate legal and economic history to analyze the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the United States. They show that the extent to which economic objectives and theoretical views shaped the inception of antitrust law. After establishing the minor influence of economics in the promulgation of U.S. competition law, they highlight U.S. economists’ caution toward antitrust until the Second New Deal and analyze the process by which the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for competition policy. They rely mainly on the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) and trace how this theoretical paradigm became collective—that is, the “economization” process in U.S. antitrust. Finally, the authors discuss the implications and possible pitfalls of such a conversion to economics-led antitrust enforcement.

scholarly journals A APLICAÇÃO DA TEORIA DA FAILING FIRM DEFENSE NO BRASIL

Percurso ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (29) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Everton Das Neves GONÇALVES ◽  
Bruna Pamplona de QUEIROZ
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Present Article ◽  
United States Of America ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Social Function ◽  
The United States ◽  
Horizontal Merger ◽  
Merger Guidelines ◽  
Economic Law ◽  
The Social

RESUMO O presente artigo, por meio de método de abordagem dedutivo e, como auxiliar, o comparativo, bem como procedimento de análise bibliográfica e jurisprudencial, pretende demonstrar que a teoria norte-americana da Failing Firm Defense encontra aplicação no atual cenário de crise brasileira, ao possibilitar a aprovação de certos atos de concentração, normalmente, reprováveis ou sujeitos às restrições, pelo Órgão de proteção à concorrência, em razão da função social da empresa. Para isso, são estabelecidos determinados critérios encontrados nos precedentes e no Horizontal Merger Guidelines dos Estados Unidos que servem de base ao CADE à utilização da teoria em seus julgados, ainda que necessária a adaptação à realidade econômica do País. PALAVRAS-CHAVES: Direito Econômico; Antitruste; Concorrência; Legislação Falimentar; Crise; Failing Firm Defense. ABSTRACTThe present article, through the method of deductive approach and, as auxiliary, comparative, as well as the process of bibliographical and jurisprudential analysis, the proposals that demonstrate the American theory of the Defense of Low Companies, are in Increasing probability of competitions, normally reprehensible or subject to restrictions, by competition law, because of the social function of the company. The horizontal merger guidelines of the United States of America are not based on the United States Horizontal Fusion Guidelines. KEYWORDS: Economic Law; Antitrust; Competition; Bankruptcy Legislation; Crisis; Failing Firm Defense.

scholarly journals COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMPETITION PROTECTION SYSTEMS IN EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-158
Author(s):  
Goce Galev
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United States Of America ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Sherman Act ◽  
Legal Provisions ◽  
Protection Systems ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position

The origin and basic principles of legislation concerning the restriction, prevention, distortion of competition, as well as the conduct of monopoly companies, and consequently the abuse of dominant position, should be sought in historical legal circumstances. The American and European competition protection systems have a common goal, and both systems seek to protect consumers, the free flow of goods and services on the market, and access to competitors' markets. However, given the different historical and economic-political circumstances, the material and procedural rules that are driving the systems of protection of competition differ significantly in their content, their application and their institutional set-up in general. The basic principles, doctrines, and methods of enforcing US competition law stem from the provisions of three legislative acts that, while broadly and broadly formulated, still contribute to the regulation of actions that restrict competition and illicit market monopolization. Namely, these are the Sherman Act passed in 1890, the Clayton Act and the law regulating the work of the Federal Trade Commission passed in 1914. At first glance, there seems to be a great similarity between Community competition law and that of the United States of America. However, a detailed analysis shows that Article 81 of Treaty of Rome, which prohibits agreements that prevent, restrict and distort competition and, consequently, price-fixing agreements and the first part of the Sherman Act, which prohibits trade restrictive agreements are almost incomparable. The same is true of Article 82, which prohibits abuse of dominant position and Article 2 of Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization and the attempts to monopolize.The purpose of this paper is primarily to illustrate the differences, similarities of these two systems. The reason for this, lies in trying to determine how and to what extent economic and legal circumstances affect the choice of the system of protection of competition and, consequently, legal provisions and their application.

Intellectual Property and Competition Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Scott Hemphill
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Core Ability

This chapter surveys the intersection of competition law—or antitrust law, as it is known in the United States—with intellectual property (IP). It examines whether and how IP rights alter the substantive scope of antitrust law, either by operation of statute or as a matter of economic policy. It discusses a wide variety of antitrust claims, alleging collusion, exclusion, or both, that have been raised against IP rights holders. The examples are drawn mainly from the United States, although European developments are also included where relevant. The analysis supports the conclusion that, beyond a rights holder’s core ability to assert a valid, infringed right against a rival, IP restricts antitrust law less than one might expect. Moreover, the restrictions that do exist are often subtle.

A Giant Problem: The Influence of the Chicago School on Australian Competition Law, Economic Dynamism and Inequality

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 696-714 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Triggs ◽  
Andrew Leigh
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Chicago School ◽  
The United States ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Competitive Process ◽  
Growing Body

Australia has a competition problem: there is not enough of it. Our industries are concentrated. Our markets show signs of weak competition. The way Australia’s courts, parliamentarians and regulators think about competition is partly to blame. Although it has been less influential in Australia than in the United States, the Chicago School’s views on competition have shaped our laws, policies and enforcement practices. The Chicago School views market concentration as a virtue more than a vice. The School contended that barriers to entry are negligible, market power is temporary, most mergers are good, vertical restraints and predatory pricing are either benign or efficient. The growing body of research and experience, however, shows that the Chicago School’s faith in the ability of markets to self-correct and deliver competitive outcomes was misplaced. There is a strong progressive case for repositioning how we think about competition. Focusing more on the competitive process, the structure of markets and the incentives those structures create for firms will play an important role in reducing inequality.

Introduction

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Schillig
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
The United States ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Too Big To Fail ◽  
Reform Legislation ◽  
Conceptual Clarity ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Corporate Insolvency

The Introduction provides a brief summary of the background for the reform legislation on recovery and resolution in the European Union and in the United States, with a particular focus on the ‘too-big-to-fail’ problem. It gives an overview of the content of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Single Resolution Mechanisms for the eurozone, and the Orderly Liquidation Authority under the Dodd–Frank Act. It further seeks to provide some terminological and conceptual clarity as regards the subject matter of the book, notably with a view to delineating supervision, resolution, and corporate insolvency. The structure of the book is summarized in outline.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document