Chief executive officers (CEOs) of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) firms are known to take lesser pay and engage themselves in corporate social responsibility activities to achieve the dual objective of the enhancement of firm’s performance as well as benefit for stakeholders in the long run. This study examines the role of ESG transparency in strengthening the impact of firm performance on total CEO pay in ESG firms. A panel of 67 firms for the period of 2014–2019 has been analyzed using the two-step system GMM model, with NSE Nifty 100 ESG Index as the data sample and ESG scores from Bloomberg database as a proxy for transparency. Findings reveal that environmental and governance disclosure scores have the potential to intensify the negative relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation, while social disclosure scores do not. In addition, various firm-specific, board-specific, and CEO-specific attributes have also been considered controls affecting remuneration. This paper contributes to the literature by exploring the effect of exhibiting ESG transparency and its nexus with CEO pay as well as firm performance.
This study analyzes the effect of Internal Revenue Code section 162(m) on the compensation package of those chief executive officers (CEOs) hired after the imposition of this code section. Research documents that CEO compensation has increased dramatically since the imposition of section 162(m); yet, this research has not distinguished between the effects on the compensation of CEOs already in place when section 162(m) was imposed from those CEOs hired post-162(m) imposition. We focus our analysis on the compensation of CEOs hired after the imposition of section 162(m), because when firms hire a new CEO, they have a better opportunity to redesign the executive pay package. Consequently, we posit that section 162(m) will have its greatest effect when the affected companies change CEOs. Our analysis provides evidence that the increase in salary normally associated with the hiring of a new CEO has been mitigated and there has been an increase in the sensitivity of firm performance to bonus pay for CEOs appointed after 1994 in affected firms.
In this paper the educational background of the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of Large U.S. Firms are examined. Specifically, the educational background of CEOs from large U.S. firms, as identified in the Forbes 800 Compensation List, are examined. Information concerning the number of Chief Executive Officers that received their undergraduate and graduate degrees from 463 institutes of higher education are compiled. We find that most CEOs have an undergraduate degree, while about half possess a graduate degree. The results indicate that there are preferred educational backgrounds for selection as the CEO of a major corporation. We also examine how the educational background of the CEO is related to the CEOs total compensation. The evidence indicates that those CEOs that do not have a degree earn significantly more than those CEOs that do have a college degree. We find little evidence that the school attended affects the compensation that the CEO receives. Finally, we examine firm ROA and Tobins Q based on the educational background of the CEO. We find an association between possession of a degree as well as where the degree was earned and the ROA and Tobins Q of the firm.
This study explores the implications of CEO entrepreneurial orientation for firm performance through corporate dynamic capabilities. It explores the moderating effects of firm industry type on the above indirect effect. Based on 188 matched sample data collected from vice chief executive officers (CEOs) of Chinese firms, this study found that CEO entrepreneurial orientation was positively related to corporate dynamic capabilities and firm performance and that corporate dynamic capabilities mediated the positive relationship between CEO entrepreneurial orientation and firm performance. Firm industry type moderated the direct effect of CEO entrepreneurial orientation on corporate dynamic capability, and the indirect effect of CEO entrepreneurial orientation on firm performance through corporate dynamic capability. Both direct and indirect effects were stronger in manufacturing enterprises. The findings enrich the CEO entrepreneurial orientation literature by extending the existing knowledge on its underlying mechanism and its impact on firm performance, as well as its boundary conditions.
To date, the effect of the specific type of prior work experience of chief executive officers (CEOs) on innovation and firm performance remains poorly understood. Using upper perspective theory, this study argues that CEOs’ academic work experience affects firms’ innovation output, which in turn determines how research and development (R&D) activities affect firm performance. Analyzing a sample of 1210 Chinese publicly traded firms from 2013–2017, we found that firms with CEOs who were previously associated with universities or research institutions had better innovation output and performance than firms led by CEOs without such background. In addition, we found that former academics spent more on R&D investment, resulting in lower firm performance compared to firms that were not led by CEOs with an academic background. Furthermore, the innovation output was even higher, and performance was inversely reduced for ventures where state ownership is significant.
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="color: black; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">This paper examines the educational background of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) from large U.S. firms. Forbes CEO compensation lists and Compustat data covering 500 or more firms annually are utilized in the analysis for the period 1997-2006.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Universities are ranked based on the number of graduates placed in top CEO positions and of the total compensation their graduates earn as CEO.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Results show a select group of schools educate a large proportion of top CEOs.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Harvard dominates the CEO market at all educational levels.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Results show low correlation between university placement rankings and compensation rankings.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Regressions on CEO compensation provide additional insights into CEO compensation determinants. Regressions of CEO educational variables on firm performance measures identify links between CEO education and firm performance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is the first known paper to examine CEO gender as a determinant of compensation and firm performance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The evidence here provides hiring and compensation committees valuable information on appropriate hiring, retention and compensation strategies.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It also provides government officials additional insights for designing appropriate regulations.</span></span></span></p>
AbstractThe purpose of this study is examine how agency theory and stewardship theory lead to different firm-level outcomes on an array of different outcomes. Based on these differences, we argue for the development of an agent–steward measurement scale, which will help researchers classify chief executive officers (CEOs) along an agent–steward continuum. This, in turn, will spur research to predict and test CEO behaviors and firm-level outcomes. Agency theory suggests CEOs take advantage of their powerful positions to maximize their personal economic utility, whereas stewardship theory suggests CEOs are motivated through intrinsic awards and will balance their interests with those of other stakeholders. We use these theories to examine possible differences in CEO behaviors. This is important because different CEO behaviors might lead to differing impacts on important firm-level outcomes. This paper reviews the relevant agency and stewardship literatures, then offers propositions regarding CEO behaviors from agent and steward perspectives.
The purpose of the current study was to examine the indirect effects of executives' stakeholder and economic values on firm performance through their followers' perceptions of leadership and followers' extra effort. Analyses of data collected from separate surveys of chief executive officers (CEOs) and two subsets of followers in 520 firms in 17 countries show that CEOs' emphasis on economic values is associated with followers' perceptions of autocratic leadership, whereas CEOs' emphasis on stakeholder values is associated with followers' perceptions of visionary leadership. Additionally, visionary leadership relates positively to employees' extra effort, which in turn relates to firm performance; however, no relationship is found for autocratic leadership. We discuss how predominant decision-making values that are oriented toward a range of stakeholders may yield more favorable outcomes for leaders than values that focus primarily on economic-based issues.
CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: The Role of ESG Transparency