Protection for Sale: The case of oligopolistic competition and interdependent sectors

2014 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 1195-1216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Paltseva
2001 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Bernhofen ◽  
Zahid Hafeez

2006 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 380-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rigoberto A. Lopez ◽  
Xenia Matschke

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Fan ◽  
Chenyu Yang

This paper studies (1) whether, from a welfare point of view, oligopolistic competition leads to too few or too many products in a market, and (2) how a change in competition affects the number and the composition of product offerings. We address these two questions in the context of the US smartphone market. Our findings show that this market contains too few products and that a reduction in competition decreases both the number and variety of products. These results suggest that product choice adjustment may exacerbate the welfare effect of a merger. (JEL D43, G34, K21, L13, L41, L63)


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