Efficient and flexible matching of recursive types

Author(s):  
J. Palsberg ◽  
Tian Zhao
Keyword(s):  
2005 ◽  
Vol 44 (05) ◽  
pp. 693-696 ◽  
Author(s):  
O. Gefeller ◽  
H. Brenner ◽  
T. Stürmer

Summary Objectives: We recently introduced the concept of flexible matching strategies with varying proportions of a dichotomous matching factor among controls to increase power and efficiency of case-control studies. We now present a method and a computer program to calculate power and relative efficiency compared to an unmatched design varying the proportion of the matching factor in controls over all possible values from 0 to 100 percent. Methods: For all these values, the program calculates the expected variance of the combined Mantel-Haenszel odds ratio and determines the power using the standard error of the expected combined Mantel-Haenszel odds ratio under the null hypothesis as derived from the Mantel-Haenszel test statistic without continuity correction. Results: Thereby, the program allows estimating the optimal prevalence of the matching factor in selected controls for a given scenario which often differs from the prevalence in cases. It furthermore allows to estimate loss in power and efficiency compared to optimal matching by suboptimal matching. Conclusions: Estimations like these are helpful with respect to the decision when to stop efforts to optimize the degree of matching during the recruitment of controls. Our program will strongly facilitate assessing the benefits of flexible matching strategies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (11) ◽  
pp. 4998-5014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorothée Honhon ◽  
Kyle Hyndman

We study how three matching institutions, differing in how relationships are dissolved, affect cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma and how cooperation rates are affected by the presence of a reputation mechanism. Although cooperation is theoretically sustainable under all institutions, we show experimentally that cooperation rates are lowest under random matching, highest under fixed matching, and intermediate in a flexible matching institution, where subjects have the option to dissolve relationships. Our results also suggest important interactions between the matching institution and reputation mechanism. Under both the random matching and flexible matching institutions, both subjective (based on subjects’ ratings) and objective (based on subjects’ actions) reputation mechanisms lead to substantial increases in cooperative behavior. However, under fixed matching, only the subjective reputation mechanism leads to higher cooperation. We argue that these differences are due to different reputation mechanisms being more forgiving of early deviations from cooperation under certain matching institutions, which gives subjects the ability to learn the value of cooperation rather than getting stuck with a bad reputation and, consequently, uncooperative relationships. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.


2015 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 29-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Vanden Berghe ◽  
Gianpaolo Coro ◽  
Nicolas Bailly ◽  
Fabio Fiorellato ◽  
Caselyn Aldemita ◽  
...  

2001 ◽  
Vol 171 (2) ◽  
pp. 364-387 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Palsberg ◽  
Tian Zhao
Keyword(s):  

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