From Gray Panther to National Nanny: The Kidvid Crusade and the Eclipse of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 1977-1980

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 576-593
Author(s):  
Molly Niesen
Keyword(s):  
Federal Trade Commission ◽  
The U.S

Antitrust: U.S. Supreme Court Affirms FTC Jurisdiction but Vacates Scope of Analysis on CDA Policy

1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-198
Author(s):  
Joseph R. Zakhary
Keyword(s):  
Public Relations ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Trade Commission ◽  
Ninth Circuit ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Rule Of Reason ◽  
Antitrust Analysis ◽  
Business Financing ◽  
The U.S

In California Dental Association v. FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that a nonprofit affiliation of dentists violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1998), which prohibits unfair competition. The Court examined two issues: (1) the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) jurisdiction over the California Dental Association (CDA); and (2) the proper scope of antitrust analysis. The Court unanimously held that CDA was subject to FTC's jurisdiction, but split 5-4 in its finding that the district court's use of abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was inappropriate.CDA is a voluntary, nonprofit association of local dental societies. It boasts approximately 19,000 members, who constitute roughly threequarters of the dentists practicing in California. Although a nonprofit, CDA includes for-profit subsidiaries that financially benefit CDA members. CDA gives its members access to insurance and business financing, and lobbies and litigates on their behalf. Members also benefit from CDA marketing and public relations campaigns.

scholarly journals Judicial Response to the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-79
Author(s):  
Carl Shapiro ◽  
Howard Shelanski
Keyword(s):  
Federal Trade Commission ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
Horizontal Merger ◽  
Average Increase ◽  
Department Of Justice ◽  
Merger Guidelines ◽  
Direct Competition ◽  
The Government ◽  
The U.S

AbstractWe study how the courts have responded to the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. Looking at decided cases, we find that both the government and merging parties rely on the 2010 Guidelines in presenting their cases, each side respectively arguing that it should win if the court properly follows them . The 2010 Guidelines had the strongest effect on the case law in the area of unilateral effects, where a number of courts have embraced them in ways that clearly depart from earlier decisions. The case law now exhibits much greater receptivity to a government showing that the merger will lead to higher prices simply due to the loss of direct competition between the two merging firms. The courts also have followed the 2010 Guidelines by more willingly defining markets around targeted customers. We do not detect any effect on decided cases of the higher concentration thresholds found in the 2010 Guidelines. Both the average pre-merger level of market concentration and the average increase in market concentration alleged by the government in litigated cases to date declined after 2010 .

Too scared to shop: The role of apatephobia, trust, risk, and suspicion in market exchanges

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus Wardley
Keyword(s):  
Federal Trade Commission ◽  
Counterfactual Thinking ◽  
Feedback Mechanism ◽  
Current Paper ◽  
Market Exchange ◽  
Nomological Network ◽  
Defensive Processing ◽  
Intentional Deception ◽  
The U.S

According to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, in 2018 there were over 1.4 million reports of fraud resulting in an estimated loss to consumers of $1.48 billion (Federal Trade Commission, 2019). A natural reaction to the prevalence of fraudulent transactions is apatephobia, or a fear of intentional deception leading to less desirable outcomes in a market exchange. The current paper relates apatephobia to the literature on trust, risk, suspicion, defensive processing, emotions, and counterfactual thinking and offers 15 propositions related to these constructs. Further, a nomological network is proposed which relates these constructs together, identifies the conditions under which apatephobia will result in a consumer declining to engage in an exchange, and the feedback mechanism by which being deceived strengthens the motivation to avoid any future reoccurrence. Little academic attention has been paid to a fear of being deceived, thus I expect the current work to be of interest to researchers in the area of trust, risk, and deception.

FTC Presses its Attack on Behavioral Advertising

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles H. Kennedy
Keyword(s):  
Federal Trade Commission ◽  
Online Tracking ◽  
Individual Actions ◽  
The U.S

AbstractAs online tracking for marketing purposes becomes more common in the U.S., the Federal Trade Commission is leading the effort to control those practices. This article examines the FTC’s guidelines for behavioral advertising and suggests that future enforcement efforts will concentrate on individual actions against companies that are alleged to have violated the guidelines. Also discussed in this article is a recent FTC action against a company’s use of online tracking.

scholarly journals Vertical Mergers and Input Foreclosure Lessons from the AT&T/Time Warner Case

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Federal Trade Commission ◽  
Department Of Justice ◽  
Merger Guidelines ◽  
Vertical Merger ◽  
Practical Guide ◽  
Economic Expert ◽  
Time Warner ◽  
Vertical Mergers ◽  
The U.S

AbstractThis article offers a practical guide to analyzing vertical mergers using the general approach to input foreclosure and raising rivals’ costs that is described in the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines that were issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. The step-by-step analysis described here draws lessons from how that theory of harm played out in the lone vertical merger case that has been litigated by the antitrust agencies in recent decades: the 2018 challenge by the Department of Justice to the merger between AT&T and Time Warner. I testified in court as the DOJ’s economic expert in that case. I explain here how to quantify the increase in rivals’ costs and the elimination of double marginalization that are caused by a vertical merger and how to evaluate their net effect on downstream customers. I also explain how this economic analysis fits into the three-step burden-shifting approach that the courts apply to mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Based on my experience in the AT&T/Time Warner case, I identify a number of shortcomings of the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines.

scholarly journals TFD: TELECOM FRAUD DETECTION USING CONSOLIDATED WEIGHTED REPUTATION ALGORITHM

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-174
Author(s):  
J. Deepa Anbarasi, Dr. V. Radha
Keyword(s):  
Federal Trade Commission ◽  
Fraud Detection ◽  
Mobile Network ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Phone Calls ◽  
Traffic Detection ◽  
The U.S

Noisy phone calls are aggravating and distracting, as well as frustrating. They may be classed as 'nuisance', 'emergency', 'random', and 'unsolicited' calls. Users have no inherent privileges on the internet; rather, their personalities are produced without any arrangement or evidence of involvement. It costs the U.S. communications company $8 billion per year to avoid call spam on the phone grid. Between January 2014 and June 2018, the FTC (Federal Trade Commission) received over 22 million reports of fraudulent and illegal telemarketing calls. Nowadays, the mobile network is used to issue automatic phone calls such as robocalls. Since it operates on text, we struggle with the following: What tactics and methods do we use to combat spam? Telephone TFD (Telecom Fraud Detection) here is discussed first. Concerning spam, we advanced our proposal by proposing a targeted traffic detection using a single weighted credibility algorithm with appropriate weighting criteria.

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