Lorenz Equilibrium: Concept and Evolutionary Detection

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reka Nagy ◽  
D. Dumitrescu ◽  
Rodica Ioana Lung
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Concept

scholarly journals Holding a group together: non-game-theory vs. game-theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Richter ◽  
Ariel Rubinstein
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Equilibrium Concept

Abstract Each member of a group chooses a position and has preferences regarding his chosen position. The group’s harmony depends on the profile of chosen positions meeting a specific condition. We analyse a solution concept (Richter and Rubinstein, 2020) based on a permissible set of individual positions, which plays a role analogous to that of prices in competitive equilibrium. Given the permissible set, members choose their most preferred position. The set is tightened if the chosen positions are inharmonious and relaxed if the restrictions are unnecessary. This new equilibrium concept yields more attractive outcomes than does Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game.

Modeling of Interannual Snow and Ice Storage in High-Altitude Regions by Dynamic Equilibrium Concept

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. 04014034 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noriaki Ohara ◽  
SuHyung Jang ◽  
Shuichi Kure ◽  
Z. Q. Richard Chen ◽  
M. Levent Kavvas
Keyword(s):  
High Altitude ◽  
Dynamic Equilibrium ◽  
Ice Storage ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Snow And Ice

Voting Equilibria Under Proportional Representation

2014 ◽  
Vol 108 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
SEOK-JU CHO
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
Policy Outcome ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Robust Equilibrium

This article studies the consequences of strategic voting by outcome-oriented voters in elections under proportional representation (PR). I develop a model of elections under PR, in which voters choose among an arbitrary finite number of parties, and the policy outcome is determined in a postelection bargaining stage. I use a new solution concept, robust equilibrium, which greatly mitigates the well-known problem of indeterminate predictions in multicandidate competition. Applying the equilibrium concept to the model, I find that PR promotes representation of small parties in general, even when voters are strategic. However, the median voter plays a critical role in shaping policy outcomes, which reflects the majoritarian nature of parliamentary policy making rules. Thus, PR may not be incompatible with the majoritarian vision of representative democracy if voters’ main concern is policy outcomes.

scholarly journals A computational model of outguessing in two-player non-cooperative games

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-88
Author(s):  
Tamás László Balogh ◽  
János Kormos
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Computational Model ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Simulation Based ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Non Cooperative Games

Abstract Several behavioral game theory models aim at explaining why “smarter“ people win more frequently in simultaneous zero-sum games, a phanomenon, which is not explained by the Nash equilibrium concept. We use a computational model and a numerical simulation based on Markov chains to describe player behavior and predict payoffs.

scholarly journals Dinamicke igre ulaska na trziste

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (165) ◽  
pp. 121-144
Author(s):  
Bozo Stojanovic
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Reasonable Solution ◽  
Multiple Nash Equilibria ◽  
Entry Games

Market processes can be analyzed by means of dynamic games. In a number of dynamic games multiple Nash equilibria appear. These equilibria often involve no credible threats the implementation of which is not in the interests of the players making them. The concept of sub game perfect equilibrium rules out these situations by stating that a reasonable solution to a game cannot involve players believing and acting upon noncredible threats or promises. A simple way of finding the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of a dynamic game is by using the principle of backward induction. To explain how this equilibrium concept is applied, we analyze the dynamic entry games.

Brownian Motion

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Giovanni Zocchi
Keyword(s):  
Brownian Motion ◽  
Statistical Mechanics ◽  
Concentration Gradient ◽  
Nonequilibrium Statistical Mechanics ◽  
Thermal Fluctuations ◽  
Nonequilibrium System ◽  
Individual Particle ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Self Diffusion ◽  
Main Ideas

This chapter provides an introduction to the main ideas of Brownian motion. Brownian motion connects equilibrium and nonequilibrium statistical mechanics. It connects diffusion—a nonequilibrium phenomenon—with thermal fluctuations—an equilibrium concept. More precisely, diffusion with a net flow of particles, driven by a concentration gradient, pertains to a nonequilibrium system, since there is a net current. Without a concentration gradient, the system is macroscopically in equilibrium, but each individual particle undergoes self-diffusion just the same. In this sense, Brownian motion is at the border of equilibrium and nonequilibrium statistical mechanics.

Equilibrium Theory: A Simple Production Model

2019 ◽  
pp. 451-457
Author(s):  
Tomas Björk
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Problem ◽  
Optimization Problem ◽  
Dynamic Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Theory ◽  
Production Model ◽  
Stochastic Discount Factor ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Precise Formulation ◽  
Central Planner ◽  
Simple Production

This is the first of several chapters dealing with the dynamic equilibrium theory. As an instructive first example we study a simple Cox–Ingersoll–Ross type of production model. The equilibrium concept is given a precise formulation and we derive the equilibrium short rate as well as the equilibrium stochastic discount factor. We also study the associated optimization problem for a central planner and prove that this is equivalent to the equilibrium problem.

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