A Stackelberg Game-theoretic Model for Interference Management in Inter-satellite Communication Networks

Due to the recent cyber attacks, cybersecurity is becoming more critical in modern society. A single attack (e.g., WannaCry ransomware attack) can cause as much as $4 billion in damage. However, the cybersecurity investment by companies is far from satisfactory. Therefore, governments (e.g., in the UK) launch grants and subsidies to help companies to boost their cybersecurity to create a safer national cyber environment. The allocation problem is hard due to limited subsidies and the interdependence between self-interested companies and the presence of a strategic cyber attacker. To tackle the government's allocation problem, we introduce a Stackelberg game-theoretic model where the government first commits to an allocation and the companies/users and attacker simultaneously determine their protection and attack (pure or mixed) strategies, respectively. For the pure-strategy case, while there may not be a feasible allocation in general, we prove that computing an optimal allocation is NP-hard and propose a linear reverse convex program when the attacker can attack all users. For the mixed-strategy case, we show that there is a polynomial time algorithm to find an optimal allocation when the attacker has a single-attack capability. We then provide a heuristic algorithm, based on best-response-gradient dynamics, to find an effective allocation in the general setting. Experimentally, we show that our heuristic is effective and outperforms other baselines on synthetic and real data.

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A Stochastic Game-Theoretic Model for Smart Grid Communication Networks

Lecture Notes in Computer Science - Decision and Game Theory for Security ◽

10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_16 ◽

2017 ◽

pp. 295-314

Author(s):

Xiaobing He ◽

Hermann de Meer

Keyword(s):

Smart Grid ◽

Communication Networks ◽

Stochastic Game ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Model ◽

Smart Grid Communication

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Stackelberg game-theoretic model for analyzing distribution of benefits in cold chain distribution

2015 International Conference on Logistics, Informatics and Service Sciences (LISS) ◽

10.1109/liss.2015.7369825 ◽

2015 ◽

Author(s):

Wei Wang

Keyword(s):

Stackelberg Game ◽

Cold Chain ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Model

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Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2017-3-120-130 ◽

2017 ◽

pp. 120-130

Author(s):

A. Lyasko

Keyword(s):

Social Control ◽

Institutional Economics ◽

Theoretic Model ◽

Transfer System ◽

Value Transfer ◽

Partner Interaction ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Model ◽

Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

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