Wholesale Price Auctions for Dual Sourcing under Supply Risk

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 754-780 ◽  
Author(s):  
He Huang ◽  
Zhipeng Li ◽  
Hongyan Xu
Keyword(s):  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Supply Risk ◽  
Dual Sourcing

On Co-opetitive Supply Partnerships with End-Product Rivals: Information Asymmetry, Dual Sourcing and Supply Market Efficiency

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seung Hwan Jung ◽  
Panos Kouvelis
Keyword(s):  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Information Leakage ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Market Information ◽  
Dual Sourcing ◽  
Strategic Sourcing ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Separating Equilibrium

Problem definition: We consider opportunities for cooperation at the supply level between two firms that are rivals in the end-product market. One of our firms is vertically integrated (VI), has in-house production capabilities, and may also supply its rival. The other is a downstream outsourcing (DO) firm that has better market information. The DO is willing to consider a supply partnership with the VI, but it also has the option to use the outside supply market. Academic/practical relevance: Such co-opetitive practices are common in industrial supply chains, but firms’ co-opetitive strategic sourcing with the potential of information leakage has not been examined in the literature. Methodology: We build a game-theoretic model to capture the firms’ strategic interactions under the co-opetitive supply partnership with the potential information leakage. Results: The DO exploits its information advantage to obtain a better wholesale price from the VI and may use dual sourcing to protect its private information. Anticipating that, the VI may offer wholesale price concessions as an information rent to obtain the DO’s information. Our work identifies demand uncertainty and efficiency of outside supply market as the factors affecting the VI’s pricing decision and the resulting equilibrium. Pooling equilibrium arises often, but in a few cases, the equilibrium is separating. At the separating equilibrium, the DO always single sources, either from the VI or the independent supplier depending on the demand state. The VI benefits from ancillary revenue-generating opportunity, and from information acquisition in a separating equilibrium. On the other hand, the DO’s benefit is a cheaper price in exchange for market information in a separating equilibrium. In the pooling case, the DO uses dual sourcing to hide demand information, especially in the high demand case, and to better supply the end-market through his accurate demand information. Managerial implications: Our work provides useful insights into firms’ strategic sourcing behaviors to efficiently deal with the potential of information leakage in the co-opetitive supply environment and for the rationale behind such relationships often observed in industries.

Mitigating Supply Risk: Dual Sourcing or Process Improvement?

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yimin Wang ◽  
Wendell Gilland ◽  
Brian Tomlin
Keyword(s):  
Process Improvement ◽  
Supply Risk ◽  
Dual Sourcing

scholarly journals Contract Coordination in Dual Sourcing Supply Chain under Supply Disruption Risk

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tong Shu ◽  
Fang Yang ◽  
Shou Chen ◽  
Shouyang Wang ◽  
Kin Keung Lai ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Strike Price ◽  
Supply Disruption ◽  
Dual Sourcing ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Disruption Risk

This paper explores a coordination model for a three-echelon supply chain including two different manufacturers, one distributer and one retailer via the combined option and back contracts. And one manufacturer provides the high wholesale price with low supply disruption risk and the other is completely the opposite. This differs from the previous supply chain coordination model. Firstly, supply disruption is added to the three-echelon supply chain. Secondly, considering the coordination of the supply chain, we deploy the combined option and back contracts which are seldom used in the previous study. Furthermore, it is interesting that supply disruption risk and buyback factor do not affect the distributor’s order quantity from the manufacturer who has low product price and unreliable operating ability, while the order quantity increases with the rise of option premium and option strike price. The distributor’s order quantity from the manufacturer, which has high product price and reliable operating ability, increases with the rise of supply disruption risk but decreases when the buyback factor, option premium, and option strike price decrease.

Mitigating behavioral supply risk under dual sourcing: Evidence from an order allocation game

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chao Xue ◽  
Yan (Diana) Wu ◽  
Wanshan Zhu ◽  
Xiaobo Zhao ◽  
Jinghuo Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Risk ◽  
Order Allocation ◽  
Dual Sourcing

Strategic sourcing under recall loss sharing and product quality investment

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 1133-1160
Author(s):  
Binwei Dong ◽  
Wansheng Tang ◽  
Chi Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Product Quality ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Product Recall ◽  
Dual Sourcing ◽  
Investment Level ◽  
Sourcing Strategy ◽  
Practical Operation ◽  
Single Sourcing ◽  
Operation Risk

Product recall has been a widespread practical operation risk in the production outsourcing. To remit even avoid product recall risk, this paper considers a two-echelon supply chain where the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) orders a critical component from one or two contract manufacturers (CMs) and uses it to produce finished product with potential quality defect. The CMs can decide investment level to reduce defect possibility and share recall loss with the OEM once product recall is implemented. When the recall loss sharing rate is fixed, the OEM may adopt the single sourcing strategy or the dual sourcing strategy which depends on the recall loss sharing rate. Moreover, if the sharing rate is relatively small, the single sourcing strategy is an optimal choice for the OEM. However, when the recall loss sharing rate is determined by the OEM, she prefers to adopt the dual sourcing strategy. Meanwhile, an increase of the recall loss sharing rate may not force the CM to improve product quality. By the numerical analysis, if the marginal recall loss is large or the wholesale price is relatively small, the OEM and the CMs can reach a win-win scenario. Finally, we examine an extension in which the CMs have pricing ability on wholesale price, and the result shows that the OEM can not obtain a cost-reduction benefit under the dual sourcing strategy.

scholarly journals Backup Sourcing Decisions for Coping with Supply Disruptions under Long-Term Horizons

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Hou ◽  
Lijun Sun
Keyword(s):  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Dual Sourcing ◽  
Supply Disruptions ◽  
Sourcing Strategy ◽  
Major Supplier ◽  
Single Sourcing ◽  
Inventory Control Problem ◽  
Risk Parameters ◽  
Disruption Risks

This paper studies a buyer’s inventory control problem under a long-term horizon. The buyer has one major supplier that is prone to disruption risks and one backup supplier with higher wholesale price. Two kinds of sourcing methods are available for the buyer: single sourcing with/without contingent supply and dual sourcing. In contingent sourcing, the backup supplier is capacitated and/or has yield uncertainty, whereas in dual sourcing the backup supplier has an incentive to offer output flexibility during disrupted periods. The buyer’s expected cost functions and the optimal base-stock levels using each sourcing method under long-term horizon are obtained, respectively. The effects of three risk parameters, disruption probability, contingent capacity or uncertainty, and backup flexibility, are examined using comparative studies and numerical computations. Four sourcing methods, namely, single sourcing with contingent supply, dual sourcing, and single sourcing from either of the two suppliers, are also compared. These findings can be used as a valuable guideline for companies to select an appropriate sourcing strategy under supply disruption risks.

Better to Bend than to Break: Sharing Supply Risk Using the Supply-Flexibility Contract

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mehdi H. Farahani ◽  
Milind Dawande ◽  
Haresh Gurnani ◽  
Ganesh Janakiraman
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Supply Risk ◽  
Supply Source ◽  
Regular Production ◽  
Disruption Risk ◽  
Supply Flexibility

Problem definition: We analyze a contract in which a supplier who is exposed to disruption risk offers a supply-flexibility contract comprising of a wholesale price and a minimum-delivery fraction (“flexibility” fraction) to a buyer facing random demand. The supplier is allowed to deviate below the order quantity by at most the flexibility fraction. The supplier’s regular production is subject to random disruption, but she has access to a reliable expedited supply source at a higher marginal cost. Academic/practical relevance: Despite the prevalence of supply-flexibility contracts in practice, to the best of our knowledge, there is no previous academic literature examining the optimal design of supply-flexibility contracts. As such, the level of flexibility in practice is usually set on an ad-hoc basis, with buyers typically reluctant to share risk with suppliers. Our analysis of supply-flexibility contracts informs practice in two ways: First, using analytically supported arguments, it educates managers on the effects of their decisions on the economic outcomes. Second, it shows that the supply-flexibility contract benefits both the supplier and the buyer, regardless of which player chooses how supply risk is allocated in the supply chain. Methodology: Non-cooperative game theory, non-convex optimization. Results: We derive the supplier-led optimal contract and show that supply chain efficiency improves relative to the price-only contract. More interestingly, even though the buyer lets the supplier decide how the two share supply risk, profits of both the players increase by the introduction of flexibility into the contract. Further, supply flexibility may be even more valuable for the buyer compared with the supplier. Interestingly, the flexibility fraction is not monotone in supplier reliability and a more reliable supplier may even prefer to transfer more risk to the buyer. The robustness of these findings is established on two extensions: one where we study a buyer-led contract (i.e., the buyer chooses the flexibility fraction) and the other where the expedited supply option is available to both the supplier and the buyer. Managerial implications: The supply-flexibility contract is mutually beneficial for both players and yet retains all the advantages of the price-only contract—it is easy to implement, it requires minimal operational and administrative burden, and there is evidence of the use of such contracts in practice. While our focus is not on supply chain coordination, we note that the combination of two mechanisms—the supply-flexibility contract derived in this paper to share supply risk and a buyback contract to share demand risk—yields a coordinating contract.

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