scholarly journals Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions

Author(s):  
Muhammad Ejaz ◽  
Chaitanya Joshi ◽  
Stephen Joe
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Ejaz ◽  
Stephen Joe ◽  
Chaitanya Joshi

In this paper, we use the adversarial risk analysis (ARA) methodology to model first-price sealed-bid auctions under quite realistic assumptions. We extend prior work to find ARA solutions for mirror equilibrium and Bayes Nash equilibrium solution concepts, not only for risk-neutral but also for risk-averse and risk-seeking bidders. We also consider bidders having different wealth and assume that the auctioned item has a reserve price.


1987 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. Walker ◽  
Vernon L. Smith ◽  
James C. Cox

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christer Andersson ◽  
Ola Andersson ◽  
Tommy Andersson

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