Entry deterrence by cheap talk

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeong‐Yoo Kim
Keyword(s):  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Entry Deterrence

Can Cheap Talk Deter?

2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (6) ◽  
pp. 996-1020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dustin H. Tingley ◽  
Barbara F. Walter
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Verbal Communication ◽  
Entry Deterrence ◽  
Potential Importance ◽  
Substantial Impact ◽  
Shed Light

What effect does cheap talk have on behavior in an entry-deterrence game? We shed light on this question using incentivized laboratory experiments of the strategic interaction between defenders and potential entrants. Our results suggest that cheap talk can have a substantial impact on the behavior of both the target and the speaker. By sending costless threats to potential entrants, defenders are able to deter opponents in early periods of play. Moreover, after issuing threats, defenders become more eager to fight. We offer a number of different explanations for this behavior. These results bring fresh evidence about the potential importance of costless verbal communication to the field of international relations.

Confiance, réciprocité et cheap talk

1999 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-44
Author(s):  
Claude Meidinger ◽  
Stéphane Robin ◽  
Bernard Ruffieux
Keyword(s):  
Cheap Talk

The Effect of Continuous-Time Cheap Talk in the Experimental Minimum Effort Game

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hisashi Toku ◽  
Tatsuhiro Shichijo ◽  
Kazuhito Ogawa
Keyword(s):  
Continuous Time ◽  
Cheap Talk
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