scholarly journals The UK Corporate Governance Code Principle of ‘Comply or Explain’: Understanding Code Compliance as ‘Subjection’

Abacus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 602-626
Author(s):  
John Roberts ◽  
Paul Sanderson ◽  
David Seidl ◽  
Antonije Krivokapic
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Code Compliance ◽  
Comply Or Explain

Does compliance with corporate governance code hinder corporate entrepreneurship? Evidence from the UK

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 765-784 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adel Elgharbawy ◽  
Magdy Abdel-Kader
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Corporate Entrepreneurship ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Organisational Performance ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Comply Or Explain

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the possible trade-off between accountability and enterprise in the context of comply or explain governance. The issue was addressed through examining the effect of compliance with the corporate governance code (CGC) on corporate entrepreneurship (CE) and organisational performance. Design/methodology/approach Based on cross-sectional survey and content analysis of annual reports, the level of CE and compliance with the CGC were measured in the large and medium-listed companies in the UK during 2010. Partial least squares structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM) was used for data analysis. Findings The results suggest no conflict between compliance with the CGC and CE in the UK, which can be attributed to the flexibility of the “comply or explain” approach. This implies that no trade-off between accountability and enterprise in the context of comply or explain governance. Practical implications The study provides evidence in support of the regulatory governance framework in the UK and the comply or explain approach at large. This evidence contributes to the debate on the rules-based or principles-based governance, which may affect future CG regulations. It can also guide the directors to achieve the balance between their conformance and performance roles. Originality/value The study bridges the gap between CG and CE disciplines through developing a theoretical model that integrate contingency and agency theories lenses. Adopting a holistic approach provides insights into the relationships between CG and CE, rather than investigating the effect of each of these practices separately on organisational performance.

scholarly journals From Cadbury to Kay: discourse, intertextuality and the evolution of UK corporate governance

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 1542-1562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Price ◽  
Charles Harvey ◽  
Mairi Maclean ◽  
David Campbell
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Critical Discourse Analysis ◽  
Critical Discourse ◽  
Governance Reform ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Main Research ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Canonical Texts

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to answer two main research questions. First, the authors ask the degree to which the UK corporate governance code has changed in response to both systemic perturbations and the subsequent enquiries established to recommend solutions to perceived shortcomings. Second, the authors ask how the solutions proposed in these landmark governance texts might be explained.Design/methodology/approachThe authors take a critical discourse approach to develop and apply a discourse model of corporate governance reform. The authors draw together data on popular, corporate-political and technocratic discourses on corporate governance in the UK and analyse these data using content analysis and the historical discourse approach.FindingsThe UK corporate governance code has changed little despite periodic crises and the enquiries set up to investigate and make recommendation. Institutional stasis, the authors find, is the product of discourse capture and control by elite corporate actors aided by political allies who inhabit the same elite habitus. Review group members draw intertextually on prior technocratic discourse to create new canonical texts that bear the hallmarks of their predecessors. Light touch regulation by corporate insiders thus remains the UK approach.Originality/valueThis is one of the first applications of critical discourse analysis in the accounting literature and the first to have conducted a discursive analysis of corporate governance reports in the UK. The authors present an original model of discourse transitions to explain how systemic challenges are dissipated.

6. Company Management and Governance

2020 ◽  
pp. 100-120
Author(s):  
Imogen Moore
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
Executive Remuneration ◽  
Questions And Answers ◽  
The Uk ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions and coursework. Each book includes typical questions, suggested answers with commentary, illustrative diagrams, guidance on how to develop your answer, suggestions for further reading, and advice on exams and coursework. This chapter explores important issues in company management and corporate governance, starting by examining the role of directors and shareholders (and the relationship between them) and the separation of ‘ownership and control’. Since the early 1990s, the governance of listed companies has been dominated by self-regulatory codes (currently the UK Corporate Governance Code). This chapter examines how these codes operate and considers key themes in corporate governance, including the role of non-executive directors and auditors; the position of institutional investors; and executive remuneration.

13. Corporate governance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek French
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Shareholder Activism ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Legal Controls ◽  
And Control ◽  
Do So

This chapter surveys corporate governance. It identifies the key problem of the separation of ownership and control in companies that are not owner-managed. Shareholders are seen as the owners of the company but directors manage the company and can do so for their own benefit rather than the shareholders’. There is a list of the numerous legal controls on directors, which are studied in other chapters. There is discussion of two ways of looking at directors, either as stewards who must account for their actions to the owners or as entrepreneurs whose wealth-creating work deserves reward. The UK Corporate Governance Code, which applies to premium listed companies, is discussed, as is shareholder activism.

scholarly journals Accrual and real-based earnings management by UK acquirers

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 492-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
Talie Kassamany ◽  
Salma Ibrahim ◽  
Stuart Archbold
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
Management Behaviour ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Logistic Regressions ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose This study aims to investigate the occurrence of pre-merger earnings management for a sample of 197 stock- and cash-financed UK acquirers between 1990 and 2009. It also examines the earnings management behaviour around the change in the Corporate Governance Code in 2003 based on the Higgs recommendations. Design/methodology/approach Mean and median accrual- and real-based manipulation are examined in the period before the announcement of a merger and acquisition. These are compared across stock and cash acquirers as well as before and after the implementation of the Higgs recommendations. Logistic regressions are also run to examine accrual- and real-based manipulation across stock and cash acquirers after controlling for variables that may affect the acquisition type. Findings The study found some evidence of upward pre-merger accrual-based earnings management by stock-financed acquirers, which is in line with the findings of Botsari and Meeks (2008). Furthermore, no significant changes were found in the post-Higgs period, which indicates that the recommendations put forth by Higgs may not have been successful in mitigating earnings management. The evidence also shows that cash bidders engage in pre-merger real earnings manipulation through lower discretionary expenses, possibly to enhance cash availability for the bid. Practical implications The findings in this study confirm earnings management exists around mergers and acquisitions and provide some evidence that the recommendations set out in the Higgs Report do not appear to have mitigated earnings management activities. This is of interest to regulators as well as investors and academicians. Originality/value This provides the first analysis in the UK examining the use of real-based earnings management activities by UK acquirers. It also extends prior research around corporate governance changes that occurred in the UK.

scholarly journals Compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code: Can the heterogeneous implementation be explained?

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (101 (157)) ◽  
pp. 167-200
Author(s):  
Karsten Eisenschmidt ◽  
Ute Vanini
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Peer Group ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Influence Factors ◽  
Family Influence ◽  
Institutional Setting ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
Code Compliance

Starting with the Cadbury code in 1992, various national and international Corporate Governance (CG) codes have been issued all over the world. So far, empirical studies have revealed mixed results concerning the effects and outcomes of code implementation and thus supported the hypothesis of a ‘one system does not fit all’ approach in CG. Therefore, this paper empirically analyses influence factors on compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code for a large sample of 306 listed firms in 2015. We chose German companies because of the specific institutional settings in Germany, e.g., the strong influence of founder families on a firm’s management or the relevance of debt financing. It is assumed that the country-specific institutional setting limits the transferability of results of US and UK studies. Thus, we used the German setting to derive relevant influence factors on Code compliance. In addition, we applied a more sophisticated measure of Code implementation than previous studies. Overall, we find a significant positive effect of ownership dispersion and firm size on Code compliance, whereas the other influence factors, e.g., family influence or the supervisory board’s size, reveal the right direction of impact but not the required level of statistically significance. In contrast to institutional theory, we find a negative although statistically insignificant impact of the strength of foreign investors’ influence on Code compliance. Overall, our results indicate that the institutional setting is not decisive for Code compliance. Instead, we assume that the main rationale for Code compliance is not the reduction of agency conflicts but the alignment with peer group practices as indicated by the variable company size. Future research should investigate the peer effects on the level of Code compliance in detail.

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