In defence of person‐affecting procreative beneficence

Bioethics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergio Filippo Magni
Keyword(s):  
Procreative Beneficence

scholarly journals Reasons, Rationalities, and Procreative Beneficence: Need Häyry Stand Politely By While Savulescu and Herissone-Kelly Disagree?

2011 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 258-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER HERISSONE-KELLY
Keyword(s):  
Rational Deliberation ◽  
Procreative Beneficence ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Styles Of Reasoning ◽  
The Way

The claim that the answers we give to many of the central questions in genethics will depend crucially upon the particular rationality we adopt in addressing them is central to Matti Häyry’s thorough and admirably fair-minded book, Rationality and the Genetic Challenge. That claim implies, of course, that there exists a plurality of rationalities, or discrete styles of reasoning, that can be deployed when considering concrete moral problems. This, indeed, is Häyry’s position. Although he believes that there are certain features definitive of any type of thinking that can accurately be labeled rational, he maintains that nothing about that set of features compels us to conclude that there is a single rationality. What is more, and significantly for the way in which Häyry’s book develops, there is no Archimedean point from which we are licensed to pronounce one flavor of rational deliberation to be intrinsically superior to any other or to be justified to the exclusion of all others. To this belief that “there are many divergent rationalities, all of which can be simultaneously valid,” we can perhaps give the name “the Doctrine of the Plurality of Rationalities” or, for short, “DPR.”

Nascere per sbaglio / To be born by mistake

2018 ◽  
Vol 67 (5) ◽  
pp. 563-580
Author(s):  
Elena Colombetti
Keyword(s):  
Health Problem ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Philosophical Perspective ◽  
Western Countries ◽  
Wrongful Life ◽  
Procreative Beneficence ◽  
The World ◽  
Wrongful Birth

Il danno da procreazione costituisce una fattispecie giuridica che da qualche decennio impegna molti tribunali di Paesi occidentali. Il testo affronta la questione dal punto di vista filosofico, analizzando il concetto stesso di danno da procreazione, nel suo duplice versante di nascita sbagliata e di vita sbagliata, e le argomentazioni che sostengono il dovere morale di non far nascere esseri umani con un problema di salute. In particolare vengono prese in esame la tesi di Harris e di Savulescu, secondo cui tale doverosità deriva dall’obbligo di non introdurre sofferenza inutile nel mondo (Harris) e dal Principio di Beneficialità Procreativa (Savulescu). L’analisi è condotta secondo due livelli: il primo rimanendo nella logica stessa della beneficialità e della non maleficienza, cercando anche di vedere se le premesse poste dai due autori portino effettivamente alla conclusione dell’esistenza di tale obbligo morale; la seconda discutendo alcune delle premesse teoriche di tali tesi. ---------- For a few decades, many courts of western countries are facing the claims for wrongful birth and wrongful life. The paper addresses the issue from a philosophical perspective, analysing the same concept of a “damage from procreation”, in its double face of wrongful birth and wrongful life, and the arguments that support the moral duty of not giving birth to human beings with a health problem. Specifically, it examines the thesis of Harris and Savulescu, according to which such dutifulness derives from the obligation not to introduce unnecessary suffering in the world (Harris) and the Principle of Procreative Beneficence (Savulescu). The analysis is conducted on two levels: the first, remaining in the logic of beneficence and non-maleficence, trying to see if the premises laid down by the two authors lead to the conclusion of the existence of this moral obligation; in the second, discussing some of the theoretical premises of these theses.

Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children

Bioethics ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 413-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Savulescu
Keyword(s):  
Procreative Beneficence

scholarly journals Selektion zum Wohl des zukünftigen Kindes?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Denkhaus
Keyword(s):  
Procreative Beneficence

ZusammenfassungDer Beitrag setzt sich kritisch mit dem Prinzip des prokreativen Wohltuns (principle of procreative beneficence, PB) von Julian Savulescu und seinen Implikationen für den Umgang mit der Präimplantationsdiagnostik (PID) auseinander. PB fordert angehende Eltern dazu auf, aus mehreren möglichen zukünftigen Kindern dasjenige auszuwählen, dessen Leben voraussichtlich am besten verlaufen wird. Paare mit Kinderwunsch sind danach zumindest unter bestimmten Umständen (z. B. wenn im Rahmen einer unabhängig indizierten IVF mehr Embryonen entstehen, als übertragen werden können) moralisch verpflichtet, eine PID in Anspruch zu nehmen, um die Weitergabe genetisch bedingter Krankheiten zu verhindern. Die Auswahl von Embryonen im Rahmen einer PID kann jedoch nur dann mit dem Wohlergehen des zukünftigen Kindes begründet werden, wenn man die entsprechende Wohltunspflicht mit Savulescu und Kahane als „unpersönliche“ moralische Pflicht versteht. PB wirft daher die Frage nach der Relevanz unpersönlicher Erwägungen für Entscheidungen über Fortpflanzung und Familiengründung auf. Gegen Savulescu und Kahane argumentiere ich dafür, reproduktive Verantwortung als einen integralen Aspekt elterlicher Verantwortung und damit als personenbezogene Verantwortung zu deuten, und verteidige diese Konzeption reproduktiver Verantwortung gegen Einwände, die sich aus einem von Savulescu und Kahane konstruierten hypothetischen Szenario – dem Röteln-Beispiel – ergeben.

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