Parties as Disciplinarians: Charisma and Commitment Problems in Programmatic Campaigning

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Hollyer ◽  
Marko Klašnja ◽  
Rocío Titiunik
Keyword(s):  
Commitment Problems

scholarly journals Urban Conflict, Rent Seeking, and Corruption Economic and Political Institutions in a Historical Perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 96
Author(s):  
Marie-Christine THAIZE CHALLIER
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Social Unrest ◽  
Abuse Of Power ◽  
Medieval France ◽  
Limiting Property ◽  
Urban Conflict ◽  
Commitment Problems

This paper is an empirical analysis to explore the relationships between urban conflict and both rent seeking and corruption. It examines social disturbances in medieval France through a sample of twelve towns examined over the period 1270-1399 in a real context of informational asymmetries, commitment problems, and issues indivisibilities. As regards the economic corruption class, it is found that townspeople rebel more often and more intensely against the extortion of funds carried out by policy makers than against the embezzlement of a part of these funds. As to the political corruption class, the findings highlight that abuse of power against municipalities is identified in more social unrest than influence peddling against these local institutions. Furthermore, it is shown that rent-seeking-related policies (like arbitrary actions limiting property rights, economic rules-based policies, and targeted political measures) have less influence on urban conflict than corrupt policies do. These findings produce insights that apply beyond the historical context and analysis of the paper. Situations presenting over-indebted towns despite overtaxed people disturb also modern democracies.

Investigation of solution techniques of unit commitment problems: A review

2021 ◽  
pp. 0309524X2199244
Author(s):  
Vineet Kumar ◽  
Ram Naresh ◽  
Amita Singh
Keyword(s):  
Power Systems ◽  
Planning Process ◽  
Unit Commitment ◽  
Operational Planning ◽  
Recent Past ◽  
Research Papers ◽  
Start Up ◽  
Subsequent Step ◽  
Commitment Problems ◽  
Published Research

The Unit Commitment (UC) is a significant act of optimization in day-to-day operational planning of modern power systems. After load forecasting, UC is the subsequent step in the planning process. The electric utilities decide in advance which units are to start-up, when to connect them to the network, the sequence in which the generating units should be shut down and for how long. In view of the above, this paper attempts on presenting a thorough and precise review of the recent approaches applied in optimizing UC problems, incorporating both stochastic and deterministic loads, based on various peer reviewed published research papers of reputed journals. It emphasizes on non-conventional energy and distributed power generating systems along with deregulated and regulated environment. Along with an overview, a comprehensive analysis of the UC algorithms reported in the recent past since 2015 has been discussed for the assistance of new researchers concerned with this domain.

Captured Commitments: An Analytic Narrative of Transitions with Transitional Justice

2010 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 341-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monika Nalepa
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Narrative Approach ◽  
Analytic Narrative ◽  
Step Down ◽  
Communist Countries ◽  
Commitment Problems ◽  
Opposition Parties

How can outgoing autocrats enforce promises of amnesty once they have left power? Why would incoming opposition parties honor their prior promises of amnesty once they have assumed power and face no independent mechanisms of enforcement? In 1989 autocrats in a number of communist countries offered their respective oppositions free elections in exchange for promises of amnesty. The communists' decision appears irrational given the lack of institutions to enforce these promises of amnesty. What is further puzzling is that the former opposition parties that won elections in many countries actually refrained from implementing transitional justice measures. Their decision to honor their prior agreements to grant amnesty seems as irrational as the autocrats' decisions to place themselves at the mercy of their opponents. Using an analytic narrative approach, the author explains this paradox by modeling pacted transitions not as simple commitment problems but as games of incomplete information where the uninformed party has “skeletons in its closet”—that is, embarrassing information that provides insurance against the commitments being broken. The author identifies the conditions under which autocrats step down even though they can be punished with transitional justice and illustrates the results with case studies from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary.

From Protectionism to Regionalism: Multinational Firms and Trade-Related Investment Measures

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerry A. Chase
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Multinational Firms ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Theoretical Work ◽  
Sunk Costs ◽  
Asset Specificity ◽  
The Political ◽  
Multilateral Trade ◽  
Commitment Problems

Trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) have been a key issue in regional and multilateral trade negotiations, but they have received little attention in theoretical work to date. This article analyzes the political economy of TRIMs to illuminate why regional arrangements have been a popular framework for eliminating them. The main argument is that multinational firms often demand safeguards when TRIMs are being liberalized, particularly if they have large sunk costs due to asset specificity. In general, regional arrangements are better equipped than multilateral rules to incorporate the safeguards these firms demand: regionalism requires governments to make binding commitments, and it creates opportunities to discriminate against outsiders. A case study of lobbying by U.S. companies with FDI in Canada from the early twentieth century to the negotiation of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement illustrates these points. The article concludes that regional arrangements are likely to remain more active, and more successful, than multilateral discussions in managing the commitment problems inherent in liberalizing TRIMs.

scholarly journals Solving Nonlinear Single-Unit Commitment Problems with Ramping Constraints

2006 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 767-775 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Frangioni ◽  
Claudio Gentile
Keyword(s):  
Single Unit ◽  
Unit Commitment ◽  
Commitment Problems
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