Optimizing Cooperative Advertizing, Profit Sharing, and Inventory Policies in a VMI Supply Chain: A Nash Bargaining Model and Hybrid Algorithm

2015 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 449-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ning Jiang ◽  
Linda L. Zhang ◽  
Yugang Yu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Hybrid Algorithm ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Inventory Policies

Bargaining Based Supply Chain Scheduling

2012 ◽  
Vol 220-223 ◽  
pp. 299-303
Author(s):  
Tian Tian Chang ◽  
Li Li Wang ◽  
Ji Hui Zhang ◽  
Qing Yue Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Scheduling Problem ◽  
Bargaining Theory ◽  
Supply Chain Scheduling ◽  
Manufacturing Efficiency ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
Nash Bargaining Theory

Coordination across the supply chain improves the manufacturing efficiency a lot. To provide a rational cooperation mechanism for supply chain scheduling, a bargaining model was established on the basis of the Nash bargaining theory. The solution of the model draws forth a new scheduling problem with multi-objective product. A polynomial heuristic was designed to find the near-optimal bargaining solution under the assembly circumstance.

scholarly journals Implications of Contract-Bargaining Mechanisms for Coordination and Profit Sharing in a Distribution Channel

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Nikunja Mohan Modak ◽  
Shibaji Panda ◽  
Sudipta Sinha ◽  
Dipankar Ghosh
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Distribution Channel ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Process ◽  
Channel Conflict ◽  
Holding Costs ◽  
Sequential Bargaining ◽  
Holding Cost

The present work models a three-level distribution channel that has a manufacturer, multiple distributors, and multiple retailers under each distributor to analyze channel members’ cooperative, semicooperative, and noncooperative decisions for an arbitrary replenishment cycle other than the first in the infinite time horizon. It uses two sequential bargaining processes: forward contract-bargaining (FCB) and backward contract-bargaining (BCB) to eliminate channel conflict and allocate additional profit among channel members. We successfully implement a hybrid contract mechanism that combines wholesale price discount (WPD) and subsidy on holding cost for channel coordination. The concept of Nash bargaining is applied for additional profit sharing. The proposed hybrid contract can fully coordinate the tree-like supply chain and enrich the entire profit of the supply chain at its best. The manufacturer provides WPD to each distributor separately, and each distributor provides a subsidy to each of its retailers independently. Both the sequential bargaining processes are designed in such a way that an upstream channel member always has the opportunity to account for different reservations for its different downstream members. Although each bargaining process eliminates the channel conflict, finds win-win ranges, and distributes surplus profit, the distributors prefer BCB, whereas the manufacturer and the retailers prefer the FCB. Also, without receiving WPD, the distributors have the ability to coordinate the supply chain and find win-win profits by subsidizing the retailers’ holding costs. A numerical case is presented to explain the findings of the work.

scholarly journals Joint Innovation Investment and Pricing Decisions in Retail Supply Chains with Customer Value

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1309
Author(s):  
Jiali Qu ◽  
Benyong Hu ◽  
Chao Meng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Customer Value ◽  
Business Models ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Game Equilibrium

In the retail industry, customer value has become the key to maintaining competitive advantages. In the era of new retail, customer value is not only affected by the product price, but it is also closely related to innovations, such as value-added services and unique business models. In this paper, we study the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts and customer value. We first find that, in the non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, revenue sharing contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in the non-cooperative game. By considering supply chain members’ bargaining power, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product. In addition, revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. When the supply chain is coordinated, supply chain profit is allocated to the supply chain members based on their bargaining powers.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Framework at the Rubber Company with a Profit Sharing approach in ensuring Material Availability

2019 ◽  
Vol 505 ◽  
pp. 012009
Author(s):  
Meilita Tryana Sembiring ◽  
Irwan Budiman ◽  
Anita Christine Sembiring ◽  
Evta Indra ◽  
Delima Sitanggang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Profit Sharing

Measuring Performance of a Three-Stage Network Structure Using Data Envelopment Analysis and Nash Bargaining Game: A Supply Chain Application

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (05) ◽  
pp. 1429-1467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Amirkhan ◽  
Hosein Didehkhani ◽  
Kaveh Khalili-Damghani ◽  
Ashkan Hafezalkotob
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Data Envelopment Analysis ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Data Envelopment ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Nash Bargaining Game ◽  
Dea Models ◽  
Overall Efficiency

The issue of efficiency analysis of network and multi-stage systems, as one of the most interesting fields in data envelopment analysis (DEA), has attracted much attention in recent years. A pure serial three-stage (PSTS) process is a specific kind of network in which all the outputs of the first stage are used as the only inputs in the second stage and in addition, all the outputs of the second stage are applied as the only inputs in the third stage. In this paper, a new three-stage DEA model is developed using the concept of three-player Nash bargaining game for PSTS processes. In this model, all of the stages cooperate together to improve the overall efficiency of main decision-making unit (DMU). In contrast to the centralized DEA models, the proposed model of this study provides a unique and fair decomposition of the overall efficiency among all three stages and eliminates probable confusion of centralized models for decomposing the overall efficiency score. Some theoretical aspects of proposed model, including convexity and compactness of feasible region, are discussed. Since the proposed bargaining model is a nonlinear mathematical programming, a heuristic linearization approach is also provided. A numerical example and a real-life case study in supply chain are provided to check the efficacy and applicability of the proposed model. The results of proposed model on both numerical example and real case study are compared with those of existing centralized DEA models in the literature. The comparison reveals the efficacy and suitability of proposed model while the pitfalls of centralized DEA model are also resolved. A comprehensive sensitivity analysis is also conducted on the breakdown point associated with each stage.

Implications of Price Matching in Supply Chain Negotiation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weixin Shang ◽  
Gangshu (George) Cai
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Price Matching ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Multiple Buyers ◽  
Wholesale Pricing

Problem definition: Few papers have explored the impact of price matching negotiation (PM), in which a channel matches its price with the resulting wholesale price bargained by another channel, on firms’ performances, consumer welfare, and social welfare, with and without supply chain coordination. Academic/practical relevance: Negotiation has been widely seen in determining both uniform and discriminatory wholesale prices, which affect outcomes of competitive supply chain practices. Methodology: To characterize the PM mechanism, we use game theory and Nash bargaining theory to compare PM with simultaneous negotiation (SN) through a common-seller two-buyer differentiated Bertrand competition model. Results: Our analysis reveals that PM can benefit the seller but hurt all buyers, which is at odds with some fair wholesale pricing clauses intending to protect buyers. Under coordination with side payments, however, all firms can conditionally benefit more from PM than from SN. Despite firms’ gains, PM leads to less consumer utility and social welfare compared with SN, unless the second buyer in PM is considerably less powerful than the first buyer. Coordination further worsens PM’s negative impact on consumer utility and social welfare. Moreover, the existence of a spot market can increase the wholesale price in PM, hurting buyers, consumers, and society. Furthermore, the qualitative results about PM remain robust under an alternative disagreement point for PM, multiple buyers, and other extensions. Managerial implications: This paper delivers insights on when price matching in supply chain wholesale price negotiation can benefit a seller, buyers, consumers, and society in a variety of scenarios. It advocates how managers can use PM to their own advantages and provides rationale to decision makers for policy regulations regarding wholesale pricing.

An Empirical Bargaining Model with Left-Digit Bias: A Study on Auto Loan Monthly Payments

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhenling Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Large Data ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Lower Interest Rate ◽  
The Empirical Analysis

This paper studies price bargaining when both parties have left-digit bias when processing numbers. The empirical analysis focuses on the auto finance market in the United States, using a large data set of 35 million auto loans. Incorporating left-digit bias in bargaining is motivated by several intriguing observations. The scheduled monthly payments of auto loans bunch at both $9- and $0-ending digits, especially over $100 marks. In addition, $9-ending loans carry a higher interest rate, and $0-ending loans have a lower interest rate. We develop a Nash bargaining model that allows for left-digit bias from both consumers and finance managers of auto dealers. Results suggest that both parties are subject to this basic human bias: the perceived difference between $9- and the next $0-ending payments is larger than $1, especially between $99- and $00-ending payments. The proposed model can explain the phenomena of payments bunching and differential interest rates for loans with different ending digits. We use counterfactuals to show a nuanced impact of left-digit bias, which can both increase and decrease the payments. Overall, bias from both sides leads to a $33 increase in average payment per loan compared with a benchmark case with no bias. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing.

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