Labor supply response to overpayment notifications: Evidence from Social Security Disability Insurance

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Priyanka Anand ◽  
Denise Hoffman ◽  
John T. Jones ◽  
Siarhei Lukashanets
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Labor Supply ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Social Security Disability Insurance ◽  
Supply Response ◽  
Social Security Disability

scholarly journals Does Disability Insurance Receipt Discourage Work? Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of SSDI Receipt

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (5) ◽  
pp. 1797-1829 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole Maestas ◽  
Kathleen J Mullen ◽  
Alexander Strand
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Labor Supply ◽  
Administrative Data ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Causal Effects ◽  
Social Security Disability Insurance ◽  
Insurance Benefit ◽  
Percentage Points ◽  
Program Entry ◽  
Social Security Disability

We present the first causal estimates of the effect of Social Security Disability Insurance benefit receipt on labor supply using all program applicants. We use administrative data to match applications to disability examiners and exploit variation in examiners' allowance rates as an instrument for benefit receipt. We find that among the estimated 23 percent of applicants on the margin of program entry, employment would have been 28 percentage points higher had they not received benefits. The effect is heterogeneous, ranging from no effect for those with more severe impairments to 50 percentage points for entrants with relatively less severe impairments. (JEL H55, J14, J22)

Who’s at risk of entering Social Security Disability Insurance? A comparison of application and allowance rates for groups of at-risk individuals

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kara Contreary ◽  
Todd Honeycutt
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
Social Security ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Risk Groups ◽  
Evidence Base ◽  
Social Security Disability Insurance ◽  
Program Participation ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Social Security Disability ◽  
Employment Characteristics

BACKGROUND: The U.S. government has implemented several programs to reduce federal expenditures on Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and help beneficiaries return to work, but the limited success of these efforts has raised interest in approaches that help workers with disabilities remain in the workforce. OBJECTIVE: This paper provides information on individuals at risk of applying for DI benefits to help build the evidence base for policies that provide workers with disabilities support to eliminate the need to apply for and receive DI benefits. METHODS: Using three panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to SSA administrative data, we describe the employment characteristics of seven groups at risk of applying for DI benefits before and after application, as well as the outcomes of their DI applications. RESULTS: New private disability insurance recipients were more likely to apply for and receive DI than members of other at-risk groups. However, individuals with high healthcare expenditures made up the largest proportion of successful applicants across the at-risk groups considered here. CONCLUSION: While it seems plausible that individuals within an at-risk group who are likely to apply for DI benefits can be identified and provided supports to help them maintain employment, focusing on a specific group to promote employment over DI benefits may have a limited effect on the DI program because applicants come from multiple groups.

Placement Decision Dilemmas and Solutions

1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (6) ◽  
pp. 268-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.G. Hopf
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Service Delivery ◽  
Educational System ◽  
Supported Employment ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Social Security Disability Insurance ◽  
Placement Decisions ◽  
Placement Decision ◽  
Social Security Disability

This paper presents the private agency's view of the service-delivery dilemma of funding versus placement decisions. It focuses on three program areas to highlight this dilemma: 1) Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) disincentives to competitive placement, 2) the private agency's role when the educational system falls short, and 3) supported employment.

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