Behavioral analysis of asymmetric information sharing on Lumisight Table

Author(s):  
M. Matsuda ◽  
M. Matsushita ◽  
T. Yamada ◽  
T. Namemura
2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-410
Author(s):  
Bruce L. Gordon ◽  
Daniel T. Winkler

In this paper, we examine how the new house premium has changed over time. We propose that the new home premium can largely be attributed to the “lemons problem” from Akerlof (1970). Recent research suggests that the growth of the Internet has significantly reduced the lemons problem for many products. Our results suggest that the new house premium is about 5.6% without considering time-on-the-market (TOM) and has been declining. This premium ranges from 14.6% (1998) to −2.8% (2010). The average new house premium is 13.3% considering TOM, and ranges from 22.5% (1998) to 5.0% (2010). A trend analysis reveals that new house premiums have fallen 0.8%–0.9% annually, consistent with the Internet, information sharing, and reputation feedback mechanisms reducing the lemons problem associated with asymmetric information.


2010 ◽  
Vol 426-427 ◽  
pp. 249-253
Author(s):  
Jie Zhao ◽  
S.Z. Ding

In order to improve information asymmetry in construction supply chain and keep effective information among parties involved sharing seamlessly, current narrow sense understanding of information sharing in construction industry is summarized firstly; then broaden content and essence of information sharing in construction supply chain is pointed out, that is not only information sharing which can be improved by information technology included, but some asymmetric information which caused by different parties own interest also included in sharing scope. Information sharing is process of making information symmetrical to each party. Conclusion is given that information sharing is basis for adding value to whole construction supply chain under the condition of risk & profit sharing.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Meo

AbstractThe possibility to compare information partitions is investigated for economies with asymmetric information. First, we focus on two potentially suitable instruments, the Boylan distance and the entropy, and show that the former does not fit the purpose. Then, we use the entropy associated with the information partition of each trader to construct a partially endogenous rule which regulates the information sharing process among traders. Finally, we apply this rule to some examples and analyze its impact on two cooperative solutions: the core and the coalition structure value.


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