The Paradox of Integration: Habermas and the Unfinished Project of European Union

Politics ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shivdeep Singh Grewal

In a recent article Jürgen Habermas (1999) highlighted the potential for the European Union to act as a vehicle for the extension of democratic governance beyond the nation state, a project aimed at limiting the socially corrosive impact of globalisation. Yet this position appears paradoxical as the European Union itself exacerbates a major aspect of globalisation: the emasculation of national parliaments known as the ‘democratic deficit’. This paradox can be understood by analysing the dynamics of post-war European integration through the lens of Habermasian social theory: EU evolution can lead either to the colonisation of the lifeworld by market and administrative subsystems (as with the democratic deficit), or to a process of lifeworld rationalisation conducive to pan-European solidarity and democracy. The latter of these tendencies could be encouraged through ‘procedural democracy’: this would institutionalise the conditions by which independent associations in European civil society, channelling their ‘communicative power’ through parliament, might reassert control over the two subsystems. In order to retain legitimacy, procedural EU democracy would have to link existing legislatures to the European Parliament, while citizenship would combine national and civic components. Hence the European Union would be more able than the nation-state to combine universal notions of justice with ethical pluralism.

Author(s):  
Maciej Banaszak

An issue raised more and more frequently in political, as well as scientific discourse in the context of the European Union, is “democratic deficit”. At the time, EU is perceived as an institution guaranteeing the preservation of democratic values in Europe and promoting them both on the continent and beyond. This article discusses both points of view, with emphasis placed on the democratic deficit aspect, measures undertaken to eliminate the negative consequences of the process, as well as the history of the concept: starting from the single European Act, through general elections to the European Parliament, and formal solutions leading to the gradual increase of EU powers. It is assumed in the article that the problem of democratic deficit has persisted in the European Union, especially since several changes were introduced to the political system of EU after The Treaty of Lisbon. As result, the key question that must be answered is whether under the provisions of the Treaty the EU will strengthen its democratic legitimacy. This article attempts to provide an answer, analyzing the role of national parliaments in the new institutional and normative reality and in the context of the democratic legitimacy deficit.


Author(s):  
Richard Corbett

This chapter examines the democratic credentials of the European Union by asking whether it matches some key features common to many modern democratic systems: representation (whether legislation is adopted by representative assemblies); separation of powers; the executive’s democratic accountability; respect for fundamental rights; and whether competing political parties offer voters genuine choice. The chapter also clarifies some key concepts and terms such as bicameralism, democratic deficit, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, it considers an alternative to representative democracy: the organizing of referenda to settle issues. Finally, it discusses the EU’s provisions for helping national parliaments scrutinize the participation of their government in EU institutions.


1994 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karlheinz Neunreither

During Recent Years, The Notion of The Democratic deficit has become, together with subsidiarity, or transparency, one of the most popdar subjects for conferences on European Union. While almost everyone seems to agree that a democratic deficit exists, it is far from certain that there is a general understanding of what is meant by it.The most radical meaning would be that the European Union (EU) as such is undemocratic and that its decision-making does not correspond to democratic norms. Quite often when national governments have to explain unpopular decisions of the EU, responsibility for these uncomfortable situations is attributed to a faceless monster, the ‘Brussels bureaucracy’. The assumption is that a very strong central authority exists which embodies the power of decision-making and that democratic accountability of this central authority either does not exist or at least is not sufficiently guaranteed. In other words, the EU institutional system does not comply with democratic norms. This is by far the most extreme definition of a democratic deficit.


Author(s):  
Richard Corbett

This chapter examines the democratic credentials of the European Union by asking whether it matches some key features common to many modern democratic systems: representation (whether legislation is adopted by representative assemblies); separation of powers; the executive's democratic accountability; respect for fundamental rights; and whether competing political parties offer voters genuine choice. The chapter also clarifies some key concepts and terms such as bicameralism, democratic deficit, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, it considers an alternative to representative democracy: the organizing of referenda to settle issues. Finally, it discusses the EU's provisions for helping national parliaments scrutinize the participation of their government in EU institutions.


Author(s):  
Christine Neuhold

The debate on whether or not the European Union (EU) is suffering from a democratic deficit is “crowded territory.” The debate is not only far-reaching but has evolved along with the transformation of the system of European governance. In the 1990s the “standard version of the democratic deficit” was developed. This drives on the observation that EU member states have transferred powers to the supranational construction of the EU and as such these powers escape national parliamentary control. The fact that the European Parliament was a rather weak institution is seen as to further aggravate the situation. While this is, since the early 2000s, no longer seen as an adequate standard of comparison and indicator for the democratic quality of the EU, the EU democratic system is still seen to fall short on different accounts, for example when it comes both to participatory and representative democracy. This might come as a surprise, as the EU has undertaken a number of reforms especially since and by way of the Maastricht Treaty to make the EU more “democratic.” For example, the (indirect) involvement of national parliaments into EU policymaking was strengthened or the tool of the European Citizen Initiative (ECI) was introduced. As such, the debate on the democratic deficit is not only academic but takes place within the political arena. It is consequential by being mirrored in treaty changes and thus also functional. Overall these tools are seen to fall short however, at least so far. One reason seems to be expectation management. The terms used seem to be very “loaded”. For example, the notion is evoked that the Union is a representative democracy. Moreover piecemeal reform leads to different modes of representation. While some of these objectives have been achieved, for example, by providing access of certain groups to decision-making process, others are excluded, which can in fact exacerbate the democratic deficit. Overall the “traditional” debate on the democratic deficit has taken on a new quality: the context of emergence of the so-called illiberal democracies at the member state level. It has been stated already almost 20 years ago that the EU will have to invent new forms of citizenship, representation, and decision-making if it is ever to democratize itself. It seems that the EU has tried to do so partially, but the use of far-reaching and normative notions and concepts is bound to fall short in a system that is in constant flux and very heterogeneous.


2019 ◽  
pp. 127-140
Author(s):  
Stijn Smismans

This chapter discusses the extent to which decision-making in the European Union can be considered democratic and legitimate. The chapter clarifies the concepts ‘democracy’ and ‘legitimacy’, and describes how, although initially the legitimacy of the European polity was not perceived as a problem, it became more problematic as the EU gained more competences. The European democratic deficit became an important issue of debate only during the 1990s after the Maastricht Treaty had transferred considerable powers to the EU. The main solution to the democratic deficit has been inspired by the parliamentary model of democracy and involves strengthening the European Parliament (EP), while also paying attention to the role of national parliaments and regional and local authorities. The chapter also shows how the governance debate at the start of the twenty-first century broadened the conceptual understanding of democracy in the EU by addressing the complexity of European governance (see also Chapter 7). By looking at different stages of policy-making and different modes of governance, while dealing with issues such as transparency and the role of civil society, the chapter discusses a wider range of issues associated with the democracy and legitimacy of the Union. It assesses the impact on EU democracy of the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. The chapter concludes by warning that three main crises, namely the economic, migration, and security crises, have revived nationalist and populist movements exacerbating the challenges to the EU’s legitimacy.


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