Study on cooperative evolution behaviors in spatial public goods game based on self-questioning mechanism

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng Rui-xue ◽  
Ge Juan
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Cooperative Evolution

Group preferential selection promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (11) ◽  
pp. 1450062 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong-Bin Zhang ◽  
Hong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Role Model ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Learning Mechanism ◽  
Preferential Selection ◽  
Cooperative Evolution ◽  
Public Goods Games

We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on the square lattice, focusing on the co-player learning mechanism based on the preferential selection that are brought about by wealthy information of groups where participants collect and search for potential imitators from those groups. We find that co-player learning mechanism based on the choice of weighted group can lead to the promotion of public cooperation by means of the information of wealthy groups that is obtained by participants, and after that the partial choice of public goods groups is enhanced with the tunable preferential parameter. Our results highlight that the learning interactions is not solely confined to the restricted connection among players, but co-players of wealthy groups have the opportunity to be as a role model in the promotion of cooperative evolution. Moreover, we also find the size of learning affects the choice of distant players, cooperators (defectors) having more paths to exploit the phalanx of opponents to survive when the value of preferential parameter is small. Besides, the extinction thresholds of cooperators and defectors for different values of noise are also investigated.

Study on Cooperative Evolution Behaviors in Spatial Public Goods Game Based on Self-Questioning Mechanism

2013 ◽  
Vol 380-384 ◽  
pp. 1783-1787
Author(s):  
Rui Xue Feng ◽  
Juan Ge
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The Self ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Intensity Parameter ◽  
Cooperative Evolution

We introduce a self-questioning mechanism under spatial public goods game in the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory where players are located on a square lattice and realize it by a intensity parameter a. By stimulation and analysis, we find that compared with the original Fermi updating (a=0), the introduction of the self-questioning (a>0) can be better promote cooperative behavior at the smaller r. Subsequently, we stimulate in self-questioning mechanism (a=1), the cooperator frequency fc as a function of the factor r for different values of noise K. Results show that at the larger and smaller noise K, the system presents a considerably different cooperation phenomenon. Whats more, fc as a function of r has center symmetry nature about point (5.0, 0.5) whatever the noise K is. Further analysis indicates the reasons for the formation of these phenomena. Finally, we report the agents average payoff in the steady state and its reasons for it.

scholarly journals Cooperative Evolution Mechanism of Unmanned Swarm within the Framework of Public Goods Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Minggang Yu ◽  
Ming He ◽  
Ziyu Ma ◽  
Mingguang Zou ◽  
Lei Wan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Centralized Control ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Theoretical Derivation ◽  
Evolution Mechanism ◽  
Cooperative Evolution ◽  
Average Abundance ◽  
Actual Control

One of the key advantages of unmanned swarm operation is its autonomous cooperation. When the communication is interrupted or the centralized control manner is lost, the cooperative operation can still be carried out orderly. This work proposed a cooperative evolution mechanism within the framework of multiplayer public goods game to solve the problem of autonomous collaboration of unmanned swarm in case of failure of centralized control. It starts with the requirement analysis of autonomous cooperation in unmanned swarm, and then, the evolutionary game model of multiplayer public goods based on aspiration-driven dynamics is established. On this basis, the average abundance function is constructed by theoretical derivation, and furthermore, the influence of cost, multiplication factor, and aspiration level on the average abundance is simulated. Finally, the evolutionary mechanism of parameter adjustment in swarm cooperation is revealed via case study, and deliberate proposals are suggested to provide a meaningful exploration in the actual control of unmanned swarm cooperation.

Inter-group selection of strategy promotes cooperation in public goods game

2021 ◽  
pp. 126292
Author(s):  
Jianwei Wang ◽  
Wenshu Xu ◽  
Wei Chen ◽  
Fengyuan Yu ◽  
Jialu He
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Selection ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Selection Of

scholarly journals Bringing tax avoiders to light: moral framing and shaming in a public goods experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Stefanos A. Tsikas
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Social Contagion ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Social Sanctions ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Public Goods Experiment

Abstract With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.

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