Analysis and Evaluation Framework Based on Spatial Evolutionary Game Theory for Incentive Mechanism in Peer-to-Peer Network

Author(s):  
Guanghai Cui ◽  
Mingchu Li ◽  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Linlin Tian ◽  
Jianhua Ma
2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (12) ◽  
pp. 3044-3064 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guanghai Cui ◽  
Mingchu Li ◽  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Jiankang Ren ◽  
Dong Jiao ◽  
...  

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammed Ahmed Ahmed Al-Jaoufi ◽  
Yun Liu ◽  
Zhen-jiang Zhang ◽  
Lorna Uden

In a wireless sensor network, some nodes may act selfishly and noncooperatively, such as not forwarding packets, in response to their own limited resources. If most of the nodes in a network exhibit this selfish behavior, the entire network will be paralyzed, and it will not be able to provide normal service. This paper considers implementing the idea of evolutionary game theory into the nodes of wireless sensor networks to effectively improve the reliability and stability of the networks. We present a new model for the selfish node incentive mechanism with a forward game node for wireless sensor networks, and we discuss applications of the replicator dynamics mechanism to analyze evolutionary trends of trust relationships among nodes. We analyzed our approach theoretically and conducted simulations based on the idea of evolutionary game theory. The results of the simulation indicated that a wireless sensor network that uses the incentive mechanism can forward packets well while resisting any slight variations. Thus, the stability and reliability of wireless sensor networks are improved. We conducted numerical experiments, and the results verified our conclusions based on the theoretical analysis.


Author(s):  
Sarfaraj Alam Ansari ◽  
Kunwar Pal ◽  
Mahesh Chandra Govil ◽  
Mushtaq Ahmed ◽  
Tanvi Chawla ◽  
...  

2014 ◽  
Vol 24 (8) ◽  
pp. 2132-2150
Author(s):  
Hong-Yan MEI ◽  
Yu-Jie ZHANG ◽  
Xiang-Wu MENG ◽  
Wen-Ming MA

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