Do risk and competition trigger conditional cooperation? Evidence from public good experiments

Analisi della sostenibilitŕ economica di un sistema di sviluppo locale: simulazione ad agenti di configurazioni dei meccanismi cooperativi tra produttori

SOCIOLOGIA DEL LAVORO ◽

10.3280/sl2009-114004 ◽

2009 ◽

pp. 35-50

Author(s):

Riccardo Boero

Keyword(s):

Public Good ◽

Formal Model ◽

Local Development ◽

Social Simulation ◽

Public Good Provision ◽

Conditional Cooperation ◽

Agent Based ◽

Development System ◽

Cooperative Dynamics ◽

Good Provision

- The author presents a formal model of cooperative dynamics in a local development system, with a specific focus on the evaluation of institutional interventions undertaken by stakeholders aiming at supporting cooperation.Keywords: agent-based social simulation, Slowfood presidia, voluntary public good provision, conditional cooperation, rural local development systems

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Evolution of conditional cooperation in public good games

Royal Society Open Science ◽

10.1098/rsos.191567 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 7 (5) ◽

pp. 191567

Author(s):

Balaraju Battu ◽

Narayanan Srinivasan

Keyword(s):

Public Good ◽

Social Behaviour ◽

Role Models ◽

Population Level ◽

Public Goods Game ◽

Conditional Cooperation ◽

The Social ◽

Previous Round ◽

Good Behaviour ◽

Public Good Games

Cooperation declines in repeated public good games because individuals behave as conditional cooperators. This is because individuals imitate the social behaviour of successful individuals when their payoff information is available. However, in human societies, individuals cooperate in many situations involving social dilemmas. We hypothesize that humans are sensitive to both success (payoffs) and how that success was obtained, by cheating (not socially sanctioned) or good behaviour (socially sanctioned and adds to prestige or reputation), when information is available about payoffs and prestige. We propose and model a repeated public good game with heterogeneous conditional cooperators where an agent's donation in a public goods game depends on comparing the number of donations in the population in the previous round and with the agent's arbitrary chosen conditional cooperative criterion. Such individuals imitate the social behaviour of role models based on their payoffs and prestige. The dependence is modelled by two population-level parameters: affinity towards payoff and affinity towards prestige . These affinities influence the degree to which agents value the payoff and prestige of role models. Agents update their conditional strategies by considering both parameters. The simulations in this study show that high levels of cooperation are established in a population consisting of heterogeneous conditional cooperators for a certain range of affinity parameters in repeated public good games. The results show that social value (prestige) is important in establishing cooperation.

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Conditional cooperation and confusion in public-goods experiments

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences ◽

10.1073/pnas.1509740113 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 113 (5) ◽

pp. 1291-1296 ◽

Cited By ~ 52

Author(s):

Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew ◽

Claire El Mouden ◽

Stuart A. West

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Behavioral Economics ◽

Public Good ◽

Alternative Explanation ◽

Experimental Methods ◽

Conditional Cooperation ◽

Common Assumption ◽

Economics Experiments ◽

Cast Doubt ◽

Public Good Games

Economic experiments are often used to study if humans altruistically value the welfare of others. A canonical result from public-good games is that humans vary in how they value the welfare of others, dividing into fair-minded conditional cooperators, who match the cooperation of others, and selfish noncooperators. However, an alternative explanation for the data are that individuals vary in their understanding of how to maximize income, with misunderstanding leading to the appearance of cooperation. We show that (i) individuals divide into the same behavioral types when playing with computers, whom they cannot be concerned with the welfare of; (ii) behavior across games with computers and humans is correlated and can be explained by variation in understanding of how to maximize income; (iii) misunderstanding correlates with higher levels of cooperation; and (iv) standard control questions do not guarantee understanding. These results cast doubt on certain experimental methods and demonstrate that a common assumption in behavioral economics experiments, that choices reveal motivations, will not necessarily hold.

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Conditional cooperation in case of a global public good – Experimental evidence from climate change mitigation in Beijing

China Economic Review ◽

10.1016/j.chieco.2019.101308 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 56 ◽

pp. 101308 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Bodo Sturm ◽

Jiansuo Pei ◽

Ran Wang ◽

Andreas Löschel ◽

Zhongxiu Zhao

Keyword(s):

Climate Change ◽

Public Good ◽

Experimental Evidence ◽

Climate Change Mitigation ◽

Global Public Good ◽

Conditional Cooperation ◽

Change Mitigation

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Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs

American Economic Journal Microeconomics ◽

10.1257/mic.20180336 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 13 (4) ◽

pp. 261-299

Author(s):

Florian Engl ◽

Arno Riedl ◽

Roberto Weber

Keyword(s):

Public Good ◽

Cooperative Behavior ◽

Spillover Effects ◽

Direct Influence ◽

Control Groups ◽

Conditional Cooperation ◽

Positive Spillover ◽

Public Good Games

Most institutions are limited in scope. We study experimentally how enforcement institutions affect behavior, preferences, and beliefs beyond their direct influence over the behaviors they control. Groups play two identical public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. Institutions generally have economically significant positive spillover effects to the unregulated game. We also observe that institutions enhance conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about others’ cooperativeness, suggesting that both factors are drivers of observed spillover effects. In additional treatments, we provide evidence for several factors, including characteristics of institutions, that enhance or limit the effectiveness and scope of spillover effects. (JEL C92, D02, D83, D91, H41)

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