Language Signaling High Proportions and Generics Lead to Generalizing, but Not Essentializing, for Novel Social Kinds

2021 ◽  
Vol 45 (11) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Hoicka ◽  
Jennifer Saul ◽  
Eloise Prouten ◽  
Laura Whitehead ◽  
Rachel Sterken
Keyword(s):  
Social Kinds

Administrasi Humas

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmad Rifai
Keyword(s):  
The Social ◽  
Social Kinds

Abstract—This article aims to explain the understanding of the definiton of interaction of school with social, the interaction in the social, kinds of husemas, and fungsion of teacher in interaction of school and social.

scholarly journals PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS AND SOCIAL KINDS

2006 ◽  
Vol 106 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sally Haslanger ◽  
Jennifer Saul
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Social Kinds

scholarly journals The Logic and Normative Force of Dual-Character Generics: Towards a Theoretical Model for the Study of Normatively Shifted Predications

2020 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-126
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Kowalewska-Buraczewska
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Noun Phrases ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
Social Constructs ◽  
Normative Force ◽  
Social Kinds ◽  
Dual Character ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThis paper investigates the relationship between generic statements and the expression, transmission and persistence of social norms. The author presents the concept of normativity and its importance in the decision-making process in the context of social reality and social norms that comprise it (Bicchieri, 2006, 2016; Bicchieri et al., 2018). The paper analyses the idea of “what is normal” (Haslanger, 2014) to show how social norms are triggered by particular generic constructions relating to “social kinds”, represented by noun phrases denoting “dual character concepts” (Knobe et al., 2013; Prasada et al., 2013; Leslie, 2015). DCCs are shown as effectively serving their persuasive and explanatory function due to their polysemous nature (Leslie, 2015) rather than to different pragmatics (Leslie, forthcoming). Special focus is placed on gender terms as particularly salient social kinds; this salience can be explained by a culturally pivotal role of social constructs of manhood and womanhood and by linguistic potential of generics in the development of social beliefs and legitimizing norm-driven behaviours.

Function Is Not Enough

2019 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irene Olivero
Keyword(s):  
State Of The Art ◽  
The State ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Extrinsic Property ◽  
Externalist Theory ◽  
Social Kinds ◽  
Common Nature

The “nature” of an artifact is often equated with its function. Clearly, an artifactual function must be an extrinsic property. This feature of functions has important implications on the semantics of artifactual kind terms: it enables us to vindicate that artifactual kind terms have an externalist semantics. Any alleged externalist theory, indeed, must show that the referents of the considered terms share a common nature (i.e., an extrinsic property), whether we know or could possibly ever know what that nature is. However, the state of the art shows that function is not enough to represent such “nature”: function does not exhaustively account for important phenomena that characterize artifacts and artifactual kinds, nor does it thoroughly define what they are. Thus, extending the scope of externalism to artifactual kind terms seems doomed to fail. Pace opposite views, it could even be argued that artifacts are a sub-class of social kinds. If so, not only social but also artifactual kind terms cannot refer externalistically, since their referents constitutively depend on human intentions and norms. Either way, externalism fails to apply to those kinds of terms.

scholarly journals Formation Stories and Causality in Sociology

2014 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 259-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Hirschman ◽  
Isaac Ariail Reed
Keyword(s):  
Causal Analysis ◽  
Social Kinds ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

Sociologists have long been interested in understanding the emergence of new social kinds. We argue that sociologists’ formation stories have been mischaracterized as noncausal, descriptive, or interpretive. Traditional “forcing-cause” accounts describe regularized relations between fixed entities with specific properties. The three dominant approaches to causality—variable causality, treatments and manipulations, and mechanisms—all refer to forcing causes. But formation stories do not fit the forcing-causes framework because accounts of formation violate the assumptions that ground forcing-cause accounts and instead emphasize eventfulness, assemblage, and self-representation. Yet these accounts are, we argue, fundamentally causal. In particular, formation stories provide the historical, empirical boundaries for the functioning of forcing-cause accounts. We catalog the breadth of formation stories in sociology and use examples from diverse literatures to highlight how thinking of formation stories as causal accounts can improve our understanding of the relationship of history and culture to causal analysis.

scholarly journals Three Conceptions of a Theory of Institutions

2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (6) ◽  
pp. 550-568 ◽  
Author(s):  
N.Emrah Aydinonat ◽  
Petri Ylikoski
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Social Institution ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Social Kinds

We compare Guala’s unified theory of institutions with that of Searle and Greif. We show that unification can be many things and it may be associated with diverse explanatory goals. We also highlight some of the important shortcomings of Guala’s account: it does not capture all social institutions, its ability to bridge social ontology and game theory is based on a problematic interpretation of the type-token distinction, and its ability to make social ontology useful for social sciences is hindered by Guala’s interpretation of social institution types as social kinds akin to natural kinds.

scholarly journals Social Kinds, Reference, and Meta-Ontological Revisionism

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-156
Author(s):  
Michel-Antoine Xhignesse
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Social World ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
First Order ◽  
Epistemic Humility ◽  
Substantial Error ◽  
Social Kinds ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Default Position

AbstractJulian Dodd has characterized the default position in metaphysics as meta-ontologically realist: the answers to first-order ontological questions are thought to be entirely independent of the things we say and think about the entities at issue. Consequently, folk ontologies are liable to substantial error. But while this epistemic humility is commendable where the ontology of natural kinds is concerned, it seems misplaced with respect to social kinds since their ontology is dependent upon the human social world. Using art and art-kinds as paradigmatic examples of social kinds, I argue that meta-ontological realism sets conditions that are too strict to apply to social kinds. Nevertheless, I argue that we should not be too quick to embrace the conclusion that our folk theories of social kinds cannot err substantially. By modelling the reference of social kind-terms on that of natural kind-terms, it becomes clear that in both cases, our sole epistemic privilege lies in our ability to pinpoint the subject of our inquiries.

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