E-Governance to m-Governance in Telecom Sector through Regulatory Body

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rakesh Gupta ◽  
Vivek Gupta ◽  
Ramya Rajamanickam
Keyword(s):  
Regulatory Body ◽  
Telecom Sector

Experiential learning: analyzing success and failures in Indian telecom sector

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (9) ◽  
pp. 3702-3719 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaili Singh ◽  
Mahua Guha
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Operating Experience ◽  
Reference Points ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Published Data ◽  
Regulatory Body ◽  
Vicarious Learning ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Performance Discrepancy ◽  
Telecom Sector

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the self and vicarious learning patterns of organizations through operational success and benchmark failure experiences. The study is specific to the Indian telecom sector. Design/methodology/approach This study uses published data of four major telecom firms in India reported by Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and analyzed the influence of aspiration performance discrepancy on organizational learning by hypotheses testing. Feasible generalized least square model with year fixed effects is used to run panel data regression. Findings In the case of operating experience for performance above aspiration, firms fail to learn from their own experience as well as from others’ experiences. For benchmark failure experience under positive discrepancy, firms learn from their own experience. For performance below aspiration, no significant result was found. These insights allow managers to reconfigure their learning orientation and to develop an effective mechanism for absorbing crucial knowledge from themselves and peer firms. Practical implications Practitioners should take into account that their knowledge repertoire is essential for learning in good times. This study also motivates managers involved in operating activities to make use of publicly disclosed reports, engage in vicarious learning or form a coalition for developing coping mechanism under negative discrepancy scenarios. Originality/value This paper presents a unique context by studying operational success, and failure experiences of telecom sector in India wherein benchmark for failure was decided by the governing regulatory body, TRAI, unlike other studies where success and failures reference points are intrinsically selected.

Managing natural monopolies: interplay of the regulator and telecom companies in India

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Rima Mondal ◽  
Nivisha Singh
Keyword(s):  
Learning Outcomes ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Natural Monopoly ◽  
Regulatory Body ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Telecommunications Sector ◽  
Fierce Competition ◽  
Telecom Sector ◽  
Price Floor ◽  
First Mover

Learning outcomes The learning outcomes of this paper are as follows: to understand the characteristics of a natural monopoly such as telecommunications sector and impact of “network externality”; to understand the role of a regulator in maintaining a balance between competition and consolidation of telecom sector; to understand the importance of first-mover advantage in telecom sector and coping mechanism of late entrants; to understand different pricing mechanisms of “natural monopolies” that can be adopted to remain profitable; to understand social cost of price floor in telecommunications sector. Case overview/synopsis Indian telecom sector is going through a downturn where most of the private sector telecom service providers have reported huge losses, failed to pay adjusted gross revenue (AGR) dues and reported decline in average revenue per user over a period of 3–4 years. Fierce competition in the sector leads to rock bottom calling and data charges. Bharti Airtel benefitted for being the first mover in terms of market share but with entry of JIO in 2016, the service providers have entered a price war. As a result, service providers have requested Mr. R.S. Sharma, Chairman of Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) to come up with a floor on calling charges and requested the government for a bailout package. Currently, Mr. R.S. Sharma, Chairman TRAI is facing a dilemma whether to regulate and come up with a floor on calling and data charges or leave the sector for market correction. Mr. Sharma can also recommend to amend the definition of AGR. Telecommunications sector exhibit the characteristics of a natural monopoly where there is a need of a regulator to introduce “competition for the sector” and “competition in the sector.” In India, TRAI is the regulatory body responsible for introducing “competition for the sector” by auction and “competition in the sector” by deregulating calling and data charges, maintaining at least three private and one public service provider, decreasing “switching cost” of the customers, etc. The case deals with the issues of why there is a need of a regulator in natural monopolies, how different chairmen of TRAI have successfully introduced competition “for” and “in” the sector, and how Indian telecom sector went through a downturn? What should TRAI do to maintain competition in the sector? Complexity academic level The case deals with the issue of managing telecommunications sector (a natural monopoly) by a regulator in the context of India. The regulator had successfully introduced “competition in the sector” and “competition for the sector.” This led to sharp increase in subscriber base and decrease in calling and data charges. Presently, fierce competition in the sector has left the service providers cash crunched. The case deals with the dilemma faced by the chairman of the regulatory body in India on whether the regulator should come up with a price floor or market correction. Study level: MBA, Executive MBA. Supplementary materials Teaching Notes are available for educators only. Subject code CSS 10: Public sector management.

Welfare Effects of Introducing Competition in the Telecom Sector in Djibouti

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xavier Stephane Decoster ◽  
Gabriel Lara Ibarra ◽  
Vibhuti Mendiratta ◽  
Marco Santacroce
Keyword(s):  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Telecom Sector

Waste minimization program in Shuaiba Industrial Area

1999 ◽  
Vol 39 (10-11) ◽  
pp. 289-295
Author(s):  
Saleh Al-Muzaini
Keyword(s):  
Solid Waste ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Industrial Area ◽  
Waste Minimization ◽  
Regulatory Body ◽  
Eastern Sector ◽  
Western Sector ◽  
Petroleum Companies ◽  
The Cost

The Shuaiba Industrial Area (SIA) is located about 50 km south of Kuwait City. It accommodates most of the large-scale industries in Kuwait. The total area of the SIA (both eastern and western sectors) is about 22.98 million m2. Fifteen plants are located in the eastern sector and 23 in the western sector, including two petrochemical companies, three refineries, two power plants, a melamine company, an industrial gas corporation, a paper products company and, two steam electricity generating stations, in addition to several other industries. Therefore, only 30 percent of the land in the SIA's eastern sector and 70 percent of land in the SIA's western sector is available for future expansion. Presently, industries in the SIA generate approximately 204,000 t of solid waste. With future development in the industries in the SIA, the estimated quantities will reach 240,000 t. The Shuaiba Area Authority (SAA), a governmental regulatory body responsible for planning and development in the SIA, has recognized the problem of solid waste and has developed an industrial waste minimization program. This program would help to reduce the quantity of waste generated within the SIA and thereby reduce the cost of waste management. This paper presents a description of the waste minimization program and how it is to be implemented by major petroleum companies. The protocols employed in the waste minimization program are detailed.

DRUG REGULATORY PROCEDURES IN TANZANIA: A GLIMPSE

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Achin Jain ◽  
M P Venkatesh M P ◽  
Pramod T.M. Kumar
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Medical Devices ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Well Being ◽  
New Drugs ◽  
Regulatory Body ◽  
Herbal Drugs ◽  
Drug Products ◽  
Set Up

In Tanzania, Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority (TFDA), is a regulatory body responsible for controlling the quality,safety and effectiveness of food, drugs, herbal drugs, cosmetics and medical devices. The Authority has been ensuringsafety, efficacy and quality of medicines by quality control tests; in addition to other quality assessment mechanisms.The guidelines laid by TFDA have also emanated from commitment to democracy and gives strong emphasis to thefulfilment of the needs of the less privileged rural population.Tanzania is an emerging market; the pharmaceutical market is valued at over US$250 million, and is growing at anannual rate of around 16.5% and is expected to reach approximately US$550 billion in 2020. Currently, the market ishighly dependent on imports, which account for around 75% of the total pharmaceutical market.The procedures and approval requirements of new drugs, variations, import, export and disposal have been set up bythe TFDA, which help in maintaining quality of the drug products that are imported as well being produced locally 

THE CHANCELLERY OF CONTRACT AFFAIRS (TO THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN RUSSIA IN PETER THE GREAT’S TIME)

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 131-144
Author(s):  
D.A. REDIN ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Public Procurement ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Early History ◽  
Regulatory Body ◽  
Peter The Great ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Administrative Regulation ◽  
The Right ◽  
Distinct Features

The purpose of the article is to research the history of creation and formation of the Chancellery of Contract Affairs – the first supervisory and regulatory body in the field of public procurement in Russia. The early history of the Contracting Chancellery (1715–1717) can be traced in the context of the development of legislative and administrative regulation of public procurement during the reign of Peter the Great. The institution of public procurement itself, according to the author, is associated with the acquisition of distinct features of the modern state by Russia, which was manifested in the previous time. The immediate impetus for the development of the institution was the reform of the armed forces and the resulting mobilization efforts of the supreme power. The very content of the research predetermined the use of source-based and historical-legal methods. As a result of the study, the author states that the creation of a special body – the Chancellery of Contract Affairs, designed to take control of the situation under state contracts, turned out to be the right decision. The well-coordinated work of the Contracting Chancellery with the Senate, fiscal authorities and investigative bodies led to the creation of a number of important regulatory legal acts, almost ‘from scratch’ forming the legislative basis for the institution of public procurement functioning. The need for further work on the designated topic is noted.

Impact of Big Data over Telecom Industry

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Waqar Khan ◽  
Muhammad Asghar Khan ◽  
Muhammad Alam ◽  
Wajahat Ali
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Data Science ◽  
Cell Phones ◽  
Smart Phones ◽  
World Population ◽  
Huge Amount ◽  
Scale Down ◽  
Telecom Industry ◽  
Telecom Sector ◽  
Theoretical Computing

<p>During past few years, data is growing exponentially attracting researchers to work a popular term, the Big Data. Big Data is observed in various fields, such as information technology, telecommunication, theoretical computing, mathematics, data mining and data warehousing. Data science is frequently referred with Big Data as it uses methods to scale down the Big Data. Currently<br />more than 3.2 billion of the world population is connected to internet out of which 46% are connected via smart phones. Over 5.5 billion people are using cell phones. As technology is rapidly shifting from ordinary cell phones towards smart phones, therefore proportion of using internet is also growing. There<br />is a forecast that by 2020 around 7 billion people at the globe will be using internet out of which 52% will be using their smart phones to connect. In year 2050 that figure will be touching 95% of world population. Every device connect to internet generates data. As majority of the devices are using smart phones to<br />generate this data by using applications such as Instagram, WhatsApp, Apple, Google, Google+, Twitter, Flickr etc., therefore this huge amount of data is becoming a big threat for telecom sector. This paper is giving a comparison of amount of Big Data generated by telecom industry. Based on the collected data<br />we use forecasting tools to predict the amount of Big Data will be generated in future and also identify threats that telecom industry will be facing from that huge amount of Big Data.</p>

Why Not Allow FASB and IASB Standards to Compete in the U.S.?

2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald A. Dye ◽  
Shyam Sunder
Keyword(s):  
Network Externalities ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Standard Setting ◽  
Regulatory Competition ◽  
Regulatory Body ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
The Status ◽  
Informative Signals ◽  
The U.S

This paper discusses arguments for and against introducing competition into the accounting standard-setting process in the U.S. by allowing individual corporations to issue financial reports prepared in accordance with either FASB or IASB rules. The paper examines several arguments supporting the status quo, including (1) the FASB's experience and world leadership in making accounting rules; (2) the increased risk of a “race to the bottom” under regulatory competition; (3) the inability of most users of financial reports to understand the complex technical issues underlying accounting standards; (4) the possibility that IASB's standards will be diluted to gain international acceptance, allowing additional opportunities for earnings management; (5) the risks of the IASB being deadlocked or captured by interests hostile to business; (6) the costs of experimentation in standard setting; and (7) economies from network externalities. Arguments examined on the other side include how competition will (1) help meet the needs of globalized businesses; (2) increase the likelihood that the accounting standards will be efficient; (3) help protect standard setters from undue pressure from interest groups; (4) allow different standards to develop for different corporate clienteles; (5) allow corporations to send more informative signals by their choice of accounting standards; (6) protect corporations against capture of regulatory body by narrow interests; and (7) not affect network externalities at national or global scales.

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