INSUFFICIENT ENTRY OF EMPLOYEE-CONTROLLED FIRMS IN A FREE-ENTRY OLIGOPOLY

2017 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 437-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kojun HAMADA ◽  
Takao OHKAWA ◽  
Makoto OKAMURA
Keyword(s):  
Free Entry ◽  
Insufficient Entry

Two Rationales for Insufficient Entry

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Linfeng Chen ◽  
Tan Li ◽  
Bing Qian
Keyword(s):  
General Model ◽  
Free Entry ◽  
Excessive Entry ◽  
D Investment ◽  
Insufficient Entry

AbstractThis study offers two new rationales for insufficient entry in a given industry. The first is the presence of complementary industries. Suppose there is free entry in an industry and the complementary industries are monopolistic. If the number of complementary industries is sufficiently high, then there is insufficient entry. However, if these industries are substitutes, then there is always excessive entry. The second rationale is that there is cost-reducing R&D investment and spillover. When the spillover rate is sufficiently high, there is insufficient entry. Further, we consider the general model and obtain similar results.

On multiplicity of consistent conjectures in free entry oligopoly

1988 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasuhito Tanaka
Keyword(s):  
Free Entry

The Impact of Visa-free Entry on Outbound Tourism: A Case Study of South Korean Travellers Visiting Japan

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 302-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
Choong-Ki Lee ◽  
Hak-Jun Song ◽  
Lawrence J. Bendle
Keyword(s):  
Free Entry ◽  
South Korean ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals Multi-Project R&D Competition With Free-Entry

1993 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 309-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pedro Pita Barros ∗
Keyword(s):  
Free Entry

Consumers’ Misevaluation and Public Promotion

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Atsushi Yamagishi
Keyword(s):  
Welfare Loss ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Free Entry ◽  
Opposite Result ◽  
True Value ◽  
Oligopolistic Market ◽  
Public Econ ◽  
The Government

Abstract: I analyze markets in which consumers may misestimate the true value of goods and the government can affect the valuation through public promotion. When entry of firms is not allowed, the government makes consumers overvalue the goods to mitigate welfare loss from underproduction in an oligopolistic market, provided that the promotion cost is sufficiently low. On the contrary, in a free-entry market, no matter how low the promotion cost is, the government may make consumers undervalue them in order not to induce wasteful entries despite the remaining underproduction problem. In addition, my result in a free-entry market suggests that the main finding of Glaeser and Ujhelyi (J Public Econ 94: 247-257, 2010)crucially depends on the barriers to entry and the opposite result may be obtained under free entry.

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