A Generic Attack on Checksumming-Based Software Tamper Resistance

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Wurster ◽  
P.C. van Oorschot ◽  
A. Somayaji
Keyword(s):  
Generic Attack

scholarly journals Generic attack against robust steganography based on spring transform and geometrization

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (16) ◽  
pp. 3880-3892 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qilin Qi ◽  
Aaron Sharp ◽  
Dongming Peng ◽  
Yaoqing Yang ◽  
Hamid Sharif
Keyword(s):  
Generic Attack ◽  
Robust Steganography

scholarly journals A Simple Generic Attack on Text Captchas

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haichang Gao ◽  
Jeff Yan ◽  
Fang Cao ◽  
Zhengya Zhang ◽  
Lei Lei ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Generic Attack

Using phishing experiments and scenario-based surveys to understand security behaviours in practice

2014 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 393-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Waldo Rocha Flores ◽  
Hannes Holm ◽  
Gustav Svensson ◽  
Göran Ericsson
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
Risk Behaviour ◽  
The Other ◽  
Target Information ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Observed Behaviour ◽  
And Gender ◽  
Generic Attack

Purpose – The purpose of the study was threefold: to understand security behaviours in practice by investigating factors that may cause an individual to comply with a request posed by a perpetrator; to investigate if adding information about the victim to an attack increases the probability of the attack being successful; and, finally, to investigate if there is a correlation between self-reported and observed behaviour. Design/methodology/approach – Factors for investigation were identified based on a review of existing literature. Data were collected through a scenario-based survey, phishing experiments, journals and follow-up interviews in three organisations. Findings – The results from the experiment revealed that the degree of target information in an attack increased the likelihood that an organisational employee falls victim to an actual attack. Further, an individual’s trust and risk behaviour significantly affected the actual behaviour during the phishing experiment. Computer experience at work, helpfulness and gender (females tend to be less susceptible to a generic attack than men), had a significant correlation with behaviour reported by respondents in the scenario-based survey. No correlation between the results from the scenario-based survey and the experiments was found. Research limitations/implications – One limitation is that the scenario-based survey may have been interpreted differently by the participants. Another is that controlling how the participants reacted when receiving the phishing mail, and what actually triggered each and every participant to click on the attached link, was not possible. Data were however collected to capture these aspects during and after the experiments. In conclusion, the results do not imply that one or the other method should be ruled out, as they have both advantages and disadvantages which should be considered in the context of collecting data in the critical domain of information security. Originality/value – Two different methods to collect data to understand security behaviours have rarely been used in previous research. Studies that add target information to understand if such information could increase the probability of attack success is sparse. This paper includes both approaches.

scholarly journals Grøstl Distinguishing Attack: A New Rebound Attack of an AES-like Permutation

2017 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Victor Cauchois ◽  
Clément Gomez ◽  
Reynald Lercier
Keyword(s):  
Linear Programming ◽  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Mixed Integer Linear Programming ◽  
Mixed Integer ◽  
Programming Approach ◽  
Distinguishing Attack ◽  
Input And Output ◽  
Memory Complexity ◽  
Generic Attack ◽  
Truncated Differential

We consider highly structured truncated differential paths to mount a new rebound attack on Grøstl-512, a hash functions based on two AES-like permutations, P1024 and Q1024, with non-square input and output registers. We explain how such differential paths can be computed using a Mixed-Integer Linear Programming approach. Together with a SuperSBox description, this allows us to build a rebound attack with a 6-round inbound phase whereas classical rebound attacks have 4-round inbound phases. This yields the first distinguishing attack on a 11-round version of P1024 and Q1024 with about 272 computations and a memory complexity of about 256 bytes, to be compared with the 296 computations required by the corresponding generic attack. Previous best results on this permutation reached 10 rounds with a computational complexity of about 2392 operations, to be compared with the 2448 computations required by the corresponding generic attack.

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