They should have known better: The roles of negligence and outcome in moral judgements of accidental actions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Nobes ◽  
Justin W. Martin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgements

Midgley`s Can't We Make Moral Judgements?

1994 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jefferey Blustein
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgements

History and Morality

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Bloxham
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Country ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Majority Opinion ◽  
The Past ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Value Judgements ◽  
The Impact

Against majority opinion within his profession, Donald Bloxham argues that it is legitimate, often unavoidable, and frequently important for historians to make value judgements about the past. History and Morality draws on a wide range of historical examples, and its author’s insights as a practising historian. Examining concepts like impartiality, neutrality, contextualization, and the use and abuse of the idea of the past as a foreign country, Bloxham’s book investigates how the discipline has got to the point where what is preached can be so inconsistent with what is practised. It illuminates how far tacit moral judgements infuse works of history, and how strange those histories would look if the judgements were removed. Bloxham argues that rather than trying to eradicate all judgemental elements from their work historians need to think more consistently about how, and with what justification, they make the judgements that they do. The importance of all this lies not just in the responsibilities that historians bear towards the past—responsibilities to take historical actors on those actors’ own terms and to portray the impact of those actors’ deeds—but also in the role of history as a source of identity, pride, and shame in the present. The account of moral thought in History and Morality has ramifications far beyond the activities of vocational historians.

scholarly journals Inclusive and exclusive beneficiary attributions: The role of social identity complexity in interpretations of and punishment for dissent

2021 ◽  
pp. 136843022110194
Author(s):  
Sonia Roccas ◽  
Adi Amit ◽  
Shani Oppenheim-Weller ◽  
Osnat Hazan ◽  
Lilach Sagiv
Keyword(s):  
Social Identity ◽  
Social Identities ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Identity Complexity ◽  
Social Identity Complexity

We suggest that intentionality attributed to dissenting behavior in intergroup contexts (e.g., exposing one’s country’s secrets) may be conceptualized as benefitting one of four social circles. Two social circles exclude the perceiver: (a) the actor him/herself and (b) the outgroup affected by the behavior; and two circles include the perceiver: (c) the ingroup of both the perceiver and the actor and (d) humanity as the ultimate collective including both ingroup and outgroup. We further suggest that adopting different beneficiary attributions depends on the perceivers’ social identity complexity (Roccas & Brewer, 2002), which refers to an individual’s representation of their multiple social identities on a continuum from highly overlapping to highly differentiated (i.e., simple vs. complex social identity). Perceivers are more likely to attribute dissent behavior to social circles that exclude (rather than include) themselves the simpler their social identity; such exclusive attributions lead to harsher moral judgements, expressed as punitiveness.

On Justifying Moral Judgements.

1975 ◽  
Vol 25 (98) ◽  
pp. 93
Author(s):  
Anne Lloyd Thomas ◽  
Laurence C. Becker
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgements

scholarly journals Moral Judgements on the Actions of Self-Driving Cars and Human Drivers in Dilemma Situations From Different Perspectives

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noa Kallioinen ◽  
Maria Pershina ◽  
Jannik Zeiser ◽  
Farbod Nosrat Nezami ◽  
Gordon Pipa ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Self Driving Cars

scholarly journals Do Moral Judgements Motivate Free Will Belief?

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Elliott Monroe ◽  
Dominic Ysidron
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Causal Relationship ◽  
Attribution Theory ◽  
Replication Study ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Experiment Study ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
Immoral Behavior ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Do So

Free will is often appraised as a necessary input to for holding others morally or legally responsible for misdeeds. Recently, however, Clark and colleagues (2014), argued for the opposite causal relationship. They assert that moral judgments and the desire to punish motivate people’s belief in free will. In three experiments—two exact replications (Studies 1 & 2b) and one close replication (Study 2a) we seek to replicate these findings. Additionally, in a novel experiment (Study 3) we test a theoretical challenge derived from attribution theory, which suggests that immoral behaviors do not uniquely influence free will judgments. Instead, our nonviolation model argues that norm deviations, of any kind—good, bad, or strange—cause people to attribute more free will to agents, and attributions of free will are explained via desire inferences. Across replication experiments we found no evidence for the original claim that witnessing immoral behavior causes people to increase their belief in free will, though we did replicate the finding that people attribute more free will to agents who behave immorally compared to a neutral control (Studies 2a & 3). Finally, our novel experiment demonstrated broad support for our norm-violation account, suggesting that people’s willingness to attribute free will to others is malleable, but not because people are motivated to blame. Instead, this experiment shows that attributions of free will are best explained by people’s expectations for norm adherence, and when these expectations are violated people infer that an agent expressed their free will to do so.

scholarly journals Belief Pills and the Possibility of Moral Epistemology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Sinclair
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Truth ◽  
Recent Attempt ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking ◽  
Evolutionary Explanations ◽  
Moral Facts

This chapter argues that evolutionary debunking arguments are dialectically ineffective. Such arguments rely on the premise that moral judgements can be given evolutionary explanations which do not invoke their truth. The challenge for the debunker is to bridge the gap between this premise and the conclusion that moral judgements are unjustified. After discussing older attempts to bridge this gap, this chapter focuses on Joyce’s recent attempt, which claims that ‘we do not have a believable account of how moral facts could explain the mechanisms…which give rise to moral judgements’. It argues that whether there is such an account depends on what it is permissible to assume about moral truth and that it is reasonable to make assumptions which allow for the possibility of at least partial moral epistemologies. The challenge for the debunker is to show that these assumptions are unreasonable in a way which does not render their debunking argument superfluous.

scholarly journals Moral judgement by the disconnected left and right cerebral hemispheres: a split-brain investigation

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (7) ◽  
pp. 170172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Conor M. Steckler ◽  
J. Kiley Hamlin ◽  
Michael B. Miller ◽  
Danielle King ◽  
Alan Kingstone
Keyword(s):  
Brain Research ◽  
Right Hemisphere ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Moral Judgement ◽  
Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
Split Brain ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
The Right ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

Owing to the hemispheric isolation resulting from a severed corpus callosum, research on split-brain patients can help elucidate the brain regions necessary and sufficient for moral judgement. Notably, typically developing adults heavily weight the intentions underlying others' moral actions, placing greater importance on valenced intentions versus outcomes when assigning praise and blame. Prioritization of intent in moral judgements may depend on neural activity in the right hemisphere's temporoparietal junction, an area implicated in reasoning about mental states. To date, split-brain research has found that the right hemisphere is necessary for intent-based moral judgement. When testing the left hemisphere using linguistically based moral vignettes, split-brain patients evaluate actions based on outcomes, not intentions. Because the right hemisphere has limited language ability relative to the left, and morality paradigms to date have involved significant linguistic demands, it is currently unknown whether the right hemisphere alone generates intent-based judgements. Here we use nonlinguistic morality plays with split-brain patient J.W. to examine the moral judgements of the disconnected right hemisphere, demonstrating a clear focus on intent. This finding indicates that the right hemisphere is not only necessary but also sufficient for intent-based moral judgement, advancing research into the neural systems supporting the moral sense.

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