scholarly journals Multilateral, Regional and Bilateral Trade‐Policy Options for the United States and Japan

World Economy ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 803-828 ◽  
Author(s):  
Drusilla K. Brown ◽  
Alan V. Deardorff ◽  
Robert M. Stern
2006 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Crump

AbstractIt is unusual to find a negotiation not linked to at least one other negotiation. In some domains, such as international trade policy, we can identify negotiation networks with parties simultaneously involved in negotiations in global, multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade policy settings. A single party (i.e., a national government) will manage similar issues in all four settings and also manage these same issues with multiple parties in a single setting. International trade policy is one of many "linkage-rich" environments.This study examines the relationship between two discrete but linked treaty negotiations: the Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement of 2003 (SAFTA) and the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement of 2003 (USSFTA). Case analysis identifies five structural factors that enhance the potential and fundamentally shape the nature of negotiation linkage dynamics. If linkage occurs then role theory can be employed to define two functional role types, a link-pin party (Singapore in this study) and linked parties (Australia and the United States). Such theory and case analysis support the development of propositions and help establish guidance for managing negotiation behavior. Key structural characteristics that appear to create linkage dynamics in this study are used to build a four-part structural framework that maps the universe of negotiation-linkage phenomena and determines the fundamental nature of four discrete linkage conditions. This framework also provides descriptive and prescriptive guidance for managing strategy and power in linked negotiations.


Author(s):  
S. S. DMITRIEV

The article explores the Trump administration’s trade policy,  characterized by: attempts to rewrite the rules of international trade  according to the regulations established by the American side, “skepticism” with respect to the international regulatory  institutions of foreign trade, a course on the renegotiation of the  existing agreements. In a relationship with a number of countries,  manifestations of “ultimatizm” – the desire to negotiate with them from a position of strength are becoming increasingly evident.  Relapses of economic isolationism under the slogan “Restore the Greatness of America” periodically are being transformed into  concrete protectionist actions. The number of imposed import restrictions is growing, and their arsenal is expanding. It is  concluded, that tightening of the market access to the domestic  market for foreign suppliers is unlikely to lead to a significant  reduction in the US trade deficit. Bet on abandoning multilateral  arrangements in favor of bilateral trade agreements, conscious  downplaying of the role and importance of the WTO and other  international institutions can also be counterproductive. Focus on  dominance in the sphere of foreign economic activity apparently will remain the main direction of Trump trade policy until the end of the  term of his administration. However, under pressure from competitors, and because of the lack of real allies, the United States  will be forced to demonstrate greater flexibility and pragmatism, the  propensity to compromise and to establishment of temporary or  permanent blocs with their main trading partners. The idea of  “normality”, refraining from populism, will gradually begin to return  to the trade policy of this country. If, however the Trump  government will continue to act in isolation, without taking into  account the opinion of the world community, an increasing number  of partners of the United States will perceive it not as a leader, but as a violator of the rules of international trade. Under certain  circumstances, such a policy can provoke local and global trade  conflicts. In addition, the United States not necessarily will have to be the winner in them.


Author(s):  
Treb Allen ◽  
Stephen Meardon

Several varieties of bilateral trade arrangements were tried in the United States from independence to 1909. They included most-favored-nation (MFN) treaties of the conditional and unconditional varieties, MFN treaties in which the conditionality was implicit, preferential trade arrangements, and agreements of a different nature authorized by the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 and the Dingley Act of 1897. This essay is an inquest of the varieties of U.S. trade arrangements and their effects on bilateral trade flows. It surveys the several varieties, discusses the circumstances of their usage, and uses a gravity model to estimate empirically their effects. The empirical results show that bilateralism's effects on trade flows are contingent upon its varieties and historical circumstances.


Author(s):  
V. Iordanova ◽  
A. Ananev

The authors of this scientific article conducted a comparative analysis of the trade policy of US presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump. The article states that the tightening of trade policy by the current President is counterproductive and has a serious impact not only on the economic development of the United States, but also on the entire world economy as a whole.


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