scholarly journals The Conditionality of Vote-Buying Norms: Experimental Evidence from Latin America

2013 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ezequiel Gonzalez Ocantos ◽  
Chad Kiewiet de Jonge ◽  
David W. Nickerson
2017 ◽  
Vol 69 (6) ◽  
pp. 940-960 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isabela Mares ◽  
Aurelian Muntean ◽  
Tsveta Petrova

2020 ◽  
pp. 178-199
Author(s):  
Karleen Jones West

The analysis presented in this chapter indicates that indigenous voters are disproportionately targeted as clients in vote-buying schemes, which is why the distribution of patronage has become a necessary vote-maximizing strategy for ethnic-party candidates to utilize to earn votes. This finding gives further credence to the argument that ethnic-party candidates must compete using the tactics employed by mainstream candidates to win votes. As such, it was unfair to expect that ethnic-party candidates could ever be more consistently policy-focused, given the expectations of patronage that indigenous constituents have during campaign season. To demonstrate the power of clientelism as a technique to attract indigenous supporters, this chapter analyzes AmericasBarometer survey data from fifteen countries across Latin America. The results show that not only are indigenous voters more likely to be targeted for clientelism, but ethnic-party supporters specifically are also more likely to be approached to sell their votes. These findings therefore provide evidence of the generalizability of the argument that ethnic-party candidates face strong incentives to engage in the clientelist behavior of mainstream parties in order to win votes across Latin America.


2021 ◽  
pp. 44-80
Author(s):  
Carew Boulding ◽  
Claudio A. Holzner

This chapter describes in detail patterns of political participation in Latin America with a particular focus on the political activity of poor citizens. It also introduces the book’s measures of poverty and political participation and engages in some preliminary statistical analysis in order to rule out alternative explanations. We identify three important findings: first, the poorest individuals in Latin America now participate in politics at least as much as, if not more than, more affluent individuals; second, the relationship between wealth and political activism is not uniform across countries or acts: in some places poor people participate more than the affluent, in most countries there is no difference in overall levels of participation across social classes, and in a few countries political stratification by class continues; third, the chapter shows that poor people do vote and protest a bit less than more affluent people but contact government more. It is the frequency with which poor people contact government officials that accounts for much of the equality in political participation that the book identifies. The analysis finds little evidence that individual-level factors explain these patterns. Instead, poor individuals participate as much or more than more affluent individuals despite possessing lower levels of education, political interest, and wealth. The chapter also explores the effect that efforts at vote buying and clientelist mobilization have on poor people’s activism, showing that although clientelism is common, it not the only mechanism through which poor people are mobilized into politics.


2013 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 609-619 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Carreras ◽  
Yasemin İrepoğlu
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 298-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathew YH Wong

Based on data from 16 Asian and 18 Latin American countries from 1996 to 2009, this article argues that corruption does indeed affect the distributive outcomes of government spending, but not necessarily in the expected direction. The incentives for bureaucrats and politicians to abuse their power during the budgetary process suggests that corruption should concentrate public funds in the hands of elites, exacerbating inequality. However, this should only be expected when corruption takes the form of looting (embezzlement). When it takes the form of cheating (vote-buying), it may actually reduce inequality as it involves resource distribution and building of clientelistic linkages. It is the level of political competition rather than regional differences that determines the distributional effects of corruption in Asia and Latin America. This article has profound implications for the study of corruption and policy outcomes, suggesting that the level of political competition is a key factor in determining the outcomes of corruption.


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