Security and Privacy Risks of Using E-mail Address as an Identity

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Jin ◽  
Hassan Takabi ◽  
James B.D. Joshi
Keyword(s):  
Security And Privacy ◽  
Mail Address ◽  
Privacy Risks ◽  
E Mail

scholarly journals Multiple-Feature Extracting Modules Based Leak Mining System Design

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying-Chiang Cho ◽  
Jen-Yi Pan
Keyword(s):  
Information Leakage ◽  
Web Security ◽  
Security And Privacy ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Online Information ◽  
Web Crawler ◽  
Mining System ◽  
Sql Injection ◽  
Mail Address ◽  
E Mail

Over the years, human dependence on the Internet has increased dramatically. A large amount of information is placed on the Internet and retrieved from it daily, which makes web security in terms of online information a major concern. In recent years, the most problematic issues in web security have been e-mail address leakage and SQL injection attacks. There are many possible causes of information leakage, such as inadequate precautions during the programming process, which lead to the leakage of e-mail addresses entered online or insufficient protection of database information, a loophole that enables malicious users to steal online content. In this paper, we implement a crawler mining system that is equipped with SQL injection vulnerability detection, by means of an algorithm developed for the web crawler. In addition, we analyze portal sites of the governments of various countries or regions in order to investigate the information leaking status of each site. Subsequently, we analyze the database structure and content of each site, using the data collected. Thus, we make use of practical verification in order to focus on information security and privacy through black-box testing.

scholarly journals Reducing Metadata Leakage from Encrypted Files and Communication with PURBs

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (4) ◽  
pp. 6-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirill Nikitin ◽  
Ludovic Barman ◽  
Wouter Lueks ◽  
Matthew Underwood ◽  
Jean-Pierre Hubaux ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Information Leakage ◽  
Maximum Length ◽  
Security And Privacy ◽  
Full Membership ◽  
Encrypted Data ◽  
Data Formats ◽  
Public Keys ◽  
Encryption Schemes ◽  
Privacy Risks ◽  
E Mail

Abstract Most encrypted data formats leak metadata via their plaintext headers, such as format version, encryption schemes used, number of recipients who can decrypt the data, and even the recipients’ identities. This leakage can pose security and privacy risks to users, e.g., by revealing the full membership of a group of collaborators from a single encrypted e-mail, or by enabling an eavesdropper to fingerprint the precise encryption software version and configuration the sender used. We propose that future encrypted data formats improve security and privacy hygiene by producing Padded Uniform Random Blobs or PURBs: ciphertexts indistinguishable from random bit strings to anyone without a decryption key. A PURB’s content leaks nothing at all, even the application that created it, and is padded such that even its length leaks as little as possible. Encoding and decoding ciphertexts with no cleartext markers presents efficiency challenges, however. We present cryptographically agile encodings enabling legitimate recipients to decrypt a PURB efficiently, even when encrypted for any number of recipients’ public keys and/or passwords, and when these public keys are from different cryptographic suites. PURBs employ Padmé, a novel padding scheme that limits information leakage via ciphertexts of maximum length M to a practical optimum of O(log log M) bits, comparable to padding to a power of two, but with lower overhead of at most 12% and decreasing with larger payloads.

Effects and utility of an online forward triage tool during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic: patient perspectives (Preprint)

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet Michel
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Health System ◽  
Information Source ◽  
Patient Perspectives ◽  
User Friendliness ◽  
Fear And Anxiety ◽  
Mail Address ◽  
Second Wave ◽  
E Mail

BACKGROUND Background: Online forward triage tools (OFTT) or symptom checkers are being widely used during this COVID-19 pandemic. The effects and utility of such tools however, have not been widely assessed. OBJECTIVE Objective: To assess the effects (quantitatively) and the utility (qualitatively) of a COVID-19 OFTT in a pandemic context, exploring patient perspectives as well as eliciting recommendations for tool improvement. METHODS Methods: We employed a mixed-method sequential explanatory study design. Quantitative data of all users of the OFTT between March 2nd, 2020 and May 12th, 2020 were collected. A follow-up survey of people who consented to participation was conducted. Secondly, qualitative data was collected through key informant interviews (n=19) to explain the quantitative findings, as well as explore tool utility, user experience and elicit recommendations. RESULTS Results: An estimate of the effects, (quantitatively) and the utility (qualitatively) of a COVID-19 OFTT in a pandemic context, and recommendations for tool improvement. In the study period, 6,272 users consulted our OFTT; 560 participants consented to a follow-up survey and provided a valid e-mail address. 176 (31.4%) participants returned a complete follow-up questionnaire. 85.2% followed the recommendations given. 41.5% reported that their fear was allayed after using tool and 41.1% would have contacted the GP or visited a hospital had the tool not existed. Qualitatively, seven overarching themes emerged namely i) accessibility of tool, ii) user-friendliness of tool, iii) utility of tool as an information source, iv) utility of tool in allaying fear and anxiety, v) utility of tool in decision making (test or not to test), vi) utility of tool in reducing the potential for onward transmissions (preventing cross infection) and vii) utility of tool in reducing health system burden. CONCLUSIONS Conclusion: Our findings demonstrated that a COVID-19 OFTT does not only reduce the health system burden, but can also serve as an information source, reduce anxiety and fear, reduce cross infections and facilitate decision making (to test or not to test). Further studies are needed to assess the transferability of these COVID-19 OFTT findings to other contexts as the second wave sweeps across Europe.

June–September 2018

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-78
Author(s):  
Frank Cranmer
Keyword(s):  
Annual Income ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
Church Congregations ◽  
Charity Commission ◽  
On Line ◽  
Mail Address ◽  
E Mail ◽  
Do So

The Charity Commission for England and Wales published an updated list of the questions to be included in the 2018 Annual Return for registered charities. The trustees of charities excepted from registration with the Commission – which include a considerable number of church congregations – are not required to submit an annual return; but an increasing number find that they must do so because when an excepted charity's annual income exceeds £100,000 it loses its excepted status. The previously expressed intention to require every charity trustee to provide an e-mail address has been abandoned; instead, the Commission intends to ask all trustees either to supply an e-mail address or to confirm that they do not have one – which looks very like a welcome climbdown. The Commission's on-line Annual Return Service opened for submissions on 20 August.

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