scholarly journals From Qualitative to Quantitative Proofs of Security Properties Using First-Order Conditional Logic

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Y. Halpern
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Security Properties

First-order conditional logic for default reasoning revisited

2000 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nir Friedman ◽  
Joseph Y. Halpern ◽  
Daphne Koller
Keyword(s):  
Default Reasoning ◽  
Conditional Logic ◽  
First Order

scholarly journals Attacking and Defending Masked Polynomial Comparison for Lattice-Based Cryptography

2021 ◽  
pp. 334-359
Author(s):  
Shivam Bhasin ◽  
Jan-Pieter D’Anvers ◽  
Daniel Heinz ◽  
Thomas Pöppelmann ◽  
Michiel Van Beirendonck
Keyword(s):  
Information Leakage ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
First Order ◽  
Comparison Operation ◽  
Security Properties ◽  
Channel Information ◽  
Comparison Algorithms ◽  
Lattice Based Cryptography ◽  
Do So

In this work, we are concerned with the hardening of post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) against side-channel attacks, with a focus on the comparison operation required for the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform. We identify critical vulnerabilities in two proposals for masked comparison and successfully attack the masked comparison algorithms from TCHES 2018 and TCHES 2020. To do so, we use first-order side-channel attacks and show that the advertised security properties do not hold. Additionally, we break the higher-order secured masked comparison from TCHES 2020 using a collision attack, which does not require side-channel information. To enable implementers to spot such flaws in the implementation or underlying algorithms, we propose a framework that is designed to test the re-encryption step of the FO transform for information leakage. Our framework relies on a specifically parametrized t-test and would have identified the previously mentioned flaws in the masked comparison. Our framework can be used to test both the comparison itself and the full decapsulation implementation.

scholarly journals Re-Consolidating First-Order Masking Schemes

2020 ◽  
pp. 305-342
Author(s):  
Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi ◽  
Amir Moradi
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Analysis ◽  
First Order ◽  
Cryptographic Algorithms ◽  
Security Properties ◽  
Channel Analysis ◽  
Hardware Platforms

Application of masking, known as the most robust and reliable countermeasure to side-channel analysis attacks, on various cryptographic algorithms has dedicated a lion’s share of research to itself. The difficulty originates from the fact that the overhead of application of such an algorithmic-level countermeasure might not be affordable. This includes the area- and latency overheads and the amount of fresh randomness required to fulfill the resulting design’s security properties. There are already techniques applicable in hardware platforms that consider glitches into account. Among them, classical threshold implementations force the designers to use at least three shares in the underlying masking. The other schemes, which can deal with two shares, often necessitates the use of fresh randomness.Here, in this work, we present a technique allowing us to use two shares to realize the first-order glitch-extended probing secure masked realization of several functions, including the S-box of Midori, PRESENT, PRINCE, and AES ciphers without any fresh randomness.

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