The Effects of Abnormal Executive Pay Dispersion: Evidence from Firm Performance and Executive Turnover

2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (5) ◽  
pp. 621-648
Author(s):  
Sanghyuk Byun
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Turnover ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Pay Dispersion

scholarly journals The Effect Of Abnormal Pay Dispersion On Earnings Management

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 687
Author(s):  
Sanghyuk Byun ◽  
Youngjoo Lee ◽  
Ohjin Kwon
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Executive Turnover ◽  
Relative Level ◽  
Top Executives ◽  
Pay Dispersion ◽  
Future Outcomes

This study examines the effect of the abnormal pay dispersion on earnings management. Prior studies find that pay dispersion among top executives affect firm performance and executive turnover. We expect that abnormal pay dispersion among top executives affects financial reporting practice as well as firm performance and turnover and provide evidence of positive association between abnormal pay dispersion and earnings management. This result suggests that executives are more likely to be engaged in earnings management to increase their compensation when they feel unfairness from the relative level of compensation. This finding helps financial statement users interpret firm performance and anticipate future outcomes by implying that additional managerial incentives for financial reporting are derived from internal pay dispersion. Our finding that abnormal pay dispersion leads to higher agency costs should also be of interest to shareholders.

Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and firm performance

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kin Wai Lee ◽  
Baruch Lev ◽  
Gillian Hian Heng Yeo
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Pay Dispersion

CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Relative Sensitivity ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Corporate Acquisitions ◽  
Acquiring Firms ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

The Economic Consequences of Financial Misreporting: Evidence from Employee Perspective

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinghua Gao ◽  
Yonghong Jia
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Employee Turnover ◽  
Labor Demand ◽  
Economic Consequences ◽  
Executive Turnover ◽  
Employee Perspective ◽  
Financial Misreporting ◽  
Employee Tenure

This study investigates the economic consequences of financial misreporting from the employee perspective. Specifically, we examine two employee reactions: (1) exiting from misreporting firms and (2) reducing holding of employer stock, in both the misreporting period and the post-restatement period. We find an increase in employee turnover and a decrease in employee holding of employer stock in the post-restatement period (restatement effect) and some evidence that employees start to react in the period of misreporting (misreporting effect). We also find some evidence that the misreporting effect varies with employee tenure in the misreporting period and the restatement effect varies with the severity of misreporting in the post-restatement period. We further show that our results are not driven by labor demand, increased likelihood of executive turnover, declining stock prices, internal control weakness disclosure, and poor firm performance.

Pay-performance sensitivity and corporate governance mechanisms: evidence from Tunisia

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Meriem Ghrab ◽  
Marjène Gana ◽  
Mejda Dakhlaoui
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Simultaneous Equation ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Estimation Model ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Ceo Pay

Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyze the CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance, termed as the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) in the Tunisian context and to test the robustness of this relationship when corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are considered. Design/methodology/approach The consideration of past executive pay as one of the explanatory variables makes this estimation model a dynamic one. Furthermore, to avoid the problem of endogeneity, this study uses the system-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). For robustness check, this study aims to use a simultaneous equation approach (three-stage least squares [3SLS]) to estimate the link between performance and CEO pay with a set of CG mechanisms to control for possible simultaneous interdependencies. Findings Using a sample of 336 firm-years from Tunisia over the 2009–2015 periods, this study finds strong evidence that the pay-performance relationship is insignificant and negative, and it becomes more negative or remains insignificant after introducing CG mechanisms consistently with the managerial power approach. The findings are robust to the use of alternative performance measures. This study provides new empirical evidence that CEOs of Tunisian firms abuse extracting rents independently of firm performance. Originality/value This study contributes to the unexamined research on PPS in a frontier market. This study also shows the ineffectiveness of the Tunisian CG structure and thus recommends for the legislator to impose a mandatory CG guide.

Founder Versus Family Owners’ Impact on Pay Dispersion Among Non-CEO Top Managers: Implications for Firm Performance

2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (5) ◽  
pp. 1524-1552 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Jaskiewicz ◽  
Joern H. Block ◽  
Danny Miller ◽  
James G. Combs
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Top Management Team ◽  
Management Team ◽  
Test Theory ◽  
Top Management ◽  
Panel Analysis ◽  
Top Managers ◽  
Pay Dispersion

Emerging evidence suggests that pay dispersion among non-CEO top management team (TMT) members harms firm performance, which raises questions about why firms’ owners tolerate or even support it. Prior research shows that the key distinction between founder and family owners is that in addition to firm performance and growth goals, family owners pursue socioemotional goals. On the basis of this distinction, we develop and test theory linking founders’ and families’ ownership to TMT pay dispersion. Consistent with our theory, a Bayesian panel analysis of Standard & Poor’s 500 firms shows that founder owners use less TMT pay dispersion and that family owners, relative to founder owners, use more, although that declines across generations. We also provide evidence that TMT pay dispersion harms firm performance. Our theory and results are significant because they help to explain why some owners favor compensation practices that cause TMT pay dispersion, despite evidence that this harms firm performance.

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